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Summary
This thesis examines the interest rate, market entry and credit decisions which banks are
expected to make following financial liberalization. It uses analytic tools from information
economics and industrial organization theory to consider the policy implications of behaviour
which responds to the constraints of imperfect information. The financial markets of the Carib-
bean Commonwealth supply the stylized facts which inform the analysis.
Chapter 1 introduces the topics treated.
The financial liberalization hypothesis is based on the 1973 works of McKinnon and Shaw.
Chapter 2 describes their characterization of market fundamentals and behaviour in LDCs. It
discusses the descriptions of equilibrium, and the welfare implications of these equilibria, in
models which analyze economies with similar fundamentals.
Chapter 3 derives stylized facts from the descriptions of the economic institutions and
financial systems of the four Caribbean countries whose banking behaviour we model.
Chapter 4 analyzes deposit rate determination by banks in the long-run equilibrium of a
search market. It posits that in long-run equilibrium depositors find it costly to switch banks
because doing so requires that they forego improved service at their current banks. The inelastic
deposit supply which results from these switching costs implies that monopsonistic deposit rates
are a noncooperative equilibrium. It is argued that this facilitates tacit collusion among banks
and that a deposit rate floor is the appropriate policy corrective.
Chapter 5 argues that the enhancement of intermediation service responsible for depositor
switching costs reflects the information banks acquire about customers and their ability to offer
suitably tailored service.
Chapter 6 considers bank entry into a market where established customers of certain value
have switching costs. Entering banks attract new customers of lower expected value. If new
banks are therefore unable to generate sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs, they exit. This
chapter argues that liberal entry policy is not sufficient to ensure competition.
Chapter 7 develops a simple model of bank screening by loan size in one sector of an econ-
omy. It finds a sequential equilibrium in which low-risk borrowers , self-select by the choice of
contracts with a loan size below that they demand at the interest rate for their risk class.
In Chapter 8 the partial equilibrium model of Chapter 7 is embedded in a general equili-
brium framework to demonstrate that the market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient. It
argues that subsidizing the highest interest rates will improve loan allocation while maintaining
the separation induced by private contracts.
Chapter 9 summarizes the main results and conclusions of the thesis.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Financial liberalization has become a major plank of the economic adjustment programmes
implemented in LDCs. It involves the removal of regulatory interventions in the financial sector,
it being presumed that interest rates will then rise to levels which attract domestic savings to the
financial sector, reflect the scarcity of capital and are competitive with the returns on foreign
markets. The resulting expansion in funds available to financial intermediaries, at rates of return
which compensate them for their costs, permits intermediaries to fund the investment projects
which they judge economically viable, that is, finance is deepened. Analyses of financial deepen-
ing commonly focus on the relation between real monetary expansion and investment, using sec-
toral macroeconomic models to examine the results of liberalization. This thesis focuses on
financial intermediary behaviour in economies with imperfect and costly information where
agents are heterogeneous and untrustworthy. Our aim is to investigate three aspects of the post-
liberalization financial intermediation described in the McKinnon and Shaw [1973] analyses.
These are: deposit rate determination, the competitive forces provided by entry into the banking
market, and credit allocation. We will also consider the policy implications of the behaviour
derived in the first and third of these analyses. Observations from four Caribbean Com-
monwealth countries will form the basis of our environmental and institutional background. A
complementary aim is therefore to account for observed outcomes in these economies with the
aid of the hypotheses advanced by economists in the region.
In developing the thesis of financial deepening, McKinnon and Shaw, especially Shaw,
were preoccupied with improving the allocation of resources in economies with segmented mark-
ets, heterogeneous labour and capital, a narrow span of financial assets and forward rates of
interest, and expensive and incomplete information. Their advocacy of financial deepening was
motivated by the role they attributed to the financial system whose richer information enables it
to provide assets which can be traded intertemporally and interregionally, hence establishing
prices which would reflect the relative availabilities of productive factors. This was the source of
their stress on interest rates. Market determination of interest rates would unify segmented capi-
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tal markets whose integration was seen as the key to the integration of the markets for labour and
land. Fmancial regulation interfered with this process. In its absence deposit rates would
increase to reflect scarce capital, competition would be improved by entiy and banks would allo-
cate credit to its best uses. We find, to the contrary, that when customer supply or demand is
influenced by their incomplete knowledge of the market or by private information, collusive
behaviour is sustainable, entry may be frustrated and credit is not allocated according to expected
social return. Carefully directed policy can improve on the liberalized market outcome in our
models, even though banks play the informational and transactional role ascribed to them by
McKinnon and Shaw.
In a sense these results should not have surprised us. The expectation that the decentralized
activity targetted by financial liberalization will produce a Pareto improvement is based on the
welfare properties of the competitive general equilibrium. But, as Shaw can be interpreted as
pointing out, the competitive equilibrium of standard analysis does not feature the heterogeneity,
fragmentation and costly information common to lagging economies, and has no need for money
and financial intermediation. The policy implications of our partial equilibrium models are con-
ditional on their particular specifications. The wider point that public policy can almost always
be Pareto improving in economies with the fundamental features described by McKinnon and
Shaw must be based on more general models of market allocation. Chapter 2 is therefore a
preamble where we look at the efficiency properties McKinnon and Shaw expected in a monet-
ized and intermediated economy. The treatment of technical analysis in this chapter is essentially
intuitive and lacks formal precision. It will suggest that the monetary mechanisms put forward
by McKinnon and Shaw anticipate much of the more recent and formal analysis of markets with
money and intermediaries. However, their work does not analyze the arrangements by which
intermediaries acquire and use information, and hence precludes consideration of the welfare
implications of these arrangements. Since they wrote, industrial organization theory and the
economics of information have provided new insights into decision-making under imperfect
information. It is these that we shall exploit to analyze deregulated behaviour.
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Chapter 3 sketches the economic background and describes the financial sectors of the four
Caribbean countries considered: The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago. It
describes the institutional framework and the observations we wish to explain, encapsulating
these in stylized facts. It will be argued that one of the chief means by which banks acquire
knowledge and enforce the behaviour of their clients is through the duration of relationships. This
process creates an attachment between bank and client. Such attachments have recently been
modelled in the industrial organization literature through the device of switching costs which cap-
tore an inelasticity of demand created by such attachment. Chapters 4 to 6 originate in the switch-
ing Cost idea, extending it in the following directions. We begin by endogeneizing switching
costs in the deposit market. This endogeneization suggests that switching costs arise from a gain
to be made by remaining with a supplier (bank) and such gains are most important in a search
environment where consumers have imperfect information about the product being purchased.
Second, therefore, we will indicate the sources of that gain and describe some empirical represen-
tations of it in the banldng market. The market significance of switching costs lies in the inelasti-
city of demand and sluggish market share which it creates. Other models have analyzed how
these affect potential competition through entry prevention and cooperation between entrant and
incumbents. Thirdly, we investigate a further aspect of potential competition, entry followed by
exit, in markets with these characteristics. Chapters 7 and 8 go on to consider credit markets
with asymmetric information.
Chapter 4 is concerned with explaining collusive deposit rate determination in the banking
market. It will employ a dynamic model of savings, with search for suitable intermediation ser-
vices, to derive the depositor decision. We shall show that a depositor who knows his current
bank and expects improved service from remaining with it must balance that gain against the
attraction of higher deposit rates elsewhere. This tradeoff creates switching costs in the long-run
equilibrium of the banldng market. In a mature market where all depositors have switching costs
we will see that the noncooperative price equilibrium supports tacit price collusion, thus explain-
ing the collusion hypothesis in the Caribbean banking market, as well as providing a possible
explanation of noncompetitive outcomes in other mature markets. We will then show that the
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effects of such tacit collusion can be corrected by interest rate regulation.
Chapter 5 is concerned with informally explaining how and why depositors can be confident
of receiving enhanced service by remaining with their banks. It will be argued that the question
can be viewed as an application of the contract duration reward arrangements most usually
applied to the labour market Their importance in the labour market arises from the asymmetry
of information between employer and employee. But, we will argue, a similar asymmetry exists
between bank and client: a client's prospects ('productivity') are both important to a bank and
private information to the client We will therefore argue that, by analogy with analyses of the
advantages of long-term contracts, relationships between bank and client may be viewed as sub-
ject to an implicit contract. This contract is more easily enforced in the banking context because
the award which rewards client longevity by an expansion in intertemporal trades is also of direct
financial benefit to the bank. Such an implicit contract would explain the bank-customer relation-
ship observed in banking markets. Further, the learning facilitated by, or embodied in, such con-
tracts are an instance of the McKinnon and Shaw view of financial intermediaries as generators
and users of information about relative values.
Chapter 6 will consider entry and exit in a market with the sluggish market shares associ-
ated with switching costs, using the observation of entry in Caribbean economies as its basis. It
will argue that banks with imperfect information about prospective markets may enter them in
search of new business even if aware that successful entry is not assured. We will show that the
fewer the existing firms in such markets, the more likely is entry to succeed because the vested
interests of incumbents encourage higher pricing and it is then easier for the new entrant to cover
his higher costs. With a larger number of incumbents, it becomes more difficult for the entrant to
attract known clients and, if market expansion proves of too little value, exit may be the entrant's
optimal strategy. We interpret this entry-then-exit phenomenon as a search for information,
rational in that the losses represent a cost of information. These results will furnish a further, to
earlier chapters, instance of how switching costs confer benefits on longevity - in this case of sup-
pliers - if analyzed in the context of imperfect information. They also explain similar phenomena
in the history of the Caribbean banking markets.
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Chapter 7 presents a model of bank screening in the credit market which demonstrates how
information-constrained loan allocation diverges from expected social return. Credit rationing
appears to be the only area of information economics and microeconomic theozy that has previ-
ously been applied in the financial deepening context, probably because rationing appears an
indisputable feature of so many LDC financial markets. This seems to contradict our argument
that McKinnon's and Shaw's important insight was their characterisation of the financial system
as an economical means of producing and utilising information, since rationing is symptomatic of
banks' inability to distinguish between their heterogeneous clients. However, a variety of models
which followed those with credit rationing have demonstrated that banks can offer sorting con-
tracts which elicit information. In some of these, the means of sorting, although allowing perfect
discrimination, may be observationally indistinguishable from rationing by loan size; or discrimi-
nation may be imperfect. Chapter 7 will discuss the application of the many models in this area
to positive analysis in LDCs, and will develop a model which illustrates how some members of
certain sectors can be receiving loans smaller than those demanded at the given rate of interest -
although (in fact, because) banks are playing the kind of informational role discussed by McKin-
non and Shaw. In addition to its welfare 'role' this model also employs a more appropriate
equilibrium concept than is usual in screening analyses.
The model of Chapter 7 furnishes specific contract variables which we will use in Chapter 8
to assess the welfare implications of separating contracts in the loan market. Chapter 8 will ini-
tially investigate the policy recommendations which follow from models of rationing. As one
would expect, a number of the models surveyed indicate that interest rate taxes and subsidies are
appropriate. More surprisingly, we will employ an adaptation of the general equilibrium frame-
work developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] to demonstrate that even when banks process
information there remains a role for government subsidization of interest rates. In analyses of
financial liberalization such credit subsidies are usually seen as one of the repressive government
measures which impair financial deepening. This chapter suggests that they may be justified even
when banks are efficiently playing their envisaged informational role.
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Frequently, a thesis contains an introductory chapter which surveys the related literature. A
different approach is adopted here: each chapter provides its own survey of relevant material;
given the topics covered this approach seems to offer a more coherent treatment. Thus, with the
exceptions of Chapters 2 and 3, each chapter discusses the relevant literature and, when neces-
sary, places the subject considered in its Caribbean context before developing the model and dis-
cussing its results and implications.
The overall theme and conclusions of the thesis may be summarized as follows. Profit
maximizing banks need to acquire information about their clients. However, they cannot trust
them to convey the information truthfully when it is to the client's disadvantage, nor can the
banks discriminate between liars and truthtellers. As hypothesized by McKinnon and Shaw,
banks do have arrangements which help compensate for this imperfect information. Experience
of clients is one means by which banks can assess reliability and they can write implicit service
contracts with clients which enable them to acquire that experience. The attachments these con-
tracts create seriously constrain competitive forces. Tacit collusion is facilitated. Further, poten-
tial entrants into the market can be prevented from acquiring a sufficient share of established cus-
tomers to cover their costs. In the credit market banks have further means of acquiring informa-
tion: screening contracts help discriminate among their customers. But these imply that marginal
rates of substitution diverge. While these informational problems are common in financial mark-
ets, they are especially important in LDCs for at least two reasons. First, since banks are often
the only sources of safe financial assets and external finance, neither savers nor borrowers can
choose non-bank forms of screening. Second, growth potential in LDCs is probably greatest in
innovative, non-traditional activities. When banks rely on experience as a source of information,
those sectors are likely to be penalized. In these circumstances, financial liberalization may pro-
duce results not dissimilar from those it is intended to correct: low deposit rates, 'restricted' entry
and rationed credit. Allocations are not in general constrained Pareto efficient. Consequently,
there remains a role for regulatory measures and controls which are carefully adapted to the
decentralized mechanisms which operate in liberalized financial systems.
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Chapter 2: Financial Liberalization Theory from a Neoclassical Perspective
2.1: Introduction
This study will find that, with strategic decision-making under conditions of imperfect
information, three propositions from McKinnon's and Shaw's financial liberalization hypotheses
are not supported. Financial liberalization does not ensure that banks set deposit rates reflecting
the opportunity cost of capital, liberal charter policy is not sufficient for competition-enhancing
entry, and banks' comparative informational advantage does not permit them to allocate credit
efficiently. These results are representative of the positive and welfare properties of the
economies and economic organizations which form the basis of the McKinnon and Shaw ana-
lyses. Our specifications can only illustrate these properties. This chapter is therefore a preamble
to consider the general analyses which derive these properties. Specifically, we discuss the infor-
mational role of prices, equilibrium in economies with incomplete markets and asymmetric infor-
mation, and the money and financial intermediation mechanisms. The discussion will also, we
hope, contribute to an appreciation of what we believe to be the key insight provided by McKin-
non and Shaw: the financial system produces and transmits information which expands trading
possibilities and efficient government policy must allow for this role.
The three propositions we will be examining were derived by McKinnon and Shaw from
their general view that financial intermediaries play a crucial role in resource allocation and that
that role is especially important in LDCs where information is imperfect, agents are heterogene-
ous and markets are incomplete. Intermediaries specialize in the production of information
which allows them to set prices reflecting and signalling opportunity costs. These interest rates
attract savings to banks who can allocate them efficiently as a result of their informational advan-
tage. Removal of repression, where repression includes all governmental measures which tax or
otherwise distort domestic capital markets', is seen as the key to allowing financial intermediaries
to fulfill their role. Government's role should be confined to maintaining noninflationary mone-
mis summaiy description is given by McKinnon [19881
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lary growth and neutral fiscal policy.
We make three main points in this chapter. The first of these is positive. In economies with
the fundamentals described by McKinnon and Shaw - asymmetric information, heterogeneity and
incomplete markets - the Arrow-Debreu (AD) competitive equilibrium (CE) is not the appropriate
equilibrium concept. The second point, also positive, concerns McKinnon's and Shaw's contri-
butions. Recognizing that the processes assumed by neoclassical monetary growth theory models
did not therefore apply to lagging economies, McKinnon and Shaw argued that in such
economies the monetary system and financial intermediation played an irreplaceable role in
transmitting information and completing markets. This assessment previewed both recent
theories of general equilibrium with asymmetric information and money, and models of financial
intermediation. These points would be of historical interest only if it were not for the third point
which is about welfare implications. Given these functions of the monetary system, McKinnon
and Shaw urged that government intervention should be minimized in order to allow financial
intermediation to determine the prices required for information transmission and market comple-
tion. The economic rationale for minimal government intervention is the duality between AD CE
and Pareto efficiency which assures us that in a CE with the AD conditions there is no govern-
ment action which can make everyone better off. But we have already argued that the AD CE is
not the appropriate equilibrium concept in the economies described by McKinnon and Shaw.
That is, the fundamentals they described are inconsistent both with the existence and the Pareto
efficiency of the AD CE. The welfare conclusions of the AD CE cannot therefore be applied in
their economies. The appropriate equilibrium concept in such economies is now generally taken
to be the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or some financial assets CE. However the REE
is not constrained Pareto efficient, and nor in general is any equilibrium with incomplete markets.
That is, a central planner with no more information or markets than given by the CE could effect
asset allocations or tax policies which make everyone better off. The existing structures are not
efficiently used. McKinnon and Shaw's insights with regard to the informational and trade
expansion roles of the monetary system were correct but, even after taking account of financial
mechanisms, agents' marginal rates of substitution are not equated. This indicates that there are
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government policies, in addition to macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution and pub-
lic good provision, that could in theory improve on the allocation of resources.
This brings us to the focus of the thesis. Many of the distortions described by McKinnon
and Shaw, and attnbuted by them to official failure to allow the market system, especially
finance, to fulfill its functions, are implied by the strategic reaction of agents to the fundamentals
they described. That is, in economies with imperfect information, distortions such as price
dispersion, monopoly power etc. would occur in the complete absence of government. Full
liberalization would not therefore bring about an efficient allocation of resources. However,
existing government regulations are almost certainly not those the central planner referred to
above would implement. In effect, the systems before and after liberalization may not be Pareto
comparable2. Liberalization may not bring about the expansion of savings, investment and
employment suggested by the McKinnon-Shaw analysis. The lesson for policy is that liberaliza-
tion is not sufficient. Existing ill-planned government intervention should be removed but poli-
cymakers then have the harder task of looking for appropriate taxes, subsidies and transfers to
correct the distortions inherent in real economic systems.
The original McKinnon-Shaw policy recommendations were therefore incomplete. To
explain why we believe this to be so this chapter describes their hypotheses from a
microeconomic viewpoint and discusses the theoretical literature which rationalizes their views.
Section 2.2 therefore highlights the environmental and behavioural background of their argu-
ments, rather than the macroeconomic interpretation usually stressed. The following sections
organize the discussion around three main themes emerging from our interpretation of their ana-
lyses. Section 2.3 considers the informational role of prices. In the McKinnon-Shaw theories it
is the ability of interest rates to signal information about relative scarcities which permits an
improved allocation of resources following liberalization. Section 2.4 discusses the literature on
equilibrium when markets are incomplete, information is asymmetric and there is money, as in
the McKinnon-Shaw economies. Section 2.5 surveys some of the recent literature which explains
2 This is hard to accept since common sense suggests that the market must be able to improve on the per-
vasive but haphazard government regulations in many LDCs. The statement is therefore very tentative.
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the functions and existence of financial intermediaries.
2.2: Policy Prescription and the McKinnon-Shaw Economies
Preliminaries
It is argued here that McKinnon and Shaw (MS) basically viewed financial intermediation
as a mechanism, that is, as an organizational arrangement (specification of how) by which agents
exchange information and make coordinated economic decisions. As such financial intermedi-
aries help complete markets and thus reduce the effects of uncertainty: by expanding trading
opportunities they permit individuals to insure against future uncertain events. Their determina-
tion of relative prices allows individuals to equate marginal rates of substitution in expectation
terms. Financial intermediaries are able to play this role because they somehow have a compara-
tive advantage in the production of information: one can view them as an analogue to the
informed traders in the Grossman analysis (see Section 2.3 below). The financial system should
therefore be liberalized to do its job, government pursuing only macroeconomic stabilization pol-
icy, public good provision and current budget surpluses on the fiscal front, while maintaining
steady nominal money growth, setting a rediscount rate, ensuring easy entry and providing depo-
sit insurance in the monetary sector3.
In evaluating this proposition we may pose two questions. The first is whether the removal
of existing repressive measures is sufficient to bring about an improvement in Pareto efficiency.
This can only be answered on a country-specific basis since the answer depends on the regula-
tions in place and the results hypothesized to follow their removal. The second is whether, from
a situation where government is confined to the stance described above, there exists, at least in
theory, government interventions which can bring about a Pareto improvement. The answer of
this chapter is affirmative. Chapters 4 and 8 show in a very limited context two possible inter-
ventions. The answer is of current interest. Governments liberalizing their financial markets4
The full package of measures for an unrepressed regime includes trade liberalization, tax-neutral fiscal
policy, devaluation/slow depreciation to a free market exchange rate.
We are of course abstracting from all the other problems that formed expectations and credibility are
likely to create in this situation.
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may not obtain the expected expansion of savings, investment and employment if the underlying
market is subject to basic inefficiencies5.
Our interpretation of McKinnon and Shaw may be questioned. Although these connections
have not previously been made, as far as we are aware, in the LDC policy context, other analysts
argue that market completion in the presence of imperfect information is the basic insight of
McKinnon and Shaw-type financial analysis. For example, Bernanke and Gertler [1987] see
recent financial intermediation theoiy as reviving the Gurley-Shaw view of financial systems and
it is the earlier Gurley-Shaw views which MS extended and applied in LDCs (see the discussion
in Ghatak [1981]). In addition, comparison of MS's work with contemporary analysis of distor-
tion in the capital markets of LDCs highlights their focus on bank behaviour. Myint [1971], for
example, attributed misallocation in capital markets to the financial dualism arising from unequal
access to resources by the modern and traditional sectors; the unequal access itself being due to
underdeveloped economic organization aggravated by government controls. He analyzed empiri-
cal outcomes similar to those addressed by MS: artificially low interest rates, chronic excess
demand for loans and the resulting rationing of credit, and proposed increasing the official rate of
interest in organized capital markets to reflect the shortage of capital funds (Myint, op. cit.,
p.331). Imperfect information, the signalling role of prices and the informational role of financial
intermediaries play no part in his analysis. The following describes the MS hypotheses.
The McKinnon Hypothesis
McKinnon argued that the monetary sector reduced market imperfections due to hetero-
geneity, indivisibilities and imperfect information because money allowed banks to pool savings
for investment and allocate these to high return uses. He therefore described money and capital
as complementary.
Contrasting LDC environments with those featured in monetary growth models and neoc-
lassical economies, McKinnon characterised LDC markets as" fragmented in the sense that firms
5 As we shall see, especially in Chapter 8. the possibility of Pareto4mproving government taxes and
transfers indicates the presence of such inefficiencies.
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and households ... face different effective prices for land, labour, capital and produced commodi-
ties and do not have access to the same technologies" (p.5) 6. He attributes this fragmentation to
three factors: two of these may be described as fundamental or "endemic in the underdeveloped
environment without carefully considered public policy" (p.8), and a third arises from officially
imposed constraints on the price mechanism.
Firstly, investment opportunities are indivisible because improved technologies require
large discrete expenditures relative to individual resources: "without indivisibilities self-financed
capital accumulation ...might well be sufficient for a slow diffusion of new technologies and a
gradual reduction in the dispersion in rates of return within and between various enterprises"
(p.13). Secondly, widespread uncertainty is generated by the heterogeneous information held by
individual agents: "why 'subjective' uncertainty exists among finn-households is easy enough to
see. ... Reliable information on any one contemplated loan or investment may be costly, relative
to its size, for an outsider to obtain" (p.18).
These two fundamental features mean that real money balances and banking assume an
increased importance. Money is risk- and default-free for short term transactions. It can be easily
marketed, as compared to other financial instruments for which creditors require substantial infor-
mation about the repayment capabilities of potential debtors. It is by frustrating the development
of a financial market that the third factor of official intervention operates to maintain fragmenta-
tion.
As a result, capital endowments, productive opportunities and market opportunities for
lending and borrowing are "badly correlated". The prevailing uncertainty prevents those with
(discrete) investment opportunities from borrowing on the external market. They are therefore
dependent on their own endowments. Government reacted to historical finance constraints by cir-
cumventing the domestic capital market through measures such as cheap credit and tariff protec-
tion. Such measures have distorted the allocative role of prices, with the result that the economy
is fragmented: different agents face different prices which therefore fail to reflect/signal the
6 All page numbers in McKinnon and Shaw references refer to their [19731 books unless otherwise staxed.
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opportunity cost of resources.
In order to capture the process by which money and financial intermediation could relax the
indivisibility and informational constraints in the absence of repressive measures, McKinnon dev-
ised a highly stylized model (Chapter 6) of an economy whose small agents are each both saver-
investor and firm-household, confined to self-finance, with their small size implying that invest-
ment expenditure is "lumpy" relative to their resources. They are thus unable to undertake invest-
ments incorporating the most productive technology, and the resulting rates of return on physical
capital are widely dispersed. In order to purchase physical capital other than their own output,
agents must store own inventories for future sale, or accumulate cash balances. Money (where
money is later defined to include both currency and the deposits of the banking system) is an
important instrument of private capital accumulation in the uncertain environment because of its
role as a means of payment and its sanction by the state 7. Agents' willingness to hold it, and
hence its value in this respect, depends on the rate of inflation, the nominal deposit rate and the
'convenience' of holding deposits and currency. The discrete rate of investment means that large
purchasing power is required at the time of investment, so that the desired cash balances-to-
income ratio rises with desired investment. It is in this sense that McKinnon argued that cash
balances and real capital are complementary rather than substitutes as assumed in monetary
growth models of industrialized countries. 8 Money in the lagging economies is a conduit for capi-
tal. It is only as the real deposit rate rises towards the marginal and intra-marginal return on self-
financed investment that money and capital start to compete in the asset portfolio. This requires
that the real return on money must, optimally, be less than the best return on self-financed invest-
ment in some units: if this is so the competing asset effect does not become dominant, discourag-
ing real capital accumulation. Money's real return must also be positive, otherwise agents may
invest in activities (e.g. storage) and goods whose internal rates of return are negative, but which
may act as a store of value alternative to money holding. When there is a high return on cash bal-
These two roles provide additional benefits from money holding and thus reduce its net holding costs re-
lative to those of other instruments.
S Ghatak, OP. cit., provides an apposite description of these models.
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ances (low inflation) money will be accumulated for lump-sum investment.
Once explicit account is taken of financial institutions, the real return on money is optimally
set higher because, rather than having to lie below the rates of return in some firm-households, it
can reflect economy-wide rates of return as banks pool savings more efficiently. Full liberaliza-
tion permits banks to attract savings and channel funds to all investors who can earn a high
return, thus breaking the confines of self-finance. In order to extend credit bank loan officers
must acquire costly information (p.77). It is these costs which, in a repressed economy, prevent
banks from lending to small-scale investors, since regulatoiy ceilings do not allow loan rates to
cover either the "peculiar administrative costs of serving each class of borrower" (p.79) or the
default risks. Banks are thus prevented from competing with traditional lenders in the informal
sector who acquire monopolistic power and charge correspondingly higher and dispersed lending
rates (p.'72).
Rate of interest regulations also constitute a barrier to entry in the financing of the tradi-
tional sector. Their removal would permit competition. Competition does not operate among the
moneylenders because (in addition to legal restrictions) their detailed knowledge of only a narrow
market restricts the scale of their operations, and because they lack the capital base for large-scale
lending (p.78). It is presumed that banks will be able to compete effectively both because their
pooling of savings overcomes capital constraints and because they have a comparative advantage
in information acquisition.
The Shaw Hypothesis
Shaw's description of the lagging economy placed greater explicit stress on the informa-
tional role of prices and the place of banks (financial intermediaries) in implementing the market.
Liberalization would "substitute a pricing mechanism and decentralized judgement" for the
"rationing mechanism of repressed finance" (Shaw, p.133).
Shaw's description of the LDC environment, his debt-intermediation view (Dlv), was set
up to contrast with what he described as the wealth view (WV) of money and finance. Both
views are macroeconomic but the underlying micro environment more or less explicit in his
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analysis is as follows. The WV model exhibits many of the features expected in a Wairasian
economy: trade is costless, there is perfect foresight and no uncertainty, agents and goods are
homogeneous, commodities are divisible, information is costless and markets are complete.
Shaw stresses that this model is inappropriate for the analysis of LDCs and that its use is at least
partly responsible for government inflationary and repressive policies because, to put it briefly,
WV ignores the role of money and finance (see, for example, p.1 02). The DIV is the antithesis of
WV. Segmented markets, dispersed prices, heterogeneous and indivisible capital mean that
savers and investors assess risks differently (p.50) and prices do not reflect social valuations.
Extension of the monetary system and financial intermediation play a crucial role in compensat-
ing for these 'imperfections'. The financial system's services are an intermediate input into the
production processes of others and could thus act to push out production possibility frontiers and
extend markets (p.107). These services are attainable by encouraging the holding of money and
deposits through decreases in expected inflation and a positive real deposit rate. Higher money
balances would save resources in the search and bargain process (p.56), and permit prices to
resume their function of clearing excess demands in interrelated markets (p.126), allowing the
financial system to insure borrower and lender risks by providing a market where they can trade
(p.127). The financial system has the ability to do this because it "presumably has clearer expec-
tations and access to richer stores of information and can supply loan insurance" (p.1 28). Interest
rates determined by banks would reflect intertemporal and spatial opportunity costs more accu-
rately, discriminating between investment opportunities. Savers who lack the information to
evaluate risky securities can delegate this task to the banks and spending units' ability to borrow
would diminish the risk they face.
Finance uses real resources in allocating savings and facilitating money's role as a means of
payment. The learning process is expensive (p.124). Differentials between loan and deposit rates
must compensate the financial intermediaries for these costs. Unlike McKinnon, Shaw did not
associate specialized information with monopoly power the curb market's high rates reflect the
risks associated with the illegality of their activities (p.89). With financial deepening it would
become profitable for intermediaries to enter the market and "market forces t' would push banks to
-16-
compete in the allocation of funds. Like McKinnon he viewed the absence of constraints as
sufficient to stimulate competitive behaviour (pp.78-79).
Summary
There are differences in the analyses of McKinnon and Shaw. For example, McKinnon
viewed money and capital as complementary because of indivisible technology and poor access
to external finance. In Shaw money and capital remained substitutes but money's services joined
capital in the economy's production function. It is their common features we stress. Both
described economies with imperfect costly information, heterogeneous agents and goods and
incomplete markets. Repression prevents the monetary system from fulifiling its pricing function
so that prices are dispersed and do not reflect social costs, resources are misallocated and growth
impeded.
Despite the role assigned to money and finance neither McKinnon nor Shaw investigate pre-
cisely how banks acquire information and make their pricing decisions, nor how they are able to
pool savings efficiently. Behaviour and mechanisms are all summarized under market forces -
which may be impeded by failure to compete but this is ensured by freedom of entry - and infor-
mation transmission by prices. The superiority of market pricing is implied by the fundamental
welfare theorems. However, the fundamentals and monetary arrangements which MS analyzed
are not consistent with those in the economy of the welfare theorems. The processes they postu-
lated are in part explained by analysis of the informational role of prices, and the role of money
and financial institutions in the environmental conditions they described are derived in general
equilibrium models with sequential trades (money) and in models of financial intermediation.
But if we adopt these models we can no longer assume that official intervention is always
inefficient. To indicate why this is so, the next three sections attempt to show how recent models
can explain the general market mechanisms postulated by MS. The correspondence between
these analyses and those of MS is obviously inexact. None of them for example take account of
indivisible technology nor treat the case of large agents9.
That is, individual agents who are sufficiently large relative to the market to affect aggregates.
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23: The Informational Role of Prices
We have argued above that the MS financial deepening argument rests on the informational
role of freely determined interest rates. This reflects a widely-held view of the competitive price
system discussed by Hayek [1945] but only rigorously examined by Grossman in the context of
futures markets and stock markets in [1976] and [1977]. In the Arrow-Debreu (AD) economy
with complete markets and state-dependent contingent contracts, prices have no role in transmit-
ting and aggregating information (they do act to make actions consistent), since the uncertainly is
aggregate: information is symmetric between agents. Informative prices require the use of
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) prices where agents know the relation between prices
and the stochastic determinants of output and use this information to make their decisions.
In order to capture the notion of the competitive price system as an economical mechanism
for information transmission, Grossman found it necessary to replace Wairasian equilibrium
(WE) prices by REE prices. In WE not only do agents ignore the information contained in
prices 10, but observation of Wairasian market-clearing prices gives agents who make inferences
from prices an incentive to recontract at WE prices, making it an inappropriate equilibrium
concept (see Grossman [1981]).
Prices transmit information among insignificantly small agents if some invest in informa-
tion collection; their information is reflected in their trades which influence price, transmitting the
information to others (Grossman [1977]). Current price also aggregates information when agents
have invested in different information since this information is reflected in their individual
demands (Grossman [1976]). This transmission and aggregation is justified as the long run static
equilibrium of a trading process: after repetition traders learn the joint distribution of the current
price and the random future price. They are then able to condition their beliefs about future price
on the current price and markets only clear at the current price which reflects all information, the
REE price.
10 Given the WE price an agent determining his trades looks only at his own preferences and budget con-
straint.
11 Sophisticated traders learn that price provides information, on observing the equilibrium price therefore
they will update their beliefs and wish to recontract.
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The paradoxical nature of this equilibrium has been pointed out by Grossman, op.cit., and
Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. Once agents learn that the current price reflects all information
(the REE is fully revealing), if investment in information is costly they have no incentive to
acquire their own information since all necessary information can be costlessly learnt from obser-
vation of the current price. Since each agent considers his trading insignificant relative to the
market, each will withdraw from information acquisition and the market price conveys no infor-
mation. This paradox is most usually resolved by the assumption that prices are only partially
revealing. This occurs if the current price is also affected by "noise", e.g. current supply or
demand is also affected by random factors, so that all information cannot be inferred from the
current price. More generally, as long as the number of relative prices is less than the number of
random variables which affect agents' payoffs, REE prices will be partially revealing.
Partially revealing prices create incentives for market formation that could explain the pro-
cess by which financial intermediaries generate new trades following MS liberalization. If there
is noise in current prices so that informed and uninformed agents have different expectations of
future prices, there are incentives for trade between the informed and the uninformed. There is
therefore a tendency for markets to develop endogenously until the gains to be made from the
difference in information between the informed and the uninformed are just sufficient to provide
the necessary incentive for costly information collection (see Grossman and Stiglit.z [1980]).
If we place financial intermediaries in the role of informed traders, the removal of restric-
tions on interest rates can be viewed as allowing a return to arbitrage sufficient to provide inter-
mediaries with the incentive to acquire information and trade on that basis with the uninformed
isolated agents in MS's framework. Financial intermediaries learn that capital investment will
command a high return (or the uses in which that high return is available) and therefore bid on the
current market for savings. The higher deposit rate informs all traders that capital held in the form
of money will command a higher future return so that they economize on its current use. Price
would be bid up until the marginal cost of capital to an intermediary is just equated to the gain
from better information.
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However, in the MS framework something else is required to complete the stoiy of
endogenous development. Although small individual traders leani from price that real money has
a high future return, capital indivisibility means that they are unable to amass sufficient capital (in
the form of savings) to realize that return. Only financial intermediaries who are "large" relative
to other traders will have the ability to utilize the information by pooling the savings of the small
units, and such agents are explicitly excluded in REE models.
Even assuming negligibly small agents, REE does not have the prescriptive properties of
the AD competitive equilibrium (CE). Under incomplete information Pareto efficiency must take
account both of the information which an individual has at the point in time when welfare is
measured, and of truth-telling constraints. A particular market arrangement may not be imple-
mentable if it depends on private information the individual does not wish to reveal (see
Holmstrom and Myerson [1983]). Viewing the REE as an arrangement to extract private infor-
mation, Laffont [1985] has explored its welfare properties. We restrict our attention to the empir-
ically appealing case of partially revealing REE. Laffont shows that partially revealing REE are
not generally Pareto efficient among incentive compatible mechanisms' 2 in even the weakest
sense of the term. (Ex post Pareto efficiency when all information is public knowledge so that no
insurance opportunities exist). The reason for this is similar to that described by Grossman:
because prices are not fully revealing, the private acquisition of information has a positive exter-
nality on the degree of information conveyed by price. Thus the social value of information
exceeds the private value and by subsidizing or taxing information acquisition, public interven-
tion may internalize the externality.
REE prices may thus explain how non-regulated interest rates transmit and aggregate infor-
marion, and it may be just because interest rates only reveal partial information that financial
intermediaries have an incentive to collect information and expand trades. However, REE are not
constrained Pareto efficient. Further, REE can only provide a veiy limited guide to the MS pro-
cess because it is only sensible when agents are small.
12 In these second best situations, one asks whether the equilibrium is Pareto efficient among existing pos-
sibilities.
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2.4: General equilibrium of an uncertain world with Incomplete markets, asymmetric
Information and money
Preliminaries
We may describe the lagging economies in the MS analyses as subject to significant non-
convexities in production, asymmetric information and a shortage of markets in which individu-
als can shed risk. Neither McKinnon nor Shaw viewed these features as solely the result of
government intervention, for example Shaw argued that "in the WV regime with perfect mobility,
price flexibility, foresight and competition, a financial system serves no purpose" (p.78) and that
intervention was only one reason for segmented markets (p.125). However, intervention
prevented the emergence of more viable processes. If interventions are removed banks' informa-
tion collection and actions can act to inform the price system, allowing prices to transfer and
aggregate information so that they signal relative scarcities. Their operations permit trading
opportunities to be established and relative prices determined where none had existed before, that
is, they help to complete markets. In order to examine the policy implications of this prediction of
the liberalization hypothesis, we must move to a general equilibrium context which takes account
of market interaction and the influence of expanded markets. The AD economy is the only logi-
cal link we have between decentralized economic activity and efficiency. MS may therefore be
interpreted as suggesting that the more closely approximated are the complete prices and markets
of the AD mechanism, the nearer will an economy move to AD efficiency properties. Indeed,
Shaw (p.47) says that "The classic conclusions of the WV (can be called upon) to explain the
advantages of the shift in development strategy from repression to liberalization".
In the following we examine the welfare implications of extending the general equilibrium
model to incorporate the features described in MS. Extensions have served mainly to incorporate
more 'realistic' informational features, and to allow for incomplete markets (prices are not deter-
mined for every finely defined commodity), so that there is a rationale for active markets at every
date. In these applications the REE has replaced the AD equilibrium concept Money is con-
sidered next. The prices MS focussed on were rates of return on money holding, but the neoclas-
sical model which is the rationale for liberalization not only does not include money but makes
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money redundant It is not a coincidence that allowance for observed institutional features pro-
vides a role for money in the general equilibrium system. This is almost the insight of MS: when
economies do not conform to the idealization of the AD world, money becomes important. The
irony is that one at the same time loses the clear prescriptive insights of AD.
Incomplete markets with asymmetric information
The AD model deals with uncertainty by making veiy fine distinctions among "commodi-
ties": the same physical good is a different commodity according to its location and date of avai-
lability or use, and the state of the world in which it is made available or used (the well-known
state-contingent commodity). The price ratios between each of these finely defined commodities
are determined in the single 'marketplace' which takes place at the beginning of the economic
system. Agents, taking these pricei as given, are therefore not subject to uncertainty about the
present value of producer plans or about consumer budget constraints. Producers are unaffected
by uncertainty or risk because all possible inputs and outputs of the production system have a
firm price. Given their probability distributions over possible states of nature and their risk atti-
tudes, consumers' buying and selling of the dated state-contingent commodities serve an
insurance function.13
This seems the key to one idea behind Shaw's view of financial intermediaries. Complete
markets remove risk by providing prices over events/dates; liberalized financial intermediaries
also remove part of the risk borne by producers by making price judgements on the basis of better
information (Shaw [1973], p.127). However, the MS environment and information structure can-
not be accommodated in the AD model. The AD model does not allow for the differential infor-
mation 14 among agents which MS stressed as a crucial component of the risk faced by agents in
LDCs. Radner (see [1982a]) has extended the AD model to allow for differential information
among agents. If the feasible plans of the agents with incomplete information are restricted to
those in the full information set (i.e. in the set of plans available if an agent had full information)
13 Complete asset markets at the initial period and spot markets thereafter serve the same purpose.
In fact, the AD equilibrium requires that at the opening market agents have common forecasts of equili-
brium spot prices in the future for eveiy event.
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which are compatible with the given information, existence and efficiency of the extended model,
relative to the given information structure, can be shown. In addition to the usual convexity and
continuity assumptions, three conditions must hold for this result (Radner [1982b]): the informa-
tion available to an agent must be independent of his or any other agent's actions, there must be
no moral hazard, and agents must not use equilibrium prices to make inferences about other
agents' behaviour. Price-taking agents, complete markets, and a single pre-history determination
of prices continue to be assumed. Thus, while allowing for asymmetric information, most of the
features associated with its existence are excluded in order for the extended AD model (Radner's
[1982a] terminology) to give AD-type results. It is also evident that the extension can be of no
use in justifying the MS arguments because its existence and efficiency proofs depend on the
absence of those features which they stressed, namely, bank acquisition and use of information
with resource expenditure, and the use of prices to signal information about capital scarcity.
The single opening of markets in the AD framework has its explanation in the presence of
complete markets and no transactions costs since there is no advantage to be gained by re-
opening markets. The institutional features in MS have no place in the framework. If all prices
are determined and accounts are settled at the beginning of time, agents have no need to econom-
ize on "search and bargain" by holding money, nor would money be held as a store of value.
Consumers who know their net present values need not hold shares so no stock market would
exist. In addition, while the extended AD provided a means of dealing with asymmetric informa-
tion it could do so only by restricting their feasible plans.
In order to incorporate these real financial features and provide a more satisfactory charac-
terisation of asymmetric information' 5, general equilibrium theory has adopted an approach
which looks for REE in a sequence of incomplete markets. With agents using equilibrium prices
to make inferences about the environment, an REE16 is a set of current prices, common price
15 The recognition of asymmetric information is sufficient to necessitate a sequence of markets (Arrow
and Hahn [1971]). When commodity availability or use depends on the state of nature and a market partici-
pant is aware that some traders have information which he lacks, he will be unwilling to enter into condition-
al contracts. Future prices which depend on the information will be treated like a random variable. As a
result it becomes appropriate to consider markets as opening in sequence as information becomes available.
Similarly, the individual may invest in securities to insure against future uncertainties.
16 Which originated in Radner [1972] and Lucas [1972]
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expectations and consistent plans such that, given current prices and price expectations, each
agent's plan is optimal for him, given his sequence of budget constraints. The sequence
economies with incomplete markets is about as far as formal neoclassical theory has gone in
allowing for the type of environment and conditions in which liberalization is to be effected. The
incomplete nature of the theory is indicated by the difficulties encountered in proving RE equili-
brium'7. Allen ([1986], p.20) stresses that "the existence problem for rational expectations
equilibrium is definitely still not fully solved in a satisfactory manner". Allen summarizes and
discusses some of the existence (and non-) results. It is sufficient here to give the flavour of the
latter by citing the result from Hart's [1975] exchange economy example of nonexistence: intui-
tively, equilibrium failed to exist because incomplete markets produce noncontinuity in budget
constraints and hence demand functions (correspondences) so that the usual fixed point tech-
niques could not be used.
Existence problems imply the tentative nature of results but the welfare analyses of REE in
incomplete markets produce two points relevant to a prescriptive assessment of a liberalized sys-
tem. Hart [1975] showed firstly that REE are not generally optimal in economies where the
market structure is incomplete and secondly that, unless all other markets are available, the open-
ing of an additional market need not produce a Pareto improvement. For the first demonstration
it is not general but constrained Pareto efficiency (PEy) that is sought. One asks whether the REE
allocation reached is PE relative to allocations that can be achieved through the existing set of
incomplete markets. Hart gave an example where a Pareto-dominated equilibrium may be the
only one attainable 18 because the move to a Pareto superior allocation would require a change in
prices and expectations which could only occur through trade. However, that trade is not possible
because markets are incomplete (in Hart's three-period model there is no borrowing and lending
17 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986], and others, have obtained existence in 'financial securities
competitive equilibria'.
18 This result has since been rigorously extended. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis showed that, generi-
cally, equilibria of pure exchange economies with incomplete markets are not constrained PE Later work
(with others) confirms this result when production is incorporated. Quinzii [1988] provides an intuitive cx-
planaxion. Imprecisely, the planner has an advantage over the market because he realizes that a relative price
change will affect welfare since marginal rates of substitution are not equated in incomplete markets. And by
marginal changes in allocations and production decisions, the planner can change relative prices.
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and no futures market). The equilibrium reached then depends on the prices at which the econ-
omy starts: there is insufficient trade to provide the 'market forces' which would lead the econ-
omy to a PE allocation in the existing set of markets. This could be the MS argument the equili-
brium achieved in the repressed economy is inefficient because the repression of prices does not
permit market forces to reach the growth-promoting allocation. MS therefore postulate that
expanding borrowing and lending possibilities through financial intermediation can improve
efficiency.
The second point made by Hart disputes (refutes?) this conclusion by considering the intro-
duction of a new security in the incomplete market structure at the first date and finding that its
introduction in fact makes everyone worse off. If utility from consumption is not constant across
dates, the time at which trade takes place becomes important (recall that Hart is analyzing an
exchange economy). In Hart's example the additional market implies that price-taking consu-
mers will trade at its opening until all gains from trade are eliminated, without recognizing the
interdependence of gains from trade at different periods. Utilities from consumption in later
periods are sufficiently reduced relative to the situation without the additional market to make all
consumers worse off.
Although it may be stretching credibility to attempt to apply this very specific abstract
result to an empirical situation, we can attempt to relate it to an argument put forward by Carib-
bean economists when urged to raise deposit rates in order to provide banks with liquidity for the
finance of real investment. The argument says that "there is no necessary correspondence
between real and financial saving" (Worrell [1984], p.60) - an increase in financial saving may be
translated into loans for consumption rather than investment purposes. In terms of the theory and
MS's framework, one can recast the argument as follows. In a repressed regime encouragement
of the deposit market is equivalent to adding a market - providing consumers with an additional
security (deposits) in which they can trade. But individual consumers do not perceive their future
consumption possibilities from general investment (the connection between earlier and later
trades), and given the opportunity to trade they will exhaust the gains from trade at later periods:
current financial saving is borrowed for later consumption (say at date 2), rather than invested in
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real assets at date 2 for consumption of the return at date 3. And banks are concerned only with
their individual profits, not with lending to improve investment. As Hart points out, an economy
with incomplete markets is in a second best position. Only if all markets are opened can an
overall improvement be expected. (In our incredible example venture capital opportunities may
be a possibility). 	 -
As emphasized before, these sequence economy models are significantly different from the
MS characterization in their assumption that agents' information structures are exogenously
fixed. This is an unattractive assumption from the 'reality' viewpoint but it has not been relaxed
because in general the technology of the acquisition and use of information does not satisfy the
assumptions required for theorems proving existence and efficiency. Both McKinnon and Shaw
stressed that acquiring and using information involved the expenditure of resources. Similarly,
Radner [1982a] notes that a production plan which requires more information must include
increased inputs. Radner and Stiglitz [1984] show that there is a fixed set-up cost to information
acquisition which introduces a non-convexity into the production possibility set. As usual this
implies that there is a discontinuity in the demand for information ,hence the difficulty with stan-
dard existence and optimality proofs. Radner and Stiglitz note that in areas where information is
important specialization may therefore be common. Radner ([1982a], p.974) also points Out that
a producer may have different information structures available, each with a production set, his
total production set being the union of the different sets, and that union may not be convex.
These results pose a further problem for a neoclassical rationale for liberalization. As already
pointed out, MS posit an economy with nonconvex production possibilities but appear to believe
that these can be mitigated by information-gathering banks. However, the Radner-Stiglitz
theorem implies that the solution is itself likely to introduce further nonconvexities.
Introducing Money
So far we have considered the implications of introducing incomplete differential informa-
tion and incomplete markets into the standard neoclassical GE model. These are both features of
the MS environment. In MS freely operating financial markets are seen as the corrective for
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resulting imperfections. Here we look at the explicit consideration of money and ask whether a
more rigorous treatment of GE in a monetary economy supports their intuition. We conclude that
it does in important positive respects, though not from a policy perspective.
Two features of the AD model preclude a role for money (see Ostroy [1989]): the complete-
ness of the markets and the single budgetary constraint of its agents. Since markets are complete,
the equilibrium which coordinates the actions of all agents is completed at the first date and
markets need never re-open, although actual delivery and production may take place sequentially
over time. There is obviously no need to maintain a store of value or medium of exchange (or
any other financial assets/Institutions) since complete (and implicitly binding) agreement has
been reached on the precise commodities to be exchanged over all time and in all eventualities.
Suppose markets were not complete, but re-opened every period for trade (i.e. there are a
sequence of markets). As long as agents satisfy only a single multipenod budget constraint so
that trades in any period need not balance, an asset with no intrinsic value would still have no
place. Agents would be concerned only with equalising their overall inputs and outputs and, with
rational expectations, they know that these will be consistent. With a sequence of single period
constraints, however, the need to meet a budget constraint each period would frustrate some
trades so adding money would be like completing markets.
Gale [1982] views money's role as based on even more fundamental features of the AD
market. An AD equilibrium can be reached at date zero only because when trades are made
agents have sufficient trust in each other to be confident that the arranged deliveries will take
place (or there is some implicit enforcer operating). In reality of course, individuals are not that
trustworthy. Specifically, in the final period of the market game, the individual who has previ-
ously received, and now has to make a delivery, has an incentive to retain the agreed commodity.
A sequence of budget constraints can act to ensure sequential delivery since it requires balanced
trades every period: there is, so to speak, a check on agents' contributions. But this requires that
agents borrow and lend between periods and have some means of transferring wealth between
markets. Certain trade patterns could not be accomplished if budgets had to be balanced at every
date. Bonds could not serve the purpose of storing wealth because they require trust in the issuer.
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Money would facilitate trade because its use could act as a guarantor of forward delivery if, as in
Gale's example (op. cit., p.239), agents were issued with flat money which had to be returned to
the issuer at the end of the economy, but could be freely exchanged among agents in the interim.
The agent making the forward delivery would have to fulfil his contract in order to retrieve the
money he had previously paid for commodities received. However, money can only serve this
purpose because the arrangement is enforceable by the fiat money issuer. And if this power of
enforcement exists, it could also be used to enforce commodity deliveries. But in the latter case
the number of contracts the authority would have to monitor and enforce would be very great.
When treated as if it had a unifonn value and used to balance budgets, money acts as a store of
information because it allows the issuer to keep track of what agents have obtained from the
economy. The use of money is therefore less costly than the monitoring required in its absence:
money has the advantage of being a decentralized method of facilitating trade. As such, Gale
characterises the monetary arrangement (which includes both the positive value attached to a
paper asset of no intrinsic value and the enforcement power) as a social institution which acts to
complete markets, that is, permit more trades.
Gale shows that when there is a complete set of paper assets (one for each state of nature)
the equilibrium of the monetary economy is in the sequential core. But if the set of paper assets
is incomplete (and this requirement is as unattainable as that of complete markets for securities),
the equilibrium allocation is almost always Pareto inefficient and as a result the sequential core is
normally empty. With incomplete assets agents have different marginal rates of substitution
between consumption in different states, giving coalitions an incentive to form to change the allo-
cation.
Incomplete markets are constrained Pareto inefficient. Money helps complete markets but
unless there is complete money the equilibrium is not PE: we already knew that adding markets
does not necessarily make everyone better off. We go on to consider whether financial intermedi-
aries help.
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23: Financial Intermediation Megthnicms
Gale's account of the role of money dealt only with fiat money: government is required to
enforce the tax payments which act as a decentralized guarantor of future delivery. However,
outside money is dominated by inside money in most monetary systems, and the financial liberal-
ization argument is primarily concerned with the benefits to be gained from intermediation. It is
the actions of financial intermediaries, rather than money per Se, which act to convey informa-
lion. In this section we describe some of the literature which derives financial intermediaries and
their contracts as endogenous market responses to private information in markets where produc-
ers must obtain outside financing. In all of these, as in MS, the raison d'etre of the financial
intermediary lies in some form of scale economies which serve to make it the least cost means of
overcoming the agency problem resulting from differential information.
These models provide formal justification of MS's insights but they also show that, while
financial intermediation is the least cost means of providing additional markets in a situation with
asymmetric information, it results in agency conflicts of its own whose resolution may require an
exogenous mechanism. That is, the equilibrium with the financial intermediary mechanism may
be constrained Pareto inefficient. However, the behaviour described by these models also make it
clear that the conventions, contracts and processes observed in financial intermediation can be
viewed as facilitating exchange and production in an incentive-consistent fashion. 111-conceived
official intervention may interfere with these mechanisms.
The earliest of these information-based treatments of financial institutions, Leland and Pyle
[1977], recognize, like MS, that financial markets are particularly afflicted by problems of asym-
metric information and are unlikely to allocate finance efficiently unless information is reliably
conveyed. Unlike MS, they also recognized that asymmetric information about project returns
could produce adverse selection problems. Information flows are improved if specialized finan-
cial intermediaries emerge to exploit economies of scale in the collection and sale of information.
Leland and Pyle did not settle the next question regarding the quality of the financial
intermediary's information. Further, the question of how financial intermediaries obtain informa-
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lion is not addressed.
Diamond [1984] shows how incentive compatible contracts can answer both these require-
ments. His analysis proceeds by addressing the levels at which asymmetric information becomes
a problem. When the realized outcome of a project with a random return is private information to
a borrower the standard debt contract (fixed repayment, bankruptcy penalty when insolvent, with
lender keeping the residual) is the optimal arrangement between a borrower and lender. A fixed
repayment (independent of the realized state) removes the incentive to misrepresent a favourable
state of nature. The bankruptcy penalty and principal-take-all clause ensures that the borrower
will only declare insolvency if this is in fact the case (i.e. there is a deterrent in the shape of a cost
of declaring insolvency). However, this optimal contract is costly because it entails a positive
probability of bankruptcy. This could be avoided by monitoring project realization, but the
privacy of project realization implies that each security holder (lender) would have to monitor,
resulting in effort duplication or a free-rider problem. The solution is to delegate the monitoring
to a single agent: this in turn generates an agency problem which can be solved by a standard debt
contract between the delegators and the monitor (depositors and bank). The financial intermedi-
ary mechanism works here because its net costs are lower. Although provision of the correct
incentives for delegated monitoring is still accomplished through a costly bankruptcy threat (a
nonpecuniary cost borne by the borrower with positive probability), if the intermediary contracts
with many firms with independent, identically distributed (i.i.d) risks, the probability of bearing
the bankruptcy costs because of a single firm's failure tends to zero. Average delegated monitor-
ing costs decline with numbers monitored so that financial intermediation works because these
economies of scale compensate for the costs of incentive provision.
Diamond (and Leland and Pyle) thus give operational content to the MS view of the infor-
mational role of financial intermediaries. The intermediary is the least cost method of information
production because with diversified assets it is able to collect and monitor information in an
incentive compatible (reliable) manner. Leland and Pyle assumed economies of scale in informa-
tion collection: some such assumption must be made to explain why it is advantageous for agents
to trade via intermediaries rather than directly. But if the viability of financial institutions
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depends on their size, we should expect them to behave strategically.
Gale and Hellwig [1985] 19 also demonstrate that the standard debt contract is the optimal
contract between borrower and lender when there is ex post asymmetric information (project out-
come is private information of the borrower). Intermediary observation of project return which
occurs when repayment is not possible is interpreted as bankruptcy which imposes a nonpecuni-
ary cost on the borrower. Avoidance of this cost produces credit rationing: the optimal contract
keeps investment below its first best level (that under perfect information) because with diminish-
ing returns to investment, lower investment increases profits and reduces the probability of ban-
kruptcy. Again we have a situation of asymmetric information corrected by a contract whose
incentive compatibility requirements prevent a first best outcome.
Several models based on Diamond and Dybvig [1983] have considered the demand deposit
contract separately, concentrating on the financial intermediary as asset transformer and hence
insurer rather than information collector and monitor. By providing liquidity, banks are able to
insure agents who learn their preferred consumption profile privately. But, because the deposit
contract provides liquidity by enabling banks to supply deposits at a pace that is out of step with
production, there is an equilibrium where all depositors try to withdraw early, resulting in a panic
run on the bank. Either a suspension of convertibility or deposit insurance could stifle the panic,
by assuring would-be withdrawers that funds will be available. Later models using the Diamond
and Dybvig framework derive runs from basic bank characteristics such as depositors' limited
information about banks' assets. Bank runs are undesirable because the intertemporal allocation
of investment resources is suboptimal (production is interrupted) when depositors withdraw early.
We see again that the bank arrangement for services (here insurance) may be improved upon by a
planner.
One analysis without this result is that of Williamson [1988] where bank 'failures' are only
associated with particular states of nature, the allocation remains optimal and there is no role for
19 See also Williamson [1986]
20 See, for example Postlewaite and Vives [1987], Jacklin and Bhauachaiya [1988]
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government intervention. Williamson's failures 21 do not have the 'flavour' we would normally
associate with bankruptcy in financial institutions: rather than being an otherwise undesirable
response to adverse circumstances, they occur by ex ante agreement among members of banking
coalitions in states of the world in which capital market trades are preferable to complex banking
structures. It may be more fruitful to view Williamson's bank and no-bank equilibria as delineat-
ing the conditions (given his model) under which banking coalitions are optimal mechanisms
(when assets are illiquid because of asymmetric information).
The role of deposit insurance as a means of avoiding bank runs, as well as the incentive
problems it creates, are well-recognized in the liberalization literature (see Shaw [1973], pp.64-
66 and The World Bank [1989], p.76). The models sketched above provide a formal description
of quite widespread notions. They also show that in averting runs deposit insurance may actually
be Pareto improving. It is because private incentives on the market create externalities (in the
Diamond and Dybvig model early withdrawers do not take account of the social costs of des-
troyed risk sharing and interrupted production) that interventions such as deposit insurance may
have a role. This externality feature is not recognized outside of the formal literature. The 1989
World Development Report suggests that
'by providing implicit and explicit deposit guarantees, governments ... have
suppressed the market forces that otherwise would have eliminated or reorganized
unprofitable firms and allocated the associated losses.' (p.'19)
In this view runs are appropriate discipline rather than the costly result of random disturbances,
and their possible costs are not set against the expected costs of insurance.
As more 'realistic' assumptions about the distribution of information are added on to the
Diamond-Dybvig model, reserve requirements also acquire an explanation in terms of the inter-
nalizing of an externality. Simplifying their analysis, Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] showed that.,
although banks may have an incentive to create an interbank market in which they may share
liquidity risks, if their investment and the proportion of early withdrawers is not publicly observ-
21 Williamson addresses this issue himself, though not entirely satisfactorily, through appeal to stylized
facts of bank failure.
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able, individual banks will reduce their investment in liquid assets and rely on the interbank
market. Hidden action creates a free rider problem. A legal reserve requirement on which the
full rate of interest is not paid, together with a discount window at a subsidized rate of interest,
solves the second-best risk sharing problem: the financial intermediaries who learn that they are
subject to a larger proportion of withdrawals can take advantage of the arrangement.
It should be pointed out that there are more general models concerned with the endogenous
derivation of financial intennediaries which find less of a role for government intervention. Thus
Boyd and Prescott [1986] show that financial intermediaries are a constrained Pareto efficient
mechanism in an economy where investment opportunities are ex ante private information, a
signal of which can be acquired at a cost Individual endowments are insufficient to both under-
take investment and evaluate investment projects. Agents with 'bad' and 'good' projects self-
select for coalition membership or project evaluation and the resulting core equilibrium is sup-
ported by coalitions which must be large in order to ensure available financing for the good pro-
jects. Again we have the size requirement for intermediaries - here the possibility of monopoly
power is avoided by the formal framework: the economy and each intermediary have a countable
infinity of member agents.
2.6: Conclusion
We have approached this discussion as if liberalization would start from a clean slate, that
is, as if considering an economy with incomplete markets, uncertainty and asymmetric informa-
tion in which money and financial intermediaries are incorporated at the start of history and
where there is no government intervention (except in so far as this is implied by the introduction
of money). In reality, liberalization would usually follow a long history of regulation: institutions
and expectations will have formed. In practice, therefore, all the results above would need to be
reinterpreted in the context of the particular economy and era in which reforms are introduced.
Neoclassical theory indicates only that we cannot expect constrained Pareto efficiency in a
liberalized regime, given the environment which it has been argued necessitates liberalization, It
is conceivable that unadulterated deregulation in a given economy would produce a situation
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which could be described as a Pareto improvement
However, many of the imperfections MS attributed to repression could just as readily be
explained by the environments of asymmetric information, indivisibiities etc. as we show in the
following chapters. Price dispersion is consistent with an unregulated market where information
is èostly since the cost of acquiring information reduces the net benefit of searching for the lowest
price (see Stiglitz [1977] and Salop and Suglilz [ 1982]). Market power can result from imperfect
information and search costs (see Chapter 4); credit rationing may be explained by decentralized
banks dealing with asymmetric information (see Chapter 7); entry may be frustrated or impeded
by imperfect information (see Chapter 6). This makes policy prescription difficult.
Unfortunately the focus on high interest rates has masked most of the more subtle argu-
ments underlying the MS recommendations. It omits the crucial informational issue and leaves
policy makers with the not unjustified perception that high rates of interest serve only to give free
rein in exploiting oligopolistic advantages. As one Caribbean central bank governor has argued
(Blackman [1985], p.35):
'In developed countries the market mechanism can be relied upon to allocate
resources in a satisfactory manner in the vast majority of cases. In developing coun-
tries the existence of monopoly, oligopoly or other market rigidities will frequently
cause the market to operate in a perverse manner. It does not help to behave as if
markets are efficient when in fact they are not. For example, there are only eight com-
mercial banks in my country, seven of which are foreign banks and hold 81% of bank-
ing deposits. They cannot be left to fix interest rates among themselves.'
In its stress on prudential regulation of the banking system, the 1989 World Developmem Report
recognizes the need to supplement deregulation because of the asymmetric information between
depositors and banks, in the case where the bank is agent and the depositor principal. But, given
the other sources of asymmetric information in the financial sector, we show that the tax/subsidy
measures a central planner could usefully effect go beyond purely prudential controls on financial
intermediaries.
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Chapter 3: Financial Markets in the Caribbean Commonwealth: Four Examples
3.1: Introduction
This chapter describes key features of the financial markets and regulatory environment of
the four Caribbean Commonwealth countries which provide the empirical framework of our
analysis 1 : The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago2.
Observations in Caribbean financial markets suggest several distortions. To take those on
which we will be focussing: interest rates are low and inflexible compared to rates on alternative
foreign markets, although the economies are small and open, and most have no explicit interest
rate controls. Potential borrowers, especially those of small scale in non-traditional activities,
complain of loan rationing. There have been several unsuccessful attempts at entry by financial
firms. Conventional analyses of LDC financial markets in the McKinnon-Shaw tradition suggest
that these outcomes result from regulation. Caribbean analysts offer explanations based on bank
behaviour. They view low and inflexible rates as the result of monopoly power. Intermediary
credit allocation is seen as reflecting bank familiarity with particular sectors, rather than rates of
return. The failure of potential competition is seen as symptomatic of the entrenched position of
long-established banks. The models in the following chapters will examine the outcomes
expected from liberalizing financial markets with typical LDC characteristics - poor information
systems and small numbers in the modern sector 3
 - using these hypotheses, suitably interpreted,
as our starting point.
The financial systems we will describe reflect the effects of interest rate regulations, credit
policies etc. The liberalization process would involve removal of these measures. We will there-
fore be conducting a counterfactual conceptual experiment. In order to do so we specify two sets
of 'stylized facts'. The first set describes the 'institutional' framework; the second the
This choice is dictated by the availability of descriptive material. Other countries of the Com-
monwealth Caribbean are expected to have veiy similar systems. The information available even for these
four countries is not uniform and therefore the bases used for comparison will only be approximately compar-
able.
2 Trinidad and Tobago is one state of two islands.
3 Of course, small numbers are an inherent feature of Caribbean economies.
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behavioural observations we wish to account for. These are described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4,
respectively. Section 3.2 outlines relevant characteristics of the four economies. Summary
descriptive data on the economies and their financial sectors is given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
3.2: Notes on the Individual economies and their financial sectors
The four economies are all highly dependent on foreign transactions, principally in the form
of invisibles, although petroleum has been an exception in Trinidad and Tobago. The banking
habit is widespread, with all four having a money to GDP ratio of about 40% (see Table 3.2).
The unusual feature common to their financial sectors is the predominance of multinational
banks. Specific features of each economy are described below.
The Bahamas
The financial sector in the Bahamas differs from those in other islands because of the
country's status as a tax haven and major offshore financial centre. Financial institutions locate
there to take advantage of tax measures and administrative arrangements, as well as to service
clients benefiting from these. Finance and tourism are the most important productive sectors.
However, limits on convertibility and exchange controls continue to insulate the domestic portion
of the banking sector from the external market. Our concern is with domestic operations. Finan-
cial organizations with both resident and authorised dealer status carry out Bahamian dollar
business and foreign exchange dealings (the latter may include offshore business) but tend to
view their domestic and external operations separately (Ramsaran [1984]). The two operations
would be connected by foreign currency loans made to residents and by external transactions
between local institutions.
In 1978 there were ten resident commercial banks; six of these being branches 6 of
Resident banks are those with a licence to carry on Bahamian dollar business i.e,they are resident for
balance of payments and exchange control purposes.
Authorised dealer status is normally accorded to banks when countries operate exchange controls. It al-
lows the banks to hold gold and foreign exchange and to carry on the foreign exchange transactions necessaiy
for the usual trade and travel purposes. Capital and financial transactions would normally require explicit
exchange control permission.
6 Branch banks have no legal status separate from that of the multinational parent bank, they have no as-
sets and liabilities of their own, though separate accounts are maintained for internal accounting purposes. A
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multinationals, three subsidiaries, and one a consortium subsidiary. However, several of these
banks are essentially concerned with external business rather than domestic intermediation: at the
end of 1978, 96% of Bahamian dollar loans and 98% of deposits originated in the seven clearing
banks. With 52 offices maintained by the clearing banks, population per bank office was 4,500
in 1979. Banks are subject to a cash reserve requirement and liquid assets ratio on Bahamian
dollar deposits. In 1978 no liquid asset ratio was in effect but holdings of assets which would
have qualified amounted to almost 30% of Bahamian dollar deposits (Ramsaran [op.cit.], p.87).
Other financial institutions include insurance companies, finance companies (which take deposits
to on-lend for mortgage or consumer installment credit), trust companies (which principally pro-
vide trustee, company management services etc.), the Post Office Savings Bank and the People's
Penny Savings Bank. These last two are negligible in size (in 1978) compared to the others.
Barbados
Barbados is also an offshore financial centre but the enabling legislation is very recent and
it lacks the tax haven advantage of the Bahamas. Consequently the activities of resident and non-
resident branches of the same multinational are clearly demarcated: resident branches do not con-
duct offshore business. Major areas of economic activity are tourism and manufacturing, with the
sugar industry remaining a relatively important source of net foreign exchange. There are seven
commercial banks. Five are branches of multinational banks, one is government-owned, and the
other is locally-incorporated and owned by a regional insurance company. Commercial banks are
required to hold a portion of their deposits in cash as well as in stipulated government securities.
In 1986 the cash reserve requirement was 8%, and stipulated government securities 22%, of depo-
sit liabilities. Although this requirement is substantial, the banking system as a whole has held
very substantial excess reserves ever since the requirement came into effect. During 1985, for
example, excess securities averaged almost 30% of requirements. Selective credit controls have
been in effect since 1977. These place limits on commercial bank credit to the distribution and
personal sectors, with certain housing-related credit exempted. Consumer installment credit is
subsidiary is a legal entity distinct from the parent bank.
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also restricted with exemptions applying to commercially-related purchases e.g. for taxis. Both
minimum (for deposits) and maximum interest rates have in the past been fixed by the authorities.
Other financial institutions include insurance companies, trust companies (which were esta-
blished by the commercial banks to handle their mortgage finance and trust business), finance
companies (which take deposits to fund consumer instalment credit) and credit unions. In 1983
deposits at the latter represented only about one percent of deposits at commercial banks. There
is also a government-owned mortgage finance company.
Belize
Belize's economy is agriculture-based; sugar, bananas and citrus fruit are the main crops.
Almost 50% of the population live outside the urbanised districts. There are four commercial
banks, three of which are branches of multinational banks while the fourth, although 50% locally
owned, is an affiliate of an American multinational and has its head office located in Honduras.
Banks are subject to a 20% (of deposit liabilities) liquid asset ratio, and a 5% reserve require-
ment. Selective credit controls have been used to reduce credit to the distribution sector. There
were 16 bank offices in 1983, with only one of the 6 districts not having a commercial bank
office; the average number of customers per office was 9,085. In addition to insurance companies
and a government savings bank, the financial sector includes cooperatives and credit unions.
Among the countries considered, Belize is the only one that appears to have an unorganized
money market worth mentioning (Luben [1983]).
Trinidad and Tobago
The economy of Trinidad and Tobago was transformed by the oil boom of the 1 970s. The
resulting increase in income and wealth has contributed to an expansion of financial institutions.
More recently, decreased petroleum earnings may have contributed to the problems encountered
by some of these institutions. Finance companies, whose portfolios grew substantially during the
boom period, concentrated on credit for the purchase of particular commodity categories (Bourne
[1982]) and declining incomes adversely affect both their deposit inflow and the viability of such
loans. There are seven commercial banks, two of which are locally owned (one is state-owned).
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The others are subsidiaries of multinationals as a result of a government requirement, since 1970,
that foreign-owned banks have 51% percent local equity participation. At the end of 1982, banks
were subject to an effective cash reserve requirement of 16.1%; they must also hold secondary
reserve cash assets (5% of deposits in 1982) at the central bank. Selective credit guidelines have
also been used to restrict personal sector credit In 1982 there were 112 bank offices, with aver-
age population of 10,077 per bank office. In addition to the finance houses, there are insurance
companies, building societies, and credit unions. Trinidad and Tobago is the only Com-
monwealth Caribbean country, apart from Jamaica, which has a stock exchange. In 1981 there
were eight registered stockbrokers, but no secondary market for corporate securities (Bourne,
op.cit.).
3.3: Stylized facts about institutional structure
In the small very open economies of the Caribbean, where domestic financial institutions
are predominantly foreign-owned, and export-oriented service industries like tourism and interna-
tional finance are the major sources of value added, one would expect domestic banks to be both
price- and quality-takers. On the other hand, our partial equilibrium models are formulated on
the premise that domestic banks fix their prices, quantities, contracts and service independently.
This apparent anomaly is explained by the regulatory and institutional structure of the economies;
a structure which we describe by two stylized facts:
1. Domestic financial sectors are insulated from international financial markets by exchange
controls and nonconvertible foreign currencies;
2. Whatever the ownership structure of the domestic banks, price, quantity and quality dcci-
sions are taken by locally-based bank management to maximize domestic profits.
1. Insulation from foreign financial markets
Exchange control regulations tend to insulate the financial sector from foreign markets. In
general, financial institutions cannot lend to non-residents and do not compete (legally) with
foreign banks for domestic deposits. Residents can only borrow or invest abroad with exchange
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control permission which is given only after consideration of each specific case. The non-
convertibility of regional currencies obviously reinforces the insulating effect, although, in at
least the Bahamas and Barbados, the relatively widespread availability of US dollars, through the
tourist industry, does mean that residents have access to foreign currency outside legal channels.
In the Bahamas, US currency circulates with the domestic currency. However, it has been
estimated that the aggregate value of circulating US dollars represents less than 5% of the value
of local currency at any time (Ramsaran [op. cit.] p.1 15). In Barbados, the proportion is prob-
ably negligible. The question of interest in this regard is whether savers purchase US dollars
domestically to invest abroad, and do so in sufficient quantities to influence banks' behaviour. In
Barbados, the transactions costs and legal risks of accumulating sufficient foreign currency would
suggest that this can be answered in the negative. In the Bahamas although an affirmative
answer is more likely, two factors should be taken into account. First, residents (mainly foreign
exchange earners) are allowed to hold foreign currency deposits, under certain conditions, for
current transactions. At the end of 1978, such deposits were 8.2% of total Bahamian dollar depo-
sits. Second, these depositors, given the structure of the economy, are probably those most likely
to consider foreign investment but, since they already have foreign deposits, they would have less
incentive to attempt black-market-type dealings. About half of such deposits are held in
interest-bearing accounts, and not only would this permit the depositors to obtain returns compar-
able to those on external markets, it would also permit the banks to segment the deposit market,
avoiding competitive pressure on local deposits. Support for such segmentation is found in the
deposit rate: in 1978, the average fixed deposit rate in the Bahamas moved in the range 5.06-
6.79%, while US 6-month CD rates moved between 7.23-10.76%. Ramsaran [1984] also observes
that authorised dealers in the Bahamas have often ignored the restrictions imposed on their use of
foreign currency to finance local operations, but competition in this domain did not appear
sufficient to induce loan rates adjustment in line with foreign rates: the Bahamas prime rate
remained at 9.5% between 1974 and 1978, in a period when the US prime rate moved succes-
sively, as follows: 7.26%, 6.35%, 7.75%, 11.55% (end of year rates for 1975 to 1978). An even
more striking lack of response of local rates to international rates is evident in 1980 to 1982: the
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average deposit rate in the Bahamas never rose above 7.58% while the average US 6-month CD
rate was over 12% for most of the period. The prime rate, which banks would be expected to
raise, remained at 11% for the entire period while US prime rates reached record levels - over
16% throughout 1981. The experience of the Bahamas in this respect is interesting because there
are no explicit interest rate regulations there, and the inertia of their interest rates is what would
be expected in a collusive arrangement. 	 -
Misaligned exchange rates provide an incentive for savers to hold funds abroad. For small
misalignments, the net benefits of holding foreign funds (reduction of the potential loss from
domestic devaluation less the transactions cost of illegally purchasing and repatriating foreign
funds) are probably not sufficiently great to destroy the markets' segmentation. Large misalign-
ments inhibit banks' ability to compete with foreign markets since attempting to do so would
require interest rates high enough to compensate depositors for the insecurity of holding domestic
funds. However, there is little evidence of misalignment in the Caribbean, except for a brief
period in Trinidad7. Even illegal trade in foreign currency takes place at the official rate.
2. Local Decision-making
With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, where 51% local ownership of
commercial banks is a legal requirement, banks in the Commonwealth Caribbean are mainly
wholly-owned branches of multinational commercial banks. Most have regional offices located
in the region (for example, in Bridgetown, Nassau, or Miami) which cover several islands. Gen-
era! policy (such as sectoral emphases in the loan portfolio) is set by regional head office which
also has to approve very large loans, but other decisions are taken locally, within guidelines set
by the head office. Specifically, price and quality decisions are taken by the senior local bank
manager.
In Trinidad (and Jamaica) it can be assumed that the subsidiaries continue to make strategic
decisions on a basis similar to that of the branch banks, since the management remains part of the
' Guyana and Jamaica are the notable exceptions to this claim. The economic disarray in these countries
during the seventies and eighties would have so altered agents' perception of structure that vesy specific
models would be required to investigate liberalization's effects.
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multinational personnel structure. In Trinidad and Tobago, local equity is very diversified so
that owners are unlikely to marshall sufficient votes to exercise control over decisions. While
the National Insurance Board holds 10% of equity, it is itself controlled by a triumvirate of
government, trade unions and private business. Thus the subsidiaries' strategy variables and
decisions are unlikely to differ significantly from those of multinational branches. Of Jamaica,
Baum ([1974] p.15) said:
"The result of Jamaicanization has been only a passing of theoretical equity participa-
tion. The bank as an international institution remains in control; the management
exercises control and is paid for the job it does. The shareholders have an interest in
the profits but are not in an effective position to substitute their collective judgement
for that of the bank's management."
Furthermore, even the government-owned commercial banks in the region continue to behave
very similarly to the multinational branches.
We then have a decision structure where locally-based management is taking decisions on
the basis of 'guidelines' set by multinational head offices. Or the management of domestic banks
are taking decisions on the basis of guidelines set by their local board of directors. In either case
we assume that the goal is profit maximization. What would be the force of the guidelines?
Historically, the guideline set for interest rates was the London Bank rate (McClean [1975]), at a
time when a currency board system operated and local currency was tied to sterling. Not
surprisingly, in view of the date of British Competition and Credit Control, this appears to have
come to an end in 1971. Subsequently, with increasing U.S. and regional influences (a Caribbean
common market was formed, for example), profit maximization required that greater attention be
paid to domestic conditions, and head offices now rely on the judgement of locally-based
management, so guidelines appear to leave wide discretion to such managers. We can therefore
assume the strategic interaction of the banks with regard to all decisions (with the exception of
entry) to be local interaction within the environment of the individual economies.
Banks have been subject to a considerable degree of regulatory control since the advent of
central banks or monetary authorities. In addition to the standard reserve requirements, selective
credit controls limit their choice over loan portfolios. But, with the exception of Barbados, the
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authorities have in general allowed the banks to determine their own interest rates. In Barbados
banks' interest rates are largely determined by usury laws and central bank regulations, or are
subject to central bank approval. However, the size and resources of the banks relative to the
local economies, and their crucial role in those economies, does mean that central banks have to
take account of the commercial banks' interests (a point made by Bourne [1984]). Commercial
banks continue to represent a source of foreign exchange (foreign loans to local companies would
normally be negotiated via local branches) and represent financial expertise not available locally.
Although managers may be nationals, they tend to be experienced employees of the multinational
bank and many would presumably leave with the exit of the multinational. Generally speaking,
there is no domestic financial intermediary which could substitute. Thus, central bank regula-
tion is not likely to constrain bank behaviour beyond some point the banks themselves find
acceptable. This point remains relevant to the situation without controls.
3.4: Stylized facts about behaviour
The introduction indicated that Caribbean analysts have deduced certain characteristics and
expectations from their observations of and experience in these markets. Our analyses demon-
strate that the behaviour they inferred is consistent with strategic behaviour under imperfect
information. These inferences may be summarized by the following:
3. Commercial banks dominate and are the price leaders in the financial sector, with few sub-
stitutes for either savers or borrowers.
4. Banks' allocation and contract decisions are strongly influenced by the knowledge of cer-
tam customers and sectors developed over a long period of acquaintanceship.
5. Commercial banks operate an informal cartel.
3. Commercial banks as the dominant institutions
This stylized fact both describes the market structure we sometimes assume, and may be
explained by our consideration of entry. In the pricing and credit models (Chapters 4 and 7) it
limits the players we consider to those who can be described as banks. However, the entry model,
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by showing how potential entrants may be induced to leave the market, provides an explanation
of the continuing restricted number of competitors on the financial markets. As is typical in
LDCs, commercial banks dominate the financial sectors. Central banks appear to be the only
institutions with sufficient market (coercive) power to provide effective competitive pressure but,
not only are their motives bureaucratic, but their need to take account of the banks' interests limit
their freedom of action.
Consider the alternatives for savers. There are stock exchanges in Trinidad and Tobago and
Jamaica, but the limited flow of shares and high transactions costs reduce their role as a source of
assets for savers. In addition to commercial banks, financial savers have access to life insurance
companies, finance companies, trust companies and credit unions. The last of these are
significant only in Belize, about half of whose population is rural. Commercial banks held 88%
of deposits at Belizean institutions for which data is available (see Luben [1983], Tables 2, 7 and
13). In the Bahamas, commercial banks held 80% of deposits in 1978, while finance companies
(who are at the long end of the financial market, like British building societies before the recent
financial changes in the U.K.) held 19% 8, In Barbados, commercial banks had an 86.7% share of
total deposit liabilities at deposit-taking institutions 9 while trust companies' share was 12% (trust
companies play a role similar to finance companies in the Bahamas, but are largely owned by
commercial banks). In Trinidad 42% of the household and unincorporated enterprise (HIE)
sector's financial assets were held at commercial banks in 1978 and 13.8% at insurance com-
panies'0.
For borrowers, the picture is rather similar. In the Bahamas commercial banks owned
(1978) 66.7% of financial sector assets, while finance companies held 17.9%. For Barbados
The deposit-taking institutions included in this comparison are: commercial banks, finance companies,
the Post Office Savings Bank, the People's Penny Savings Bank and trust companies. Ramsaran, op.cit.,
Tables 2.22, 4.3, 4.4.4.15, 4.13.
The deposit-taking institutions are commercial banks, trust companies and finance companies; inter-
institutional deposits have been netted out to avoid double-counting.
10 These shares are obtained from flow-of-funds data (Bourne [1982]) and while they appear to indicate a
more equal distribution of private sector assets, it should be noted that they are more comprehensive than the
data given for the other countries and are therefore not directly comparable. Trinidad is the only one of the
countries to prepare flow-of-funds accounts.
Ramsaran, op.cit., Table 3.16
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commercial bank loans represented 70.6% of credit extended by major financial institutions in
1983. The trust companies (11.4% of total credit), were the major lenders after commercial
banks (and are in any case owned by the banks), and insurance companies (7.9%) were an impor-
tant source of long-term residential mortgages. In Belize commercial banks owned 77.5% of
assets of major financial institutions in 1981 (Luben, op.cit., Table 21). Despite their stock
market, commercial banks have been the main source of finance for the corporate sector in Trini-
dad, providing 30.9% of their finance in 1978. Commercial banks held just over 50% of house-
hold liabilities.
It seems clear that there are no good substitutes for commercial banks on the side of either
the saver or the borrower. Finance and trust companies variously confine their credit to consumer
installment or mortgage loans, and for depositors the former can be disproportionately risky.
Credit unions require membership. Financial savings with insurance companies are illiquid and
their lending (to policy holders) is for mortgages.
4. Bank-customer relations
Caribbean analysts have commented on a link between knowledge, longevity and customer
relations (service), especially in the credit context (see also Chapter 7.3). Loan patterns are
viewed as having evolved from sugar industry funding and import dependence. Major favoured
firms remain concentrated in the retail and wholesale trades, although some of these have
diversified into manufacturing. Thus, we have Bourne [1984] commenting:
"Information costs are the core of loan appraisal costs... (and) will differ sectorally
according to the sectoral distribution of prior knowledge and required knowledge."
while Worrell [1985] remarks that:
"The working capital finance for which firms seek bank loans is provided on the basis
of knowledge of the firm and its operations, and local bank managers are the reposi-
tories of this information."
Statistical evidence for these associations is not publicly available in the Caribbean but their
existence is supported by bank examiners who have detailed confidential knowledge of banks'
portfolios. Indeed, four out of seven banks, answering the Central Bank of Barbados' request for
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information on their loan and interest rate policy, attached first priority to the characteristics of, or
their knowledge and experience of, the individual or company management. This was the only
factor common to all the respondent banks.
In addition, the Bank of Nova Scotia's orientation towards consumer credit 12 forced the
other banks to compete in this area, a tendency fuelled by rising incomes and close communica-
tions with North America. As a result of this, and presumably of its low risk features, banks
throughout the region have tended to concentrate a considerable portion of their loan portfolio in
personal sector credit.
A relationship resulting from knowledge acquired over a long time period also has effects
on banks' deposit policy. Banks in Belize are seen by Barnett [1982] as attaching undue impor-
tance to the sectors with which they are well-acquainted, to the point where
"... the banks appear to be competing with each other for existing customers rather
than attempting to attract new deposits into the system."
In this context, we may emphasize that interest rates in Belize are not subject to controls. In Bar-
bados banks provide credit facility cover for old customers who take deposits on an informal
basis although this directly reduces banks' own revenue since such firms thus avoid bank borrow-
ing. This is a traditional practice arising out of sugar industry trade links, so that the depositors
tend to be firms or individuals with commercial or personal links to the companies13.
5. Collusion
Advocates of liberalization have recognized that banks in LDCs are unlikely to act like per-
feet competitors. Shaw ([1973], pp.88,123) attributes this to restrictions imposed on entry by the
authorities (charter policy), as well as to the effects of administered interest rates. Galbis
([ 1 979], p.41) acknowledges that oligopolistic behaviour will not result in efficiently set rates.
12 the Caribbean as in North America, the Bank of Nova Scotia wants to cariy the image of the friend
to 'the man in the street'. It wants to do this through its highly developed consumer loan program, the Scotia
Plan." (Baum [1974], p.77)
13 Given this specialized market and the risks attached to such deposits, these firms would be ineffective
competitors with the banks, though their interest rates tend to be one or two percentage points higher. In
1983 their deposits were 6.7% of total deposits at commercial banks and 50% of Dust company deposits.
Without detailed information on these finns, it would be double-counting to include such deposits in
economy-wide deposits since when not used internally they are held at commercial banks.
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With small numbers, oligopolistic behaviour appears indisputable: rational observation on the
part of the members of an industry where four firms produce 75% of the output and purchase 75%
of the input, 14 would lead them to take account of each other in their actions. Since entry is not
exogenously restricted in the Caribbean (see Chapter 6), and we are interested in bank behaviour
in the absence of controls, the issue is whether there is some more subtle form of regulation that
encourages collusion, or whether tacit collusion' 5 is feasible. The well-known difficulties of
enforcement make explicit collusion an unsatisfactory explanation. In Chapter 4 we show that, in
a search environment with switching costs, a priori noncooperative behaviour can give rise to
effective collusion. Caribbean economists have generally assumed that their banks do act col-
lusively (see Barnett [1982], p.150; Bourne, [1984], p.33; Worrell [1985], p.62) on the basis of
both historical and current observation.
There is historical evidence that banks in the sterling area collaborated in deciding the
appropriate response of local rates to movements in the London Bank Rate. Evidence given to
the Radcliffe Committee in 1957 by a group of banks describes the process as follows:
"The normal procedure in the case of currencies firmly linked to sterling is for the
local banks to confer among themselves as to the effect the Bank Rate change has on
the local structure of money rates."6
At this time, the Commonwealth Caribbean was part of the Sterling Area and banks in the region
had their head offices, or held their foreign working balances, in London. Collusive behaviour is
not surprising in the context of the British banking system's own behaviour: until 1971 British
clearing banks operated a cartel for interest rate fixing. It was only the increasing competition
from foreign banks and official insistence (Competition and Credit Control) that ended the rate-
fixing cartel (Goodhart [1984]). It can be noted that, while the Canadian Act regulating the
domestic and foreign activities of banks prohibits any agreement between banks to fix rates of
interest, it specifically exempts deposits or loans made or payable outside Canada from the prohi-
Four-firm concentration ratio for loans and deposits, Barbados, 1986
By this we mean collusion which is individually rational for the participants.
16 Radcliffe Committee, Principal Memoranda of Evidence, Vol.2, pp.64-65. Quoted in Ramsaran,
op.cjt., p.125
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bition (Baum, op.cit., p.3!).
Current observation indicates that collusive behaviour continues in the Caribbean. Banks
meet to fix fees, for example; as is evidenced by bank inspectors' observation of the simultaneous
imposition of similar fees at all banks, although fees are not immediately observable to banks or
customers. In fact, in the Bahamas, the clearing banks' agreement to fix loan and deposit rates
appears to be explicit. The prime rate
"is fixed after discussions among the clearing banks have taken place and the Central
Bank has given their approvaL Other banks then tend to fix their own rates in some
relationship to the Prime figure operated by the clearing banks." 17
Since the clearing banks control over 95% of both deposits and loans (in 1978) this agreement
effectively determines the market rates. Given this empirical evidence, inference of bank collu-
sion appears well-founded and theoretical support is given by the model of Chapter 4.
3.5: Concluding remarks
In the following chapters we use the stylized facts about institutional structure as the back-
ground to models of strategic bank behaviour in stochastic environments and/or those with infor-
marion differentiated between bank and client. The behavioural 'facts' describe our initial
assumptions about bank actions and concerns and motivate our priors about outcomes. We show
that, given the assumption that banks have special knowledge of, or acquire information about
particular clients, and that their general information is limited, market outcomes are not those
financial liberalization theory would lead us to expect
17 Ramsaran, op.cit., p.141, fooinote 81
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Table 3.1
Basic Indicators
Population 1987('000)	 240	 254	 176	 1,200
Pop'n Growth Rate	 1.55	 0.03	 2.3	 0.7
Life Expectancy (yrs.) 	 70	 75	 67	 70
Area ('000 sq. km.)	 14	 .43	 23	 5
GNPp. cap. 1987 ($US)
	 10,280	 5,350	 1,240	 4,210
GNP growth 1965-87 (ay. % p.a.)	 0.9	 2.4	 1.9	 1.3
Average inflation (% p.a.)
	
1965-80	 6.4	 11.2	 7.4	 14.0
	
1980-87	 6.3	 6.1	 1.1	 6.2
No. of bank offices	 52	 49	 16	 112
Pop'n per bank office
	 4,500	 5,102	 9,085	 10,077
Sectoral contribs. to GDP (%)
Aver. 1 980-84
Agriculture	 4	 6.8	 21.8	 3.0
Industrial Activity
Total	 11	 14.0	 11.8	 37.4
Manufacturing	 n.y	 10.6	 10.2	 8.8
Construction	 2	 6.4	 5.4	 14.6
Wholesale & Retail Trade 	 23	 28.4	 15.2	 12.2
Transp. & Communic. 	 10	 6.4	 7.0	 9.6
Gov't& Services	 n.y	 12.4	 11.4	 12.2
NOTES:
Sources: World Bank [1989] World DevelopmentReport, Oxford University Press United Nations [1988] National Accounts Statis-
tics: Analysts of Main Aggregates. 1985. United Nations Publications
* Except for The Bahamas for which only 1978 data was available.
n.y denotes not available
In the Sectoral Contributions to GDP Agriculture includes agriculture, hunting, fotesny and fishing; Industrial Activity includes min-
ing and quanying, electricity, gas and waler, in addition to manufacturing; Wholesale and Retail Trade includes distributive trades,
restaurants and hotels; Government and Services inchxles finance, insurance, real estate and business services, community, social and
personal services.
BAHAMAS: Bank office data from 1979; Source: Ramsaran [1984].
BARBADOS: Bank office data from 1984; Source: Ccniral Bank of Barbados
BEUZE: Bank office data from 1983; Source: Luben [1983]
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Bank office data from 1982; Source: Bournc [1984]
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Table 3.2
Monetary & International Transartions: A Snapshot Comparison, 1982'
Ratios to GDP at Current Prices
Bahsma.c Barbados Belize Trinidad
Monera,y Survey
Net Foreign Assets 	 1.3	 0.2	 -9.1	 41.7
Dotn. Credit to Gov't (net)
	 7.0	 8.4	 20.6	 -19.8
Doin. Credit to Priv. Sector	 33.3	 38.1	 31.6	 33.8
Quasi-Money	 27.2	 29.6	 28.5	 27.6
Tot. Monetary Liabilities
	 38.2	 42.2	 42.1	 42.1
Other Financial Instits.
Net Foreign Assets
	 6.4	 ...	 ...	 0.3
Claims on Gov't
	 0.4	 -	 ...	 0.8
Claims on Priv, Sector	 9.8	 6.4	 .,.	 14.5
Deposits	 9.6	 4.4	 ...	 9.7
Liquid Liabilities	 47.3	 46.6	 ...	 51.4
International
Exports, fob	 169.2	 26.0	 50.7	 42.0
Sugar exports	 -	 3.1	 18.0	 0.3
Citrus exports	 -	 -	 5.3	 -
Petroleum exports 	 -	 -	 -	 36.6
Imports, cif	 211.7	 55.7	 ...	 50.5
Current Acct. Balance	 -4.4	 -1.8	 -4.1	 -4.7
Current GDP, 1982' ($US mu.)	 1449	 990	 193	 7907
Sources: IMF, Interno4onal Financial Statistics, 1987 Yearbook; United Nations (19881 National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of
Main Aggregates, 1985, United Nations Publications
'Data for Bdlize is for 1984; ... denotes not available; - not applicable or negligible
The Monetary Suniey consolidates the accounts of the monetary authorities and deposit money banks, measuring money creation.
- Net Foreign Assets are the sum of foreign assets less the sum of foreign liabilities of the title institutions.
- Domestic Credit to Government is the sum of claims on government less the sum of government deposits of the title institutions.
- Quasi-Money are the time, savings and foreign currency deposits of residents with the monetary authorities and deposit money
banks. Total Monetary Liabilities are the sum of quasi-money, currency outside banks and private sector demand deposits, i.e. M2
Other Financial Instimtlo,sr include institutions such as savings and mortgage loan institutions, post office savings, development
banks, building and loan associations and life insurance companies. Their deposits are time and savings deposits unless otherwise
noted in country notes.
Liquid Liabilities consolidate total monetary liabilities and deposits at other financial institutions, eliminating intra-sectional items. It
is a broader measure of M3.
BAHAMAS: Commercial bank data (included in the monetary survey) relate to accounts of the authorized dealers which are permitted
to deal in gold and all foreign currencies. Other financial institutions consolidates the accounts of licensed banks and trust companies
permined to undertake domestic business, other than commercial banks. Their deposits include foreign currency deposits.
BARBADOS: Other financial institutions are the trust companies.
BEIJZE: Belize's data is for 1984. No data on other financial institutions is available.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Monetary Survey domestic credit to the private sector is the total for local government, business and indivi-
duals. Other financial institutions consolidates the accounts of banking institutions and life insurance companies.
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Chapter 4: Deposit Rate Determination
4.1: Introduction
Since the 1973 publication of Shaw's and McKinnon's books, analyses of finance in LDCs
have stressed the role commercial banks' deposits play in mobilising savings. These analyses
argue that, unless constrained by regulation, competitive commercial banks are led by available
loan opportunities to set deposit rates at the high levels which reflect the opportunity cost of capi-
tal in poor economies. This claim has been extensively modelled and tested at a macroeconomic
level, the emphasis being on the interest elasticity of aggregate savings. However, commercial
bank deposit rate determination in the face of financial savings behaviour has not been analyzed.
This chapter aims to do so.
The chapter makes four points. First, we show that when depositors value the intermediary
services provided by banks, and both bank and depositor have private information, there are util-
ity gains to the depositor of remaining with a bank. That is, the depositor has switching costs.
This implies a reduction in deposit supply elasticity, which encourages tacit price collusion by
banks. The resulting monopsonistic deposit rate can frustrate savings mobilisation following
liberalization and makes deposit rate regulation an appropriate policy.
Second, the modelling device of switching costs has facilitated a growing number of ana-
lyses which examine repeated, stable relationships between buyer and seller. All of these models
impose the switching cost exogenously. We derive switching costs endogenously as a tradeoff
between service quality and the interest rate resulting from relationship-specific quality enhance-
ment in, the long-run of a market where customers must search for quality. On this basis, we
draw a distinction between switching costs and transactions costs, arguing that it is because the
former entail ex post matching that they can be an important source of monopoly power. The dis-
tinction is of general interest because it can indicate markets in which price competition is less
likely.
Third, we believe that switching costs can provide an explanation of the durable bank-
customer relationship much discussed in the banking firm literature.
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Fourth, the model provides a rationale for the collusive behaviour Caribbean economists
have argued characterizes their banking sectors. Such behaviour seems at odds with the instability
of cartel arrangements, but we show that there are conditions under which collusion is non-
cooperatively sustainable.
The chapter is structured as follows. Pricing games are usually able to consider markets for
distinct goods. The substitutability between domestic bank deposits and other financial assets
could raise doubts about the validity of a similar approach in the financial context. Section 4.2
describes the institutional features which justify this treatment. Similarly, the usual analysis of
financial deepening treats deposit flow as money demand and regards bank deposits as homo-
geneous. Section 4.3 explains our view of quality differentiated deposit accounts and discusses
the similarities between our switching cost hypothesis and the bank-customer relationship
analyzed in the banking literature. Section 4.4 describes and solves the model of depositor
behaviour, demonstrating the development of switching costs. These are used in our deposit
market application of Kiemperer's [1987a] model to show, in Section 4.5, that tacit collusion can
be a noncooperative equilibrium.
There is a point worth stressing here. Although our analysis concludes, in contrast to the
liberalization hypothesis, that post-regulation banks will collude on the deposit rate, holding it
beneath the social opportunity costs of funds, the priors of our analysis do not diverge in sub-
stance from those of, for example, Shaw. We have however explicitly considered consumer
choice of bank services in a situation of imperfect information, and bank strategic response to
such behaviour. This is significant in two respects. From the descriptive point of view, it sug-
gests that liberalization theory did not go sufficiently far in analyzing the choice-theoretic impli-
cations of their own postulates, and from the policy viewpoint it suggests that the financial
deepening thesis may have been misleading in its inference that no regulation is the optimal pol-
icy stance.
Thus, following discussion of our results in Section 4.6, we go on in Section 4.7 to show
that, in markets of the type described here, regulation is the appropriate policy response.
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4.2: Institutional background and stylized facts
Two stylized facts from the Caribbean area allow us to isolate a domestic commercial bank-
ing sector with a limited number of firms as the only financial savings repository available to
depositors (savers):
Insulated domestic financial markets
In a truly open financial market, international arbitrage implies that financial prices and ser-
vices would be determined at world levels. Exchange controls and nonconvertible currencies
insulate the domestic financial markets from this possibility. The empirical justification of this
'fact' has been described at some length in Chapter 3.4. Here we summarize the key points.
As a result of exchange control regulations, domestic financial institutions do not in general
compete (legally) with foreign intermediaries for domestic deposits. Residents can only borrow
or invest abroad with exchange control permission which is given only after consideration of each
specific case. The non-convertibility of regional currencies reinforces the insulating effect for the
small depositor although, in at least the Bahamas and Barbados, the relatively widespread availa-
bility of US dollars through the tourist industry, does mean that residents have access to foreign
currency outside legal channels. However, as we concluded in Chapter 3, the balance of the evi-
dence suggests that legal risks and transactions costs effectively prohibit the illegal transfer of
funds abroad for those residents who do not have access to foreign currency deposits.
A small nwnber of banks with no effective competition from alternative institutions
In the absence of this 'fact', the consumer deposit decision would have to reflect the altema-
tive services and (adjusted) rates of return offered by different types of institutions, and the
analysis of bank interest-rate setting would have to take account of strategic action by issuers of
alternative liabilities. A model attempting to capture this degree of reality would rapidly become
intractable. The acceptability of the simplification basically depends on whether or not it is rea-
sonable to take the view that liabilities of other financial institutions are not seen as substitutes by
depositors, and that banks are aware of this and act as market leaders in deposit-rate setting. This
view is based on the following observations.
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While there are stock exchanges in Trinidad (and Jamaica), the limited flow of shares and
high transactions costs would reduce their role as a source of assets for savers. Therefore, on the
savings side of the market, potential competitors to commercial banks consist chiefly of insurance
companies, finance companies and credit unions, with their relative importance varying according
to the economic and geographic features of the different countries (see Table 4.1). In Belize, for
example, where there is a scattered rural population, credit unions are relatively important with
members' shares at the major credit union representing 8.4% (in 1980) of aggregated deposits at
commercial banks, the Government Savings Bank and the credit union itself. Commercial banks
held 88% of these deposits . In Barbados, life insurance companies probably represent the main
alternative repository for financial savings, if trust companies are excluded - in the absence of
flow-of-funds data a direct comparison is not possible. At the end of July 1986, commercial
banks had an 85.9% share of total deposit liabilities at deposit-taking institutions 2, while trust
companies' share was 12%. Since trust companies were established by commercial banks to
handle the longer-term components of their portfolios, they are unlikely to be price competitors,
and for our purposes here could legitimately be viewed as aggregated with the banks. The
significance of life insurance companies is indicated by premiums of BDS$34.8 million in 1984,
compared to an increase of BDS$ 104.6 million in commercial bank deposits and BDS$5.0 mil-
lion in trust company deposits 3. However, insurance company liabilities are a contractual obli-
gation, with no option (if we exclude the costly one of policy cancellation) to withdraw depend-
ing on the interest rate or service received.
Insurance companies are also an important feature of the savings market in the Bahamas
where 20 companies received B$17.6 million in life premiums in 1977 while total deposits at
commercial banks rose by B$22.7 million4. Commercial banks held 80% of deposits at deposit-
taking institutions in 1978 with the remainder virtually all held by finance companies since other
Luben [1983], Tables 2, 7, 13
2 The deposit-taking institutions are commercial banks, trust companies and finance companies; inter-
institutional deposits have been netted out to avoid double-counting.
See Central Bank of Barbados [1988]
Ramsaran [1984],Tables 3.7 and 22; the figures refer only to Bahamian dollar business.
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institutions' share was negligible 5. Trust companies in the Bahamas, even the resident 6 ones,
exist primarily for the external business generated by the Bahamas' tax haven status. The finance
companies play a role similar to trust companies in Barbados, mainly funding mortgages through
deposits. They are, with perhaps one exception, independent of the commercial banks.
Flow-of-funds data for Trinidad and Tobago ' (reproduced in Bourne [1982]) indicate that
commercial banks' deposits remain dominant in private financial assets. Forty-two percent of the
household and unincorporated enterprise (HLE) sector's financial assets was held at commercial
banks in 1978 and 13.8% at insurance companies 8. Finance houses represent a potential near-
substitute for banks in Trinidad (and in Barbados) where they offer, for example, chequing facili-
ties. However, the risk attached to their deposits is likely to deter most depositors, and is evi-
denced by several recent bankruptcies (see Parris [1984]). Trinidad and Tobago is the only one
of the countries with a long-established stock exchange but shares were only 9.5% (Bourne [op.
cit.], Table 7) of instruments in HIE financial assets in 1978.
To summarize: the limited availability of shares and the high transactions costs of trading in
them preclude their consideration. None of the other institutions described would appear to
present a challenge to commercial banks' price setting. Financial savings with insurance com-
panies are relatively illiquid. Trust companies and finance houses may be either closely con-
nected by ownership with the banks, considered highly risky by the depositing public, or offer
services sufficiently different from banks as to neutralize their rivalry or place them in a different
segment of the market. Credit union-type arrangements usually require specific geographic or
professional affiliation.
The deposit-taking institutions included in this comparison are: commercial banks, finance companies,
the Post Office Savings Bank , the People's Penny Savings Bank and trust companies. Ramsaran Iop.cit.],
Tables 2.22,4.3,4.4,4.15,4.13.
6 Resident financial institutions are those with a licence to cariy on Bahamian dollar business, that is, they
are resident for balance of payments and exchange control ptirposes.
Trinidad and Tobago is the only counuy considered for which flow of funds date is available.
While these shares appear to indicate a more equal distribution of private sector assets, it should be not-
ed that they are more comprehensive than the data given for the other countries and are therefore not directly
comparable.
-55 -
Table 4.1
Institutional Distribution of Deposits
(peientage)
Bahamas Barbados Belize Trinidad
	
(1978)	 (1983)	 (1981)	 (1978)
Institution
Commercial Banks	 80.3	 86.7	 88.6	 42.0
Finance Cos.	 118.6	 1.8	 -	 sc
Insurance Cos.	 ...	 ...	 ...	 13.8
Trust Cos.
	
-	 10.6	 -	 sc
Savings Banks	 1.1	 -	 3.0	 Sc
Public Fm. Insts.	 ...	 ...	 ...	 9.2
Credit Unions	 -	 0.9	 8.4	 sc
Pension Funds	 ...	 ...	 ...	 9.2
Other	 -	 -	 -	 26.0
NOTES:
- denotes not applicable; ... denotes not available; - denotes negligible Sc = see country note
As far as possible where relevant. inter-institutional deposits have been netted out to avoid double-counting
BAHAMAS: Bahamian dollar assets. Source: Tables 2.22,4.2-4.4,4.13 in Ramsaran [1984]
BARBADOS: Source: Central Bank of Barbedos, Annual Statistical Digest, 1986
Data is end-year. except for credit unions which arc at 31.03.83
BELJZE: Proportional distribution of the deposits at the listed institutions.
Source: Tables 2,7, 13 in Luben [1983]
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Financial assets of households and unincorporated enterprises (HIE). As this is flow-of-funds data, the cov-
erage is more comprehensive than that available for the other countries and is not directly comparable. Furthermore, by definition it
excludes government and corporate assets.
sc indicates that this category is included in 'other'.
Included in 'Other' are the central bank, building societies, credit unions, the local corporate sector, trust companies, finance houses,
central and local government, trust companies and the foreign corporate sector.
Source: Table 6 in Bourne [1982]
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4.3: Switching Costs in the Banking Market
Switching costs are usually said to occur when a consumer finds it costly to start consum-
ing, or to switch suppliers of, a good. The endogenous development of switching costs obtained
in Section 4.4 is based on potential switching between deposit accounts which provide vertically
differentiated services; such services are imperfectly observable prior to account opening and
customer-specific once an account has been opened. Our notion of switching costs has pre-
cedents in the literature on the banking firm which describes the basic switching cost result, that
clients remain loyal to past suppliers, as the bank-customer relationship.
Interest in the effects of switching costs in product markets has recently been reawakened
by Kiemperer ([1986a], etc.)9. Since it is costly for a consumer to switch suppliers, demand
becomes less price elastic: instead of a smooth flow of consumers between suppliers in response
to marginal price differentials, consumers switch only in response to prices low enough to com-
pensate for switching costs. Kiemperer identifies four sources of switching costs: transactions
costs, learning costs, artificial costs such as repeat purchase coupons, and psychological costs
such as brand loyalty and/or habit. In the models he develops to demonstrate how switching
costs affect firms' strategic behaviour, Kiemperer models switching (or start-up) costs as an exo-
genous cost arising when a consumer buys from a firm from which it did not purchase in the pre-
vious period. In our Section 4.4 switching costs arise endogenously in the sense that they are
given by the interest rate premium required to induce a customer anticipating improved service to
switch banks, that is, as a utility tradeoff between the rate of interest and service quality in long-
run equilibrium.
We begin in this section by describing our concept of vertically differentiated deposit
accounts, preview our hypothesis of switching costs development and note the parallels and
differences between the loyalty we describe and that discussed in banking models.
See Kiemperer, op. cit., and Section 4.6, for references to several other models incorporating the effects
of switching costs. The switching costs description closest to our own is that of Schmalensee 119821, where
consumers' knowledge of a 'pioneering' brand, and uncertainty about the quality of the entrants' products,
gives them a high opportunity cost of experimenting with another brand.
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Vertically Differentiated Deposit Accounts
Monetary and financial analyses treat deposits as homogeneous flows in response to the
deposit rate. We view deposits at different banks as heterogeneous goods. Consumers save via
an intermediary both for the interest income they earn and for the intertemporal and spatial tran-
sactions facilities offered by the intermediary. This is recognized by the financial liberalization
literature when it discusses, for example, the payments mechanism provided by banks. In this
sense, the counterpart in the bank market to the differentiated product in the goods market is not
the deposit flow per se but the deposit account. In opening an account, the consumer is not
indifferent either as to the quality of service he receives, the variety of services available to him
or the institution he banks with. This is clear in the last case, where some institutions may be
considered more risky than others. With regard to the former two, different depositors will have
different service requirements but there are also services which all consumers would value
equally. Thus, deposit accounts combine elements of both horizontal and vertical differentiation.
In the product market, heterogeneity is usually classified as horizontal or vertical differen-
tiation, corresponding to the common distinction between goods that differ because they meet
different needs/tastes (horizontal) and goods that differ in quality (vertical). Products are said to
be horizontally differentiated when, if sold at the same price, different consumers would choose
to purchase different goods because they prefer one specification rather than another, i.e. their
tastes differ. With vertically differentiated products, on the other hand, there is a unanimous
ranking of the goods by consumers, so that, if sold at the same price, all consumers would choose
to purchase the good they judge to be "better" - that of higher quality, with a higher quantity of
all the common characteristics (Geroski, Phlips and Ulph [1985]). We denote the intertemporal
and spatial transactions facilities offered on each deposit account as service quality. It is differ-
ences in the degree to which facilities are provided that link banks' roles as asset transformer,
monitor and assessor, inducing loyalty. Hence our focus on vertical differentiation.
Observed features of the banking markets in Caribbean economies indicate that different
deposit account holders at the same bank do receive differentiated service (even when the
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accounts have similar interest rates and maturity), and ownership of an account at one bank rather
than another does imply that customers have access to different services. Some banks pay
interest on chequing accounts, interest penalties on early withdrawal of time deposit accounts
vary between banks, and are negotiable for certain customers. Credit card and cheque guarantee
cards are offered to some customers by a subset of the banks. The availability of financial advice
services differs between banks and among customers. Different banks are more or less willing to
offer loan facilities to depositors, depending on their criteria and customer evaluation. The
number of branches and queue length varies between banks.
There is a similarity between this treatment and Salop's [1977] description of the bank's
product as a service package made up of a number of attributes and convenience facilities, with
consumers differing in their needs and valuations of services ( a horizontally differentiated pack-
age) 10. His view of the bank product as a service package has the advantage of encompassing
both the asset and liability sides of the bank portfolio. However, our emphasis on the deposit
account is more appropriate to our hypothesis that the repeated and ongoing nature of the banking
transaction is crucial in determining the nature of price competition. The deposit account is the
usual means by which buyer and seller come into contact on the banking markec a bank custo-
mer normally has to open an account on the liability side of the bank's portfolio, whether current
or interest-bearing, before loans and other bank services become available to him. This is funda-
mental to the intermediary role - not only does the bank intermediate between separate borrowers
and lenders but, partly in order to do so, it also intermediates between the intertemporal require-
ments of the same economic unit, as McKinnon's [1973] stylized model of the complementarity
of financial saving and capital for the saver-investor stressed.
Like S atop, most theoretical models of differentiated products consider only one of the two
descriptions. In reality, it is obvious that products and services combine both kinds of differentia-
tion and it is not always clear in which category a particular attribute should be placed." We
10 The attributes Salop considers are minimum balances required for free chequing, activity charges relat-
ed to minimum or average account balances. financial counselling, safe deposit boxes, direct deposits, third
party payments, overdraft and line-of-credit facilities, while convenience facilities include bank hours, the
number of branches, drive-in windows and average queue lengths at teller windows.
1 heland (Chapter 7, [1987]) considers a model where a product may be both horizontally and vertically
- 59 -
argue thai, while the deposit account is both vertically and horizontally differentiated, it is the
time varying quality dimension that provides depositors with an incentive to stay and therefore
gives rise to switching costs. The key assumption is that all depositors view the ability to trade
consumption intertemporally as an important quality dimension of bank service. Thus the impli-
cit commitment (subject to certain conditions) to future overdraft, line-of-credit and other loan
facilities is a service offered by banks, and the more likely does an account appear to provide
future credit, the better it is judged by all consumers. Similarly, the courtesy and consideration
with which a customer is treated can evidently be considered as a quality attribute.12
Even when we consider those services which appear best classified as horizontally differen-
tiated, they often include a quality dimension, similar (i.e. time-varying, customer-specific as a
result of imperfect information) to that of characteristics which, at the same price, would be
equally ranked by all depositors. For example, while interest payments on chequing accounts and
cheque guarantee cards are of value only to that subset of depositors who wish to hold a chequing
account, guarantee cards (and credit card facilities) are only issued to customers after a bank has
acquired some knowledge of them'3.
Our hypothesis is summarized as follows. Individuals and firms save in the form of finan-
cia! deposits with banks both because they earn a rate of return to compensate them for foregone
present consumption, and because banks provide them with certain services which include the
payments mechanism, financial intermediation, security etc. Among the most important of these
services is that deriving from a bank's role as financial intermediary between borrowers and
lenders. As such, the bank also acts as an intertemporal intermediary for the individual economic
unit, allowing it to smooth consumption over time and in different states of nature (and even as a
differentiated, with either one of the differentiates having a dominant sole.
12 It can also be argued that the branch network and average queue length are quality differentiates, since
all customers would prefer banks with shorter queue length and more branches, if paying the same rate of in-
terest. This is evident for the personal sector, and to the extent that businesses have several outlets and have
to visit banks, we would also expect it to be nue for the business sector. However, neither feature is impor-
tant in the present context since they are ascertained ax low (negligible) cost, and are not changing in a
customer-specific fashion over time.
13 Other horizontally differentiated services are financial advice services addressed to particular economic
sectors (such as the agricultural), safe deposit boxes and third party payments.
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spatial intermediaiy via the payments mechanism, with the issue of cheque guarantee cards, third
party payments etc.). But both banks and customers are heterogeneous and operate in a situation
of imperfect information which affects their profit and utility maximising behaviour. Further-
more, they mutually recognize some of the results of this imperfect information. Customers can-
not perfectly observe the quality of the intermediary service offered by banks: different banks
may have different criteria in offering intermediary service and may be more or less risk averse.
The courtesy with which a customer is treated cannot be observed prior to depositing. In
Nelson's widely-referred-to terminology, service quality is an experience good. Thus customers
must search and wait in order to find satisfactory service. In addition, customers recognise that
the quality of the intertemporal intermediary service - the degree to which banks are willing to
lend to depositors and to facilitate their payments - depends on the bank's acquiring information
about the customer. Because customers differ in their risk characteristics 14, a profit-maximizing
bank must try to differentiate among them and one method of doing so is inference from the
deposit behaviour of the customer. The more stable the deposit behaviour of the customer, the
more able the bank is to provide this service. Thus the customer expects the service he receives
to improve over time and has an incentive to build a reputation with the bank. As a result the
customer develops switching costs: once he has started to deposit with a bank the expectation
that the reliability of his behaviour will improve the service received next period locks him into
that bank.
The strength of these factors would be expected to be much greater in underdeveloped
financial markets where economic units have poor access to other sources of credit and informa-
tion systems such as credit ratings have not been established. This may account for the fact that
the deposit account has not been considered as a means of sorting customers in information-
oriented analyses of credit markets. In addition, in small markets a bank seems far more likely
to gain valuable information through a deposit account which will tend to reflect the transactions
of the depositor more completely than in the case where the depositor may be using a variety of
14 The possible adverse selection effects on credit markets have been analysed by (principally) Stiglit.z
and Weiss in several well-known papers, [1981] for example. This issue will be considered in Chapter 7.
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financial intermediaries. This does not preclude the depositor having access to other sources of
credit or the bank having other means of sorting customers. What is claimed is that (especially)
in LDCs, this factor is important enough to give rise to substantial switching costs.
The Bank-Customer Relation
The notion of switching costs recalls the bank-customer relationship discussed in the bank-
ing literature, usually with reference to credit rationing. Hodgeman argued that customers' joint
demand for loans and revenue earning bank services meant that prime customers (those with the
largest deposits) are more valuable to the bank than the current loan would indicate (see
Blackwell and Santomero [1982] and Santomero [1984]). They are therefore less likely to be
rationed. Wood [1974] stressed the time-dependent nature of the relationship: ceteris paribus,
the bank would prefer a loan applicant more likely to maintain a long-term relationship, and the
depositor would expect more favourable loan terms as a result of maintaining a sizeable account
balance.
These descriptions do not explain how a durable relationship would be developed and main-
tamed and possible effects on the deposit supply itself do not appear to have been analysed.
Wood stresses deposit size rather than information gained over time as the crucial factor. This is
not compelling for two reasons: if size of deposit is the bank's main interest, the depositor could
obtain similar benefits by transferring large deposits to another bank rather than maintaining a
relationship with one bank, i.e. size alone is insufficient to account for durability. Secondly, both
descriptions emphasize (large) business customers, since these are the customers most likely to
have substantial deposits. However, commercial banks are evidently also interested in personal
customers and in small, profitable business customers. It is the aggregate deposits of the former
group that provide banks with funding for their revenue-making loans. The size alone of such
deposits would not be sufficient to account for durability. Nor does the phenomenon appear to
have been generally linked with informational considerations. In Santomero's [1984] survey of
the banking firm literature, the discussion of credit rationing treats the customer relation and
information problems in separate subsections.
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Flanneiy [1982] introduces informational and learning considerations into banking relation-
ships in the retail deposit market. Retail deposits are viewed as a quasi-fixed factor of production
for banks, in that the bank has sunk set-up costs in establishing the deposit account. On the con-
sumer side the costs arise from learning alternative investments, new procedures etc. The value
of this information endures beyond the initial transaction and cannot be transferred to another
bank. Thus, both bank and customer have transaction-specific investments, giving them an incen-
tive to continue the relationship in order to amortize setup cost. Banks therefore price retail
deposits above the marginal cost of funds in the short run to keep depositors. Neither setup costs
nor higher short-term rates seem likely to create durability since a future lucrative offer could
tempt the depositor away. Devinney [1986] also recognises that mutual imperfect information is
at the root of the bank-customer relationship but analyses it only in the credit rationing context
The bank updates information about the customer through granting a loan and observing repay-
ment ability.
The banking literature recognizes the durability of the bank-customer trading relationship
but does not explain it. Explanations on the deposit side tend to focus on wealth which is
transferable and those based on credit ignore the deposit account as a logically prior (and less
costly) source of information. Recognised as such by the customer, who must trade the expected
loss in service against the gain in interest income if he leaves in response to an interest differen-
tial, it gives rise to the switching costs that are the source of durability. This result is formally
derived in a model of optimal dynamic savings behaviour in the next section.
4.4: The Depositor's Problem
Introduction
In the following model we combine two applications of dynamic programming in problems
of optimal sequential choice under uncertainty by adding uncertain service quality to a utility
function defined on deterministic consumption. The consumer simultaneously searches for satis-
factory service at banks and makes optimal intertemporal consumption decisions which depend
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on the rate of interest. The search for service is analogous to the sequential information gathering
about price or wage usually modelled in search theory - see, for example, Kohn and Shavell
[1974] or Lippman and McCall [1976]. A series of papers - see Phelps [1962], Levhari and
Srinivasan [1969], Samuelson [1969] and Mirrlees [1974] - applied dynamic programming to
lifetime saving and portfolio selection when the value of wealth, income or the rate of return is
stochastic. Consumption in these models is therefore uncertain while in our model only service is
uncertain, it being assumed that consumers learn the deposit rate costlessly.
In analyses of a competitive or monopolistic product market, when the quality of a good is
imperfectly unobservable prior to purchase, and consumers differ in their willingness to pay for
quality, it is often assumed that the consumer may use product price as an indicator of quality
prior to purchase (see, for example, von Weizsacker [1980], Shapiro [1982], Wolinsky [1983]),
equilibrium price incorporating a quality premium sufficient to induce the seller to produce the
quality expected at that price. These models require that the consumer have some firm-specific
information about quality prior to purchase. A similar inference procedure is not attractive in an
oligopolistic deposit market where quality is customer/bank-specific rather than firm-specific;
each bank offers a range of qualities (here) encountered randomly by the customer. Hence, in this
analysis, the depositor is assumed to judge quality only on the basis of his assessment after a bank
visit.
We proceed by deriving the optimum consumption and service choices of the depositor and
then consider the implications of these choices for depositor behaviour by the use of comparative
statics, by consideration of reservation service quality and by examining the utility interaction
between service quality and the rate of interest.
The model
We consider an infinitely lived' 5 consumer whose objectives are to maximize the sum of
discounted utilities of consumption, q,, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, and to find
15 While the idea of an infinitely lived consumer is unrealistic, it simplifies the problem, and does not ap-
pear too great a uavesty when we consider that individuals or firms seldom behave as if they have a terminal
date in mind,
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a satisfactory level of bank service quality. 16 All savings are held in the form of bank deposits.
In any single period the depositor has the utility function:
14U
U(q,․ ) = -- + s,	 a<O	 (4.1)
which he maximizes in all periods subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
W, = (W,_ 1 ^ y - q,_i)( l + r), all t	 (4.2)
and the following boundary conditions: initial deposits (wealth) are Wo ,and )imW, =0. q, is
consumption, - a is the constant intertemporal elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, s
is the level of service quality received, W, are deposits (wealth) in period t, y is constant income
received each period, and r is the exogenous deposit rate of interest paid each period, assumed
known to the depositor at zero cost prior to depositing: the deposit rate is posted in the bank,
advertised or ascertainable by a phone call. Service quality at any bank is not public information
and a depositor can only evaluate service at the bank he has visited after a period as customer the
depositor must therefore search among banks for satisfactory service. His reservation service
level is denoted s.
Over his 'infinite' lifetime the depositor maximizes the time separable utility function:
1 q,	 ____1+a Es1
	(4.3)
where p is his rate of time preference. E is the expectations operator. For the depositor searching
for satisfactory service, service quality is a random variable with cumulative distribution func-
tion, F and probability density function f(s). The individual's consumption occurs at discrete
equal periods of time (each period of time being considered as unity). The state of the system is
described by W,. At the beginning of t the consumer decides to consume q 1 of the sum of these
deposits and his constant income, y. The amount of deposits available for consumption in the
16 The maximization problem can also be taken as representative of a firm, if we take q as retained earn-
ings, and abstract from the firm's profit maximization problem, redefining the wealth and income variables in
the budget constraint as initial equity and profit, respectively. Since the results of the model follow from the
treamlent of the service variable, explicit consideration of the firm does not appear to add much.
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next period is therefore W,+1 = (W1 + y - q,X1 + r).
This is a multistage problem, where in each period the individual has another multipenod
problem with one less period and different initial deposits. His decision sequence being the
choice of q, which determines the state W in the next period. The time separability of the life-
time utility function means that the current decision depends only on the current state W, and
income. Dynamic programming principles are commonly used to solve this class of problems.
The dynamic programming recurrence relation (see (4.4) and (4.5)) allows us to treat the
multistage problem as a single maximization problem. It reflects Bellman's Principle of
Optimality:
"An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial state and initial decision
[Wo and q in our case] are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy
with regard to the state resulting from the first decision."17
Thus, the maximum utility from state W is found by maximizing the sum of the current single
period utility,	 plus the maximum utility of consuming from the resulting next state (W1^1)
onwards. This latter quantity is V, +1 . Since we are considering an infinite time horizon, the addi-
tive utility function and constant p implies that preferences for consumption in any period are
independent of the period (the age of the consumer), and the budget constraint is independent of
period: the environment is stationary so that V^i = V, all t.
Consider a depositor who visits banks and opens a deposit account. Let V(W,․ ) be the
depositor's discounted lifetime expected utility from following his optimal strategy. V(W,․ )
depends on whether service has been found at or above the cut-off level, s, or whether the depo-
sitor is still searching for such service. s is the same in every period, provided there are no
changes in the options available to the depositor.
For the depositor who has so far encountered unsatisfactory service, S <5, the search con-
tinues and V(W,․) VB(W), the optimized expected value of utility when a deposit has been
made but before quality is observed. By the recurrence relation of dynamic programming V (W)
17 Quoted in Larson and Cast [1978]
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is defined by:
1I*uVB (W)=flXq .1 S;+ES +çE[V(W,3)]}
where W is given by (4.2). That is, the expected maximal utility for the searching depositor is
maximum consumption utility and expected service this period, plus the discounted future utility
of pursuing an optimal policy, given the wealth determined by his optimal choice this period and
his knowledge of the market disthbution of service.
Having observed service above the reservation level, s^.?, V(W,․) VG(W,S), where the
recurrence relation implies:
lifu
VG(W,․ )=maxq,,.1.+s +..[VGOVs)]}
The optimized value of utility for the satisfied depositor is his optimal consumption and the
identified service in the first period, plus the discounted future utility from pursuing an optimal
policy, given the wealth determined by his optimal choice this period and service quality
expected, where expected service quality reflects his discovery of at least his reservation service
level at his current bank.
Finding VG(W,․ )
VG (W,S ) is the expected value of the discounted stream of utility of consumption and ser-
vice generated by pursuing an optimal policy from the current period onwards, given that the con-
sumer has found at least satisfactory service quality. From its (4.5) definition, VG (W ,․ ) is addi-
tively separable in q and s, linear in s, and defined for each service quality, s ^ s . We may
therefore analyse its components separately, finding optimal q for fixed s received. We write
VG(W,S)=V(W) +vG (s), where v(W) is the discounted utility value of consumption for fixed s
and v (s) is the expected value of the discounted stream of utility from service of at least reserva-
tion level. VG (s) varies according to whether the depositor expects service quality to be station-
ary or increasing. Both cases are considered below. We begin by considering the optimal choice
of q.
(4.4)
(4.5)
all t
all t
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Optimal consumption, q
To determine optimal q. the consumer's problem is treated as an optimal control problem in
discrete time where q1 is the control and W is the state variable determined by the choice of q1..1.
The problem is to maximize the time separable lifetime utility function:
(	 I	 14-aV ____
i 1+p' H-a
subject to (4.2), and it is assumed that consumption takes place at the beginning of the period.
Define v(W) as (4.6) evaluated at the optimal value of q.
Using the Lagrange multiplier approach, let (1)i- be the multiplier/costate variable.
(4.6)
Then, from (4.2) and (4.6):
1+a
L="'	 1	 Iq,(l+p)' L (') ^{(w:1^Y _q:i)(1+r)_Wi}]
The first order conditions are:
a =0,
• ;-
--t _xf+1lT-j
aL	
Ii+rL1,ø
=
alit
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)
v(W) is found by simultaneous solution of these three FOCs. The first order homogeneous differ-
ence equation in (4.9) gives:
[Jl±2.]'
	
(4.11)
where A0
 is the initial value of the costate variable. Substituting (4.11) in (4.8):
(4.12)
where A is an arbitrary constant including A4. Raising q, from (4.12) to the power (1+a), and
dividing by (1+a)(1+p)' , gives
- 68 -
1+a	 ___
=A(1+a)(1+p)'	 (1-fcz)(l+p)'
_A u ____
- I+cz	 (1+r)'
for each period t. Therefore, summing over t
__1+p at, q1 I+Z	 - A	 ______
_________ - 1+a	 [ (1+r)J
11 -1
_A	 ____
1+a_____	
(Jp)a I
(1+r) a j
- A a R ,	 where	 (4.13)
1. 1 -1
R = [_	 IjI(1+r) a j
(4.14)
Equation (4.10), the third FOC above, satisfaction of the lifetime budget constraint and IimW: = 0
together imply:
' . q,	 -	 t'y
	 (4.15)
- WO+(1):
Substituting for q1 from (4.12) into the budget constraint (4.15):
A[J	
'	 ___(1+r)' -	 (l+r)'
Summing the infinite series we obtain
I
AR = Wo+[J]
I'i+uI +r I i
_i	
[Wo+Y[..7..jj 	 -
q,	 (4.16)A R=	 =(l+a)	 (l+u)(1+pY
The first and third terms in (4.16) reflects multiplication of (4.13) by R. We can thus use (4.16)
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to eliminate A, obtaining:
[ WO+Y[ 1+r I
--jj
v(W)	 (4.17)(l+a)Ra
which is the discounted stream of utility from consumption evaluated at the maximized level of
q.
Service levels, s for the depositor encountering .c'
The depositor must spend a period with any bank he visits in order to evaluate whether the
service being offered is satisfactory to him. After the initial period with a bank, when service
received has been assessed as being at least reservation service level, and the depositor decides to
stay with the bank, we may imagine two classes of depositor. A depositor who has maintained an
unfavourable record with the bank will expect the bank to judge him unsuitable for better (risky
to the bank, convenient for the depositor) future services. For example, a depositor overdrawing
without authorization on his current account may not get a cheque guarantee card; one with a
cheque guarantee card may not get a credit card. Thus the service quality received at the intro-
ductory stage will not be expected to change over time. On the other hand, a depositor who has
been a good accountant, has a regular income and has been prudent takes account of the reputa-
tion she has acquired with the bank, and expects the service she receives to increase in the future.
We denote the expected increase by ö> L. 6 represents improvements in facilities for spatial and
intertemporal transactions.18
Having found reservation service level ? 19, the discounted expected value of service is
Jsf(s)ds
(l-4-p	 (s )] 
where ji-F (s	 is the expected value of service given that it is satisfac-
tory service. If service quality is not expected to increase, the discounted value of service
18 3
	
, of course, also reflect the experience the depositor has acquired of the bank's procedures, and
hence her ability to exuact improved service.
19 With an infinite time horizon reservation service quality is invariant over time if there is no change in
the service he can receive. Thus, once a bank's quality has been rejected the depositor does not return to that
bank.
+
1Fp) (l+p)2 (4.19)
VG (W,․ ) =
when service is not improved, and
vG (W,․ ) =
when it is.
(4.20)
(4.21)
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expected by the depositor from staying with the bank is:
vG (s) =	 (4.18)
where s is whatever level of service is received, provided that it is above reservation level.
For the class of depositors who expect service to improve, whatever level of service of at
least reservation level is received, the expected utility of service is given by:
Consumption and service: returning to VG(W,․ )
Since VG (W,S ) =v(W) ^vG(s) where the first term is given by (4.17) and the second by
(4.18) when service is time-invariant, and by (4.19) when it increases, the expected value of the
discounted stream of utility from staying with a bank is:
[	 l+r"
Lii
(1-f-a)R a
[ Wo+Y[ 1-i-ri1 
1+a
(1+cz)Ra
Finding VB (W)
To find V8 (W) we use the recurrence relation and the fact that, from our assumptions, the
value of service expected by the searehing customer depends on his knowledge of the distribu-
tion.
For the customer searching for satisfactory service the optimized expected value of utility
after entering a bank but before observing service is
V8(W)=max I + I +	 VG(W)f(s)ds +	 VB(W)f(s)ds]	 (4.22)
VB(W) = v(W) +	 a
I	 J
(4.25)
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where I = E (s) =
	
(s) d.s is the average value of service on the market. The discounted life-
time expected utility from searching is this period's utility of consumption and expected utility of
service, plus the discounted expected utility from the next period onwards. The latter quantity is
equal to the discounted utility obtained at a bank if the depositor finds 'good' service there and
stays, plus the discounted optimized utility of leaving the current bank and continuing to search
(i.e. of facing the same problem one period later) times the probability of encountering unsatis-
factory service. Substituting for VG(W,․ ) from (4.20) into (4.22), and substituting for W from the
budget constraint (4.2) into yB (W) on the RHS above, we have:
11+a
V(W) = max.[4 . + 
^	
G(?)
[WO^Y[1.]] 1+cz
(l+a)R
+	 G(?) v°(s) + -14,-F(s) VB [(W+y—q)(l+r)l	 (4.23)
where F(s*) is the probability of encountering service below the reservation level and
G (s ) = - F (s * )] is the probability of receiving service quality of at least reservation level. In
what follows for notational simplicity, we drop the subscript t on W: and q,. Evaluating Wo at
(W+y —q)(1+r) ,(4.23)canbewritten
1+aV2(W)= maxq.,.[... + 1+ -!- G(?){ [(W+y—q)(1+r) +y f(1+r)/r)]14a}(1+a)R
^	 G(s') VG(s) + 1F(s*)VB[(W:+Y_q:)(l+r)]]
	
(4.24)
Given that VB and yG have the same structural form, differing only in the utility of service,
using (4.18) we conjecture that when the depositor has not encountered his reservation service:
where v(W) is the consumption component of VG(W,․ ) defined above and a denotes the level of
service the searching depositor will receive. We may also write VB (W) as V8 (W) = v(W) + v8,
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with vB representing the second term on the RHS of (4.25). Using this conjecture, we substitute
(4.25) for VB (W) on the RHS of (4.24) and take account of the value of v(W) found in (4.17),
while evaluating Wo as before. Simplifying we have:
I___________________________VB (W)1W1q,
	+1+	 (li-a)R
+
	 (4.26)
As before, it is convenient to analyze the consumption and quality components of VB (W)
separately. We begin by considering the choice of q.
Optimal choice of consumption, q
Differentiating the RHS of (4.26) with respect to q gives the FOC:
a	 (1+r)
q - ( l+p)R a [(W+y —q )(l+r) + y ((1+r)/r)]a
Collecting terms in q, using (4.14) and simplifying we obtain the optimizing value of q:
q
	 1	 (4.27)
This is the value of consumption derived from pursuing an optimal policy. Thus, R 1 can be
interpreted as the marginal (and average) propensity to consume out of wealth. From (4.14) we
note that this propensity depends on the subjective relative to the market discount factor and the
constant intertemporal elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. Substituting for q from
(4.27) into the first and third terms on the RHS of (4.26), and simplifying, we find the consump-
tion component of VB (W), denoted v, to be:
{w +[i]]
v=
(1-t-a)R 1+a
1 1+ (1+r)1(R —1(1+p)Ra
The complicated-looking term added to unity in the square brackets above reduces to R - I there-
fore, as conjectured, compare (4.17), the consumption component of VB (W), v ,is
[w +4i.]]
v=	 =v(W).
(l+a)Ra
(4.28)
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Finding a, the service level obtained by the searcher
Having seen that the conjecture regarding consumption in VB (W) is correct, we find the
value of a in (4.25). Considering s alone, the conjecture is:
= -iaa = max.{i^TG(s)vG(s)+TF(se)J.±2_a}
Substituting for vG(s) and cancelling (1+p):
= maxs.{i 
+ &Lsf (s) th +	 (s) 4
a may be found by differentiating this function with respect to ?. Alternatively, however, we
note that the FOCs for the optimal choice of s' imply that it is determined where the depositor is
just indifferent between staying at his current bank and searching. That is, for the searching
depositor, staying with a bank offering reservation service gives the same utility as will waiting
to search again, so that VB = v' (*) where vG (s) is vG evaluated at s. Thus
v8 = i2.a = vG(s *) = .BP S	 (4.29)
and therefore a = : the value of service received by the customer who continues searching
is the reservation level of service. Since the searching depositor is moving from bank to bank in
his effort to find satisfactory service and his reservation service quality is based on his knowledge
of the parameters of the distribution, he will eventually obtain the service quality required.
Consumption and service: returning toVB (W)
From (4.27), (4.28) and (4.29) we may write the total expected value of a searcher's
discounted stream of utility from searching as:
[ Wo+Y[
	
•111.$41
1+r I I
--J]
V8 (W,․ ) =	 +
(1+a)Ra	
1±2. s	 (4.30)
Equations (4.20) and (4.30)20 give the expected values of the discounted streams of utility
In finding V(W,․ ) , the optimal value of the objective function (or the state function), there has been
no need to explicitly consider the second-order conditions because in dynamic programming problems, it has
been shown (see Hadley [19641) that when the objective function (here q'I(1+a)) is (strictly) concave, so
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for customers following their optimal policies of remaining with a bank, and searching for better
service quality, respectively. The designation of a reservation service quality effectively divides
depositors into two groups: those who judge that the service they have found is at least acceptable
and remain with their current bank; and those who are searching for satisfactory service. In the
former group those who have handled their bank accounts in a manner satisfactory to their bank
will be receiving enhanced service from the second period onwards. By definition, the latter
group includes all searching depositors, both those entering the deposit market for the first time,
and those who have been in the market, but have not as yet found service at or above their reser-
vation level.
The relationship between financial savings and the rate of interest
The comparative statics of the consumption choice is of interest mainly because it shows
that the implied demand for financial savings responds positively to the deposit rate, and that the
rate of time preference is the reservation deposit rate, as assumed in the financial liberalization
hypotheses. We differ from the liberalization analyses only in explicit examination of the effects
of service quality on depositor behaviour. The implied savings supply function has several argu-
ments in common with that of Shaw's money demand (op. cit., p. 61) function21.
The long-run intertemporal maximum value functions show that for all depositors, the
discounted utility of consumption is wealth and the discounted market value of lifetime income
a
("permanent" income), W	 , times a factor (1
	
- (1j	
, which depends on
(1+r) a
the marginal (average) propensity to consume out of wealth and permanent income, R' (R is
defined in (4.14)), and a.. We can first show that:
Holding service quality constant, for any individual the reservation deposit rate, below
which the consumer will not supply deposits, is the time preference rate.
is the state function. Thus the relative maximum of q obtained in the first order conditions is also a global
maximum.
21 We note that McKinnon's demand for money included an investment/Income ratio resulting from his
capital/money complementaiity hypothesis.
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To demonstrate this, we note that the optimal value of the objective function, here V(W, ․ ), is a
function of the state parameters of the system . In addition, as noted in footnote 21, if the objec-
tive function is (strictly) concave, then its optimal value is also concave. Here the objective func-
tion is strictly concave in q and hence, V(W,․ ) is strictly concave in W. This can be demon-
strated by differentiating v(W) from (4.17) with respect to W (where the subscripts indicate the
first and second partial derivatives of V(W,․ ) with respect to W):
V(W,․ ) =
V(W,․ ) = -	
a-Ia	 +L±d <0Ra[W	 rJ
(4.31)
(4.32)
since a < 022 . Thus, V(W,․ ) is monotone decreasing in W. Now, differentiating either (4.4) or
(4.5) with respect to W, noting that W, = (W,_1 ^ y - q1 ) (1+r), we have that when the consumer is
following his optimum policy:
Vw(W,․ ) = 
-4-Vw[(W+y—q)(1+r),s]
Therefore:
Vw(W,, ․ ) =
	 (4.33)
If deposits are made in any period, we must have W,+1 > W,. Then, with Vw(W,․ ) monotone
decreasing in W, V(W,,S) > Vw(W,+i,․ ). So for the equality in (4.33) to hold with deposits being
made we require [ 1. ] > 1. That is, the deposit rate of interest must be greater than the time
preference rate and the latter is therefore the reservation deposit rate. Given that r ^ p. so that
deposits are being made, we can also show that:
the value of the sum of discounted utilities of consumption is a positive function of the rate
of interest so that the depositor will be attracted by a higher rate of interest, holding service
quality constant
Differentiating v(W) with respect to r and simplifying:
Note that a = ..L q so that diminishing marginal utility of consumption ünplies a <0.
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1 W	 i
r	 [z_ 1 -1 r + r 
L	
- 7Jj	 (4.34)
where a <rn = 1 -	 <1 is the marginal (average) propensity to consume out of per-
(1-i-r)
manent income and z = 1 —m <1.	 is unambiguously positive if z-1 >'• Simplify-
1	 1
ing, given z 's definition, this last inequality implies (1+p) a > (1+r) a and, since a <0, given
r ^ p, the optimal discounted utility from consumption is increasing in the deposit rate.
A change in the deposit rate has both an income and substitution effect, so that a depositor,
although switching banks in response to a higher rate of interest, may decrease his deposit flow to
the new bank. Using Merton's ([1969], p.254) interlemporal generalization of the Slutsky equa-
tion23, we can show that:
the intertemporal compensated substitution effect dominates the income (wealth) effect on
consumption so that, as assumed in the liberalization literature, total deposits will rise with
interest rates.
Let .- represent the total effect on consumption of an increase in the rate of interest. Following
Merton, we may then define 	 I j as the Hicks compensated substitution effect. Then, analo-
gous to the usual Slutsky, the intertemporal wealth effect is given by:
We proceed by finding the two component terms of this expression. Differentiating the expres-
sion for optimal q given in (4.27) with respect to r and simplifying, the total effect on consump-
lion of an increase in the rate of interest is:
=—m Y+1i*L[W+YJ±]
	
(4.35)
Taking the total derivative of (4.27), holding V constant, and dividing by dr:
Merton used this version of Slutsky to examine the more complicated problem of the effects of changes
in the mean and variance of portfolio return.
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,, 1 W	 1+r av 1 —rn -- +	 1—rn 1 +yi±.1	 (4.36)
- [__Iv+—_-..Ivj	 r	 a	 r J
For given V, taking the total derivative of (4.17) and dividing by dr, we find that the first square
bracketed term on the RHS of (4.36) is given by:
am 1 a 1 w +L±.1	 (4.37)dW - l+rdy
r J
Substituting from (4.37) into (4.36) and simplifying, the compensated substitution effect of a
change in the rate of interest is:
-- I7 if- .. [w +yi] < 0	 (4.38)
Subtracting (4.38) from (4.35), the intertemporal wealth effect is:
[.. - 
.-IV] =_m.+i.[w+i]	 (4.39)
Thus, the substitution effect dominates the wealth effect if the RHS of (4.38) exceeds the RI-IS of
(4.39) in absolute value. We may safely assume that the intertemporal wealth effect is positive;
consumption is a normal good. This implies that the RHS of (4.39) is positive. Thus, if I a I ^ 1
the substitution effect dominates the wealth effect. I a I ^ 1, an inelastic or unitary elastic margi-
nal utility of consumption between periods, implies that as consumption increases over time, the
rate at which the marginal utility of consumption falls over time increases less than or in propor-
tion to the increase in consumption, as required by the optimality of V (W ,․ ). Therefore, the nega-
tive intertemporal substitution effect dominates the wealth effect on consumption of an interest
rate change and increases in the deposit rate raises the consumer's deposit flow.
Service quality influences on depositor behaviour 24: the endogeneization of switching costs
One of our key results is obtained in this section: switching costs are derived as an interest
rate premium required to compensate the depositor for the loss of improved service.
We first consider how the reservation service quality changes once the depositor has
24 This section considers service quality at fixed razes of interest until the nadeoff between service and in-
terest is derived.
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decided to stop searching and evaluates his expected utility, looking forward one period.
Secondly, a utility trade-off between service quality and the rates of interest offered at alternative
banks can be derived by approximating the V(W,․ ) of any individual faced with the choice. We
call the interest rate premium required to compensate the depositor for changing banks once he
has established a reputation with a bank in long run equilibrium, the switching cost of the indivi-
dual.
Optimal reservation service,?
We proceed by deriving the value of reservation service quality when service quality
remains constant, then show how the value of reservation service quality at which v (s') is
evaluated changes when s increases to & in each period with a bank after the first period.
Considering only the s component of yB, we have from (4.22):
= max5. +	 TV (s )f (s )ds +	 (s * )vB]	 (4.40)+ps=s.
Evaluating vB at its maximum, substituting for vG (s), solving for vB and using the same intuitive
argument as earlier to obtain v8 (optimization of the expression found for V8 is equivalent):
s
i+.. 5 sf(s)ds5=s.	 =v6(s)=-i2-s*	 (4.41)
1_l.F(s*)
Solving for .s:
pi+'Tsf(s)
::
	 (4.42)
P +	 (s ) 1s
Recalling that G(s*)= L
.F(s), the probability of finding service quality above the reservation
5 sf(s)ds
level, and defining '')
	 , the conditional expected value of service, given that it is
Jf(s)d.c
S.,:.
atleasts. Then fr0mç442)
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1	
^ [ 
G(s 5 ) 1 
v( 5 )	 (4.43)
- G(s * )+pj	 G(s')+p]
The reservation service quality is a weighted combination of average quality available at
banks and the average good quality, reflecting the depositor's knowledge of the distribution of
service quality on the market. The reservation quality level also depends on the depositor's
degree of preference for present over future consumption. Taking the total derivative of equation
(4.43), or noting that, as p—,O, 
s -, [ G(s)+p] i(s) 
indicates that the optimizing depositor
who attaches less preference to current service and is more willing to wait for good service, will
tend to have a reservation service quality nearer the level of average good quality. The more
patient depositor would be willing to search more and hence reject more market offers, preferring
to wait for higher quality.
Consider the optimal choice of s* of the depositor for whom, after the first period, service
quality grows to 6s in each period, then substituting from (4.19) for v G into (4.40), we obtain the
expression equivalent to (4.41), v8
 for the depositor whose service improves:
8+p Sr
v6(s*)*	 (4.44)
l--11 -F(s)	 p
We may solve for s as
GSL5 * =	
GV)-i-p	 Gs5)+p s)	 (4.45)
Denoting the s in (4.45) by s , note that 8 = I implies that s' and s" are identical. To compare
them we take the total derivative of and substitute from (4.45), and simplify to give:
ds 5 -	 (1+p)pi	 < 0do - - (&+p)2(G(s)+p)
Conditional on having located? and an improved service a depositor sets a lower reservation
level for service. Since service will improve after his first period with a bank, the depositor's
options at the current bank have expanded and the level of service required at the current bank to
make him indifferent between searching and staying is lower. But note that this applies only at
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the current bank. Even with general knowledge that s increases after a period of reputation estab-
lishment, service available at as-yet-unvisited banks remains uncertain. For visits to new banks
the long-run discounted expected utility of search after the first period remains
vB =v'(s) <vG (&s*). Having searched with s the enhancement of service means that the set of
acceptable qualities is greater because, whatever s ^ s has been encountered, the depositor
knows that it will improve once he stays with that bank. This implies that, having evaluated s, he
is receiving better service than is required to make him indifferent between searching and staying.
As a result, for even the marginal depositor the discounted utility of staying with a bank offering
known good service exceeds that of continuing to search. As ifiustrated in Figure 4.1, ex post the
depositor is in the shaded area of the distribution which was his ex ante acceptable set, while the
expost set of acceptable qualities is the striped area.
Figure 4.1:
The change in reservation service quality and the set of acceptable service
qualities
s)
There is an expost matching of depositor and bank which results in the reluctance of even margi-
nal depositors to quit. There is another way of interpreting this which emphasizes the specificity
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(matching) of the relationship between customer and bank. In order to observe service and know
of its improvement the depositor has had to remain with a bank for one period receiving whatever
service is offered, i.e. he has made an investment specific to that bank. To see this note that the
cost of another search is the opportunity cost of depositing for one period at reservation service
level. With no improvement in service, that opportunity cost is just? since the depositor's
investment is only in information about s . With improved service the opportunity Cost 15 &s
since investment in reputation has also taken place. In search models with explicit search costs, a
general result is that higher search costs produce higher reservation prices (or lower reservation
wages in labour search models) and less search. Here we have an ex post increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of search and hence a lower reservation service level and less search. The depositor
receiving even marginally acceptable service has an incentive to remain with the bank, since he
will incur switching costs resulting from this increase in opportunity costs if he changes banks.
Switching costs: the service-interest rate tradeoff
In the short-run in this market there will be searching depositors who have not encountered
their reservation service quality. These searchers are easily attracted by higher interest rates since
they are unsatisfied with the service received at the bank where they are currently depositing.
However, in long-run stationary equilibrium all depositors wifi have found at least their minimum
acceptable service quality since this is determined by the market distribution of service. It is also
reasonable to assume that all are receiving improved service since our interest is in depositors'
interest rate elasticity of deposit supply: any depositors who have not established a good reputa-
tion in the long-run are unlikely to be customers for whom banks would compete. In a mature
market the marginal depositor can be viewed as facing two groups of banks: he has already sam-
pled in one pool j where he has found good, improving service, while he is still uncertain of the
quality available at banks in pool 1. Such a depositor will only be attracted by an increase in the
deposit rates offered by banks in pool i if the discounted maximal utility from consumption and
service, taking account of the relative financial returns, is higher with a return to search, that is, if
vB (r) =VG(rj,s*) ^VG(rj4s*)
This requires
82 -
14a
- (1+p) I 
_[w+y! J (l+a)-' 1- (1+P)H >s1''[	
[	 1
1+aI[W	
J 
(1+a)_l[1 
(1+ri)j	 (1+ri)j	 [pJ
Since we are considering switches by a single individual the wealth level does not affect this
choice and W, y and a are constant. Therefore in order to make this comparison we linearize the
expression for v(W) around r 
= p. and employing the resulting approximation and simplifying, we
find that VG(rj,s e )^ VG(r,as*) implies, in terms of the relative interestrates:
_	
?(&-l)	
1+u	
(446)
[w+i2.] [*]
In the long-run a marginal depositor who has sampled bank pooi j and found satisfactory service
among these will only switch banks if the excess of rj over rj is at least as great as the difference
vG
 (&c) - v (s e ), the gain in discounted service obtained after one period, weighted by a factor
which depends on his wealth, permanent income and time preference rate. We call the RHS of
(4.46) switching costs, denoted c. With no service improvement c =0 for the marginal depositor.
Heterogeneous depositors will have different switching costs since these depend on the time
preference rate, wealth and permanent income of the depositor. c is obviously decreasing in per-
manent income and wealth, with the utility gain from the income return to saving being less
attractive the lower is wealth. Differentiation of c with respect to p gives:
ac c	 ay	 l+a
+	 > 0	 (4.47)
1 1HX W 	 ___
Switching costs are increasing in the time preference rate: the impatient consumer places more
value on immediate satisfactory service and requires a higher positive rate of interest differential
to compensate him for lost service and induce him to switch banks. Further, as p -, 0, c -, 0: for
the infinitely patient depositor who does not discount the future, postponement of the gain that
brings about a continuing relationship is costless and individual consumer demand becomes per-
fectly interest rate elastic.
We may compare this relationship between switching costs and the time preference rate
with the buyer response in Gale's [19871 results discussed in Section 4.4. In a mixed price-setting
- 83 -
game, Gale finds that, with a positive probability that the buyer is unattached to the seller (his ex
ante game), as the buyer's time preference rate tends to zero, price tends to the competitive price.
This finding depends on both the increased price elasticity of a patient buyer and the resulting
pricing incentives of the seller. Only the buyer response is relevant here. The intuition both here
and in Gale's buyer response is simply that the more willing is the customer to postpone con-
sumption (the lower the rate of time preference) the more responsive he will be to price induce-
ment. In the savings context this suggests a paradox which reinforces the switching cost applica-
tion to the deposit market since (see discussion following (4.33)) it implies that it is precisely the
consumer who will accept very low deposit rates who has very low switching costs.
Switching costs' inverse relation to wealth and positive relation to time preference have
complementary implications for our application to LDCs. In poor countries the intermediation
facilities from the deposit relation may loom larger than the income return in consumer prefer-
ences. It may also be conjectured that time preference rates are higher as a result of greater gen-
eral uncertainty about the future and fewer opportunities for intertemporal trading. Both these
factors suggest that switching costs may be higher in LDCs.
We differ from the analyses of financial liberalization in explicit examination of the effects
of service quality on depositor behaviour. However, the inclusion of service quality in itself does
no violence to, for example, Shaw's hypothesis. Our service quality variable corresponds to the
variable reflecting money's intermediation services in his money demand function. Although we
assume the depositor must search for his desired services, we would argue that such information
acquisition reflects one of the costs of savings disposal discussed by Shaw (op. cit., p.61) if we do
not assume, as he seems to have done, that the monetary system was free of such costs and risks.
We have thus endogeneized switching costs from the point of view of the long-run optimal
strategy of the depositor. Given Our assumptions, in the long-run equilibrium of the banking
market there will be no marginal depositors who respond to small interest rate changes. The
implications of this result for bank deposit rate setters are taken up in Section 4.5.
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Section 4.5: The Banking Market
Banks' deposit rate determination
This section uses a representation of the deposit supply implicit in Section 4.4's model,
together with the switching cost variable developed there, to supply the depositor fundamentals
for our use in the banking market of Kiemperer's [1987a] model of switching costs in a mature
market. It concludes that noncooperative deposit-rate-setting banks will find it optimal and feasi-
ble to tacitly collude on the deposit rate.
We examine only long-run stationary deposit rate determination. Switching costs do not
operate in the short-nm - raising the rate of interest will always attract searching depositors, pro-
viding banks with a strong incentive to compete; although the attraction or incentive will be neu-
tralized if forward-looking consumers or banks expect to be worse off in the long-run as a result
of more elastic demand or more aggressive pricing, respectively, in the short-run (see footnote
28). By focussing on the long-run we are assuming that banks discount short-run depositor
switches, looking to the future where there are no shifts because all depositors have found their
reservation service and are looking forward to improved service. In the search environment banks
recognize this development of switching costs in the long-nm equilibrium and, if their discount
rates are low, short-run competition will be limited. Furthermore, the depositors who are easily
attracted in the short-run are those whose reservation levels are higher than the service found in
sampled banks and, as is evident from (4.33) and (4.47), will not only require the lowest deposit
rates but will have the lowest switching costs because of their low time preference. The empiri-
cal context also supports this treatment: the markets we are considering are mature banking mark-
ets with the earliest current banks dating from the late nineteenth century, later entry occurring in
the early nineteen fifties and late sixties and most consumers long-habituated to financial institu-
tion saving.
Since each bank offers a range of service qualities and depositors do not differ in their
preferences among banks, except in so far as they have acquired switching costs, we use
Klemperer's [1987a] homogeneous product model to consider banks' long-run profit maximiza-
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tion after market shares have been established. Each depositor knows the service at his bank and
is looking forward to improved service, and there is no new inflow of depositors25.
We consider two banks, I and j, who choose their deposit rates r, and rj . Take the size of
the market as unity and let bank K's share of the market be '(K' where '(j . -'yj = 1. Let P K (p,F) =
the proportion of bank K's (K =1 ,j ) depositors with reservation deposit rate, p , if no account is
taken of switching costs and switching costs, c ^ . (We assume that depositors are evenly disiri-
buted across banks in terms of p). Assume P'(p,) is differentiable and let a p'(P,) =pK(p,).
i(p) is the number of depositors with time preference rate p. the reservation deposit rate, that is,
the market deposit supply function without taking account of switching costs, inferred from the
depositor optimization problem. DK is the deposit supply to bank K. From the examination of
depositor behaviour we can conclude that in long-run equilibrium: PK(p,O) = 0 that is, all deposi-
tors have switching costs and p"(p,O) = 0, there are no marginal depositors who are sensitive to
small deviations in deposit rates.
Suppose that in long-run equilibrium bank i has a higher deposit rate r4 ^ r. Then bank i
will keep all of its existing customers, i(r1 ), and will attract some proportion off's customers.
The latter will consist of: a) those with p ^ i and switching costs c ^r• - rj
 ; b) those with reser-
vation deposit rate p such that r ^ p < r. They will switch if p ^ r, - c. Then bank i's deposit
supply function in the long-run will be:
= i(r) + y, JPJ(p. r, —r,)[d A(p)] ^ y Jr 
Pi(p, Ti 
—p)[d z(p)]	 (4.48)
Since r ^ r, bank j obtains deposits only from its own customers for whom rj ^ - c. There-
fore i's deposit supply is:
D = y 	 —Pi(p,r _rj )] [dá(p)]
=y, Efr)
— y ,jPi (pri —r)[db.(p)]
	 (4.49)
Allowing for a very small inflow of depositors need not alter the result if the inflow were too meagre to
give any bank the incentive to bid up the deposit rate in order to amact them. Very periodic enuy of small,
poor households constitutes an example
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Each bankK=ij maximizes
,r =R [D(r1 )] -rk[D(Tk)]
where it is the profit function and RK is the net revenue function which depends on K's market
share, holding average service quality fixed or assuming that a small change in market share has
no effect on the average net revenue from service quality. Deposit-rate setting Nash behaviour
implies:
a	 1aR	 laD
--=1i_rxJ -/--D(rK)=O. K=ij	 (4.50)
Differentiating D from (4.48) and D from (4.49) with respect to Tj and Tj ,respectively:
aD,	 r.
_ .L =YI A'(ri )+?iJPi (pri 
_ rJ)[d E1 (p)] + ?iJ,Pi (pri —p)[d(p)]	 (4.51)
aD 
= yjE'(r) + 'Yi Jj.'(Pri
 -r)[d A(p)]	 (4.52)
Substituting (4.51) into (4.50) for bank i, the first order conditions are:
0 
= {	 - { '() 
+7 pf (p, r1 -rj)Jd (p)J 
+	
pJ (p, r-r1)Jd
-(r ) 
-?i4PJ (p. rj -ij )[d i(p)] -'yj pj Pi (p r -ç)[d i(p)]
For bank j's FOCs we substitute (4.52) into (4.50) to obtain:
o 
=	
- Ti] {'(ri)^iPiri_ri)Ed 	(p)]
In a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies so that Ti 
= 
rj = r, since all depositors have switch-
ing costs in the long-run, P(p,0) = 0, and there are no marginal depositors without switching
costs, pX(p,O) =0, for both banks these FOCs may be written:
1 aR	 1
• 
ij--Tj ?KA'(T)-'(KEt(T)O
If the two banks have constant equal marginal revenues, R' = R J ' = MR then
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MR = r [i +
where E is deposit supply elasticity, so that the first order conditions for a symmetric (Nash)
equilibrium in a market with switching costs are those for a monopsonist, or collusive oligop-
sony, in a market without switching costs. The same result is obtained if the banks have similar
revenue functions and equal market shares. (In the absence of either the latter or constant equal
MR. side payments would be necessary in a collusive oligopoly.) This will be a local maximum
for each bank if the profit functions are quasi-concave.
The FOC above says that the symmetric Nash equilibrium26 in a market with switching
costs has the appearance of a collusive equilibrium in a market without switching costs, not that it
is one. However, it also indicates that tacit collusion of the kind Caribbean economists believe
characterizes their banking markets (see Chapter 3) is feasible and sustainable. The literature on
collusion points out that it usually fails because finns may have difficulties in agreeing to a pric-
ing rule because their cost functions differ, and lack the incentive to maintain the rule. Enforce-
ment of the rule is also difficult if small deviations cannot be monitored. These difficulties are
alleviated by the fact that, with switching costs, the local maximum for each bank acting non-
cooperatively is the monopsony solution. With low discount rates, tacit agreement is maintained
if each bank simply takes a long-run view of its prospects and serves its own customers, in effect
acting as a monopsonist on its market share. None have the incentive to increase deposit rates by
a small amount since doing so will not attract more depositors. Only deposit rate changes large
enough to cover switching costs are advantageous and these are easily monitored by other banks.
Further, with the market broken up into submarkets, a bank losing customers will, especially in
the small markets of the Caribbean, be able to tell that the agreement is being broken. We next
consider conditions under which large deviations are not profitable.
The collusive outcome as a global maximum
We have found that monopsonistic pricing where each bank sets the deposit rate to exploit
Eh bank maximizes profit taking the strategy of the other bank as given and pnces are equal.
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its long-run market share is a local optimum. However, another local maximum may exist which
has banks increasing their deposit rate to attract customers with low switching costs. The incen-
tive to do so is obviously greater for banks with a low long-run market share. In the symmetric
Nash equilibrium if one bank increases its deposit rate by an amount large enough to cover the
switching costs for any proportion of depositors, it not only attracts increased deposits from its
own customers but erodes the market share of other banks. Its perceived deposit supply function
becomes more elastic at the market (monopsony) price. With banks having the same constant
marginal revenue we may then get a distribution of rates with the lowest rate being the monop..
sony rate. In order to examine the conditions under which the tacit collusion local maximum is
also a global maximum we consider the deposit market with two banks paying the monoposony
deposit rate, rm. For simplicity we modify the earlier demand function.
Suppose the market has N consumers with reservation deposit rates, p ^ r,,, whose indivi-
dual supply functions are given by co(r), so that market demand is given by N w(r) , w'(r) > 0.
There are two banks with market shares Y' ^ = 1. Suppose bank 1 contemplates deviating from
the tacit agreement to set r = rm. If it raises its deposit rate to r > rm it will attract the depositors
with bank 2 for whom c ^ r - rm, i.e. all those with switching costs such that these are paid by
the excess of its rate over the monopsony rate, as well as r	 inin s owr t sle
increased deposits. Let d' be the level of switching costs which satisfies this condition with equal-
ity. i.e. c? = r - rm, and let 4) be the proportion of depositors with c ^ ?. (We assume that depo-
sitors are evenly distributed by switching costs over the banks). The deviating bank therefore
obtains deposit supply
D1 =(yi +4(f)y,JNo(r)	 (4.53)
while maintaining the agreement he has deposit supply
D im =yiNoXr)
which is just his early share of the market. We note that the elasticity of supply in this latter case
is
D'imr - (0'(r)r
Dim - to(r) =Tl(r),
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where x' denotes the derivative of the function x(.) with respect to its arguinent while for the
deposit supply in (4.53), the elasticity evaluated at r is
D 'lv (rm) T,, - 
TI(rm) ^ Tm 4'(e) 'YlDivfrm) -	 (y1^(eyyJ
='fl(rm)+ e(rm)	 (4.54)
so that the supply elasticity facing the deviant bank at r, is equal to the supply elasticity of the
individual supply curves, 1(Tm) plus an additional term, e (,'m). This term reflects the increased
market share obtained when he pays the switching costs of those with c ^ f. Increasing r above
Tm thus creates a kink in the supply curve faced by the deviant which becomes more elastic at
T > Tm - see Figure 4.2. (Compare Stiglitz's [1987] analysis of a search market with some custo-
mers with infinitesimal search costs. Since switching costs here do not tend to zero there is really
a discontinuous kink: the increase in elasticity only occurs after the price which pays switching
costs and reflects a discrete increase in market share.) Rather than the symmetric equilibrium
price which is the collusive deposit rate we may then get a distribution of rates with the lowest
the monopsony rate.
Figure 4.2: Kinked supply curve faced Ly deviant paying to attract rival's customers
Dm is the deposit supply curve if the monopsony rare, Tm,S maintained, with MCm the corresponding marginal
expense curve. At deviant deposit rate r, the supply elasticity increases, with the perceived demand curve being
D and marginal expense, MC
- 90 -
For conditions in which a distribution does not occur, consider the deviant bank's choice of
deposit rate premium. Bank I chooses to maximize:
7ti = R[(i+4(e)'&Nw(r)] —(rm+e)(yi+(e)7,JNO)(r) 	 (4.55)
Noting that	 =1, the FOCs are:
TVR' = e+Tm 
+ i(r)+e(r)	 (4.56)
If it were to continue to act as a monopsonist on market share, bank l's profit function is given by
it1, =R[Y1 N o*r )] - ryN w(r) and the monopsony price is Tm 
= + 
l/(rY Substituting for rm
into ,r and for r from (4.56) into (4.55) we obtain the profit functions which the prospective
deviant must compare:
= 
R1 - [ii(rv )+e (r )]R ' (y + 4(e)y,JN w(r)
r1(rm) R 'm ?IN(O(rm)
m=R1m_	
rl(rm)+1
If	 ^	 a bank will not find it worthwhile to deviate from the monopsony agreement.
Assuming constant marginal revenue, R', simplifying and substituting for r and r, we find that
the collusive agreement will be adhered to if
r(r) + e (ru) (ë + Tm) fY1 ^ 4(yy,) N w(r)
Tlfrm)	 rmyiNw(r_)
i.e. if the ratio of increased to simple demand curve elasticities exceeds the ratio of total deviant
costs to total costs at the monopsony price. If the increased elasticity is too large the deviant
acquires such a high share of the market that it is more worthwhile for him to revert to monopoly
pricIng.
4.6: Switching Costs and Monopoly Power: Discussion of our results
We have generalized the standard analysis of switching costs by explicitly deriving them
from the consumer's intertemporal utility maximization. This endogeneization is significant in
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that, by highlighting the difference between switching costs and the transactions costs ubiquitous
in economics, it provides an indication of the markets in which the monopoly effects analyzed by
Kiemperer and others are most likely to bite. In the following we discuss our results in relation to
the literature on switching costs and price-setting behaviour.
The monopoly deposit rate outcome conflicts with the usual intuition about price strategies
based on the Bertrand27 model. There the only equilibrium is the perfectly competitive price,
even with a small number of firms (in the absence of capacity constraints and product differentia-
tion), because consumers' sensitive response to price differentials induces firms to compete in
prices until they are driven down to marginal cost. On the other hand, it recalls Diamond's [1971]
result that with imperfect information and positive search costs, the only equilibrium is the mono-
poly price, even with a large number of firms. With all consumers having positive search costs,
each firm can increase its price by without losing customers. But once all stores have higher
prices, it is feasible for each to raise its price by c once again. This process results in the mono-
poly price as the only equilibrium outcome. Some very recent models attempting to reconcile
these two stories of price-setting behaviour help to show more generally why the monopoly rate
is the equilibrium in the model here. To anticipate, two forces appear necessary to sustain a
monopoly price outcome: it must be costly for the buyer to take up lower price offers, and sellers
must lack the incentive to compete. If acquiring new price offers is costless, and firms are aware
of this and hence have the incentive to compete for sales, we get the Bertrand outcome. If it is
costly for buyers to change firm, but sellers still have an incentive to compete, for example, if in
the Diamond model there are some marginal buyers with infinitesimal search costs, then the price
will tend towards the competitive price.
The key feature of switching costs is that they derive from the loyalty of one agent to
another with whom he has already transacted because he anticipates some benefit from the con-
tinued association. Transactions costs relate to a cost of trading, over and above the cost of the
traded good, whether or not a trade has previously taken place with the cunent trading partner.
27 The assumption that firms choose price rather than quantity is usually referred to as Bertrand competi-
tion after the economist who disputed Cournot's description of quantity setting oligopolists.
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While transactions costs are commonly associated with market power, in many cases they seem
insufficient to generate a sufficiently strong customer base. As a relevant example cited by
Kiemperer, there are the transactions cost of opening a new deposit account.
Loyalty is however a backward looking phenomenon and given rational consumers
(bygones are bygones) requires some enforcement unless we are to assume that set-up costs have
financially constrained the consumer. In our context this is given by imperfect information and
future reward. The role of uncertainty in generating switching costs has been recognized by
Schmalensee [1982] and Conrad [1983], both of whose consumers are uncertain of the quality of
an untried product, and by Kiemperer, op. cit., who discusses learning costs. As in Diamond's,
op. cit., price search model, imperfect information creates inelastic demand and hence monopoly
power. However, search costs are implicitly the opportunity costs of acquiring information and
do not have the durability aspect which distinguishes switching costs.
Most models of switching costs' price effects have imposed the costs. In Rosenthal [1982]
consumers are non-rational, always purchasing from their original seller unless his price is raised.
Kiemperer, op. cit., and Farrell and Shapiro [1988] simply assume that a price must deduct the
cost in order to attract increased market share. Schinalensee and Conrad both derive explicit util-
ity conditions under which consumers will switch brands. In Schmalensee the consumer familiar
with a pioneering brand only buys a new brand of uncertain quality if the discounted expected
surplus of buying the new brand (taking account of the possibility that he will have to revert to
the old) exceeds the certain capitalized value of continuing to buy his old brand. As in our model
knowledge of the new brand is acquired through one period of experience. However, the pioneer-
ing brand's advantage in the form of known surplus is given ex ante. Similarly, Conrad assumes
complete information about the old brand whose advantage derives from the consumer's
knowledge. Allowing for ex ante uncertainty in both these models would allow (as in a search
environment) for marginal customers for whom continued repurchase is not optimal - as recog-
nized by Schmalensee in his Appendix D. With search there are always marginal consumers who
provide firms with an incentive to lower price. Transactions costs alone do not create sufficient
lock-in to deter rivalry. In the model of Section 4.4, while there are search costs in the form of
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the opportunity cost of acquiring information about the availability of reservation service, the
costs which make switching non-optimal are the opportunity costs of service enhancement which
will be incurred by even marginal consumers.
Klemperer analyzes pricing models with switching costs for both homogeneous [1987a] and
horizontally differentiated [1987c] goods. In the first it is necessary to assume that there no mar-
ginal consumers sensitive to price deviations in order to obtain the collusive outcome in sym-
metric noncooperative equilibrium. As this density increases from zero, the profit-maximizing
price ranges from the competitive to the monopolistic price in pure strategies. Our demonstration
that when service improves after a period of experience even marginal consumers will find it
preferable to remain with their old bank avoids the need to impose this assumption and
strengthens the monopoly result. In Kiemperer's model of horizontal differentiation it need only
be assumed that marginal customers are finite and that all consumers have switching costs. Since
products are differentiated both by tastes and switching costs, given the limited number of custo-
mers attracted by a price cut, the firm does not find it worthwhile to cut price by only a small
amount. When tastes change between periods so that the price cut need no longer compensate for
both preferences and switching costs, price ranges between the competitive and the monopoly
outcome.
In a sense all these models assume an ex ante, to the purchase period considered, advantage
of the particular brand to which the consumer is attached 28. An ex post advantage explains why
even marginal consumers who have just found their reservation level are not easily tempted by
the price offers of other firms. It also suggests why even forward looking consumers are willing
to commit themselves. Consider contractual or artificial costs discussed by Klemperer. To
assume switching costs arising from contracts begs the question of why the consumer would have
been willing to sign a legal contract in the first place unless the particular supplier had ex ante
monopoly power - which prejudges the issue of switching costs' creation of monopoly power.
In fact Kiemperer notes that first period competition in a market with switching costs may be fiercer in
order to build a customer base for the second period, unless higher market share makes firms more aggressive
and forward looking firms wish to reduce rivals' second period aggression, or consumers anticipate the higher
prices that will be charged by higher market share firms and respond less readily to lower first period prices.
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Our derivation also provides a rationale for the assumption that all consumers in the market have
switching costs. In the long-run all consumers with knowledge of the distribution will have
found their reservation level. Even if there are consumers for whom service does not increase
they are by defimtion in our context precisely the clients that banks do not consider worth com-
peting for.
Of course, we have ourselves introduced an ad hoc assumption in order to endogenize
switching costs: it is not shown formally that it is profit-maximizing for banks to increase service
quality after a period of learning about the customer. Chapter 5 discusses the justification and
provides empirical examples within the banking context.
Switching costs seem more likely to operate where consumers make direct gains from
remaining within a particular relationship. Items which are a repeated consumer purchase but
provide no additional benefit to their future use - Schmalensee considers a pioneering brand of
coffee - seem unlikely to generate such costs. Computer systems are an oft-quoted example of
products with lock-in because of the learning involved in their use. They provide an example
where we may distinguish between transactions and switching costs. Lock-in arising from learn-
ing alone would not be switching costs: some of this learning may be carried over to other sys-
tems and if there are some users who have barely acquired the skills they will be attracted by
quite low price cuts by others. But consider a user who after search has found the system most
suitable to his particular uses and in which packages tailored to him can be developed. There are
then future benefits from remaining with that system that can generate switching costs.
Consider Gale's [1987] analysis of monopolistic and competitive tendencies 29. Gale
embeds skeletal versions of the Bertrand and Diamond models in a single mixed stochastic
price-setting game. In the " ex ante" version of this game, prices are known before trade and, in
both the one-shot and the repeated game, the only equilibrium outcome is the perfectly competi-
tive price. In the "ex post" version, the buyer is attached to the seller before prices are known,
The same question has been analyzed by Monensen [1986] but the conceptual results are similar.
There are also several vety well-known models analysing the conditions under which there will be price
dispersion rather than a single equilibrium price, e.g. Salop and Stiglitz [1977]. Since the main concern here
is with the monopoly price outcome, we look only at the models that help explain the latter.
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and the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is the monopoly price, even in the case of many sell-
ers. This ex ante! ex post distinction captures the key feature of search costs and switching costs
which permits market power responding to price is costly for the consumer. In the ex post
model, the consumer must sacrifice current consumption if he is to respond to price, in the ex ante
model he responds to price freely. In the repeated version of the mixed game in which ex ante
and ex post are played with positive probabilities, (where the buyer knows which game is being
played, but the seller does not) price tends to the competitive price as the probability of playing
the ex ante game increases, and to the monopoly price as the ex post game becomes more likely.
However, with any positive probability that the ex ante game is being played, as the buyer's
discount rate tends to zero, price tends towards the competitive price. The buyer with the low
discount rate has very low costs of obtaining another price offer, which concentrates the price dis-
iribution downwards and, since finns do not know which game is being played, they have the
incentive to compete.
As in the switching cost model, poor information and the date of its acquisition are impor-
tant for market power because they determine the customer's attachment to a particular price-
setter. While Gale's one-buyer model cannot capture the heterogeneity of buyers in the market,
the case of the low discount rate buyer would correspond to the marginal customer, responding to
price differentials. Such customers provide an incentive to firms to compete, an incentive rein-
forced in Gale's model by the uncertainty of the seller. Switching costs remove this incentive
since there no marginal customers in the framework we analyzed (unless there are those whom
banks have judged poor prospects).
The effects of marginal customers are also analyzed by Stiglitz [1987] for a duopoly and
many-firm industry. He modifies the standard sequential search model by a) allowing for a posi-
tive density of consumers with zero search costs and b) explicitly considering the strategic
behaviour arising when there are a finite number of firms. Stiglitz's stress on the asymmetry of
information arising from the customer's individual knowledge of the price where he is, but not of
prices available on the market again points out how information acquisition tends to segment the
market. With a continuum of firms, a decrease in price will not bring extra sales, because even
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the consumer with small search costs will not find the lower-priced store. With a finite number
of stores, however, the small search cost individual will find it worthwhile to search, and price
falls below the monopoly price. It is only by taking account of the increased elasticity of market
demand, as small search cost individuals are attracted from many stores, that the usual associa-
tion between competition and many firms is restored. As long, however, as the density of consu-
mers with zero search costs is zero, no search is induced, and the outcome is the monopoly price.
It is this outcome that is modelled in the switching cost model above.
Harking back to our earlier description of the requirements for a monopoly price, we may
conclude that switching costs permit tacit collusion because they simultaneously make it expen-
sive for the buyer to move for lower prices and remove the seller's incentive to compete. Buyers
who have nothing to gain from staying have nothing to contribute to a competitive bank. Search
costs and transactions costs, without the matching element known to the price setter, involve a
greater degree of seller uncertainty and hence incentive to compete, as in Gale, op. cit.
We have apparently strayed rather far from the repressed financial intermediation context.
However, these models show that the association between imperfectly informed customers and
monopoly power is a very general phenomenon: whatever the peculiarities of specific models,
imperfect observabiity and hence costly learning (search) reduce consumer price response. Con-
sequently, in the pervasively infonnation-constrained financial markets of LDCs, competitive
pricing seems likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Writers on financial intermediation
have generally recognized oligopoly power but assume that this will be eroded in the absence of
government intervention. We have shown that if noncooperating banks have both the incentive
and a feasible environment, the rates they set are most likely to lie below the economy's marginal
opportunity cost of funds. In the next section we briefly examine implications for government
interest rate policy.
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4.7: Policy Implications of a Collusively-determined Deposit Rate
We have considered the effects on depositor and bank behaviour of the improved transac-
tions services a bank offers its clients once they assess each other favourably. The depositor
leaves a bank where he has found satisfactory service only if the deposit rate offered elsewhere is
high enough to compensate him for the loss of future improved service. This long-run ex post
matching of bank and client provides banks with stable market shares which, by making mono-
poly pricing individually profit-maximizing, allows noncooperative banks to operate a tacit col-
lusive agreement.
The monopsonistic deposit rate does not reflect the social opportunity cost of financial say-
ings and reduces the financial flows available for investment financing in countries where poten-
tial business borrowers have little or no facilities outside of the banking sector. Thus the market-
determined interest rates have results similar to those attributed by McKinnon and Shaw to
government usury controls30.
The orthodox policy correction for the social loss resulting from monopoly pricing is pre-
cisely the price controls criticized by financial liberalization theorists. The usual diagram in Fig-
ure 4.3 illustrates the effect of a floor on the deposit rate when the collusive duopoly set monop-
sony rate rm. LD is market demand for loanable funds, downward-sloping despite the constant
net marginal revenue (NMR) of the two banks because we assume that the revenue function
reflects the effects of service quality, administrative expenses etc. With rF, the deposit rate floor,
the effective supply curve facing a bank becomes elastic up to its intersection with D'. The sup-
ply of deposits increases and there is less rationing of investment funds.
Which is not to say that loan rate ceilings are not also responsible for such outcomes. But they are not
alone. And a well-founded observation of collusive behaviour may explain why monetary authorities have a
penchant for interest rate controls.
V.,
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Figure 4.3: A minimum deposit rare policy which increases financial
savings.
But, as is equally well-known, choice of the minimum rate is unlikely to be easy. Too high
a floor may create excess supply and/or induce the bank's exit. The latter seems improbable
given the usually close communication between banks and monetary authority in LDCs. Barba-
dos, the only one of our four Caribbean countries to practise systematic interest rate controls,
introduced a floor for the first time in 1978. It has been adjusted at intervals in line with interna-
tional rates and interbank consultations.
Financial liberalization theorists have criticized not deposit rate floors but loan rate ceilings
which are far more prevalent Ceilings are just the counterpart to a floor in a monopolistic loan
market and if monopsony power in the the deposit market tends to create monopoly power in the
loan market (see later discussion of Yanelle [1986]), a loan rate ceiling may be justified. But
fixing the loan rate interferes radically with banks' ability to fix risk-appropriate rates and screen-
ing contracts (see Chapter 7). The resulting inefficiencies in loan allocation may outweigh any
gain from expanded loanable funds. And, as Chapter 8 shows, taxes are the appropriate instru-
ment for correcting the externalities generated by the screening contracts themselves.
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There is another caveat to the apparent endorsement of interest rate controls. Recall that the
FOCs for the switching cost model were those of a collusive oligopoly on the assumption of
equal market shares or constant equal marginal revenues (MRs). In the absence of such constant
MRs a collusive oligopoly with unequal market shares would have to agree on side-payments to
members with lower marginal revenues. Official fixing of a loan rate would go a long way
towards the equalization and constancy of MRs (if they were not already so) greatly facilitating
collusive deposit rate pricing.
The last two paragraphs suggest that efficient policy requires an explicit formal model of
the strategic interconnections between the loan and deposit markets. Industrial organization's
focus on product markets has diverted attention from markets where firms behave strategically on
both input and output determination. As far as I am aware, only Yanelle's, op.cit., paper
addresses the question. Very generally, her analysis suggests that such markets may have more
scope for the creation of monopoly power than one would expect without intermediation because
an element of domination on, say, the input side, allows the intermediary to dominate the output
side as well. This may help explain why we tend to observe oligopolistic financial markets31.
In summary, the collusive behaviour hypothesized in LDC financial markets is derivable
from rational consumer behaviour and noncooperative banks' profit maximization in an uncertain
world. As Section 4.4 shows, the deposit function we have employed does not differ from that
used by financial liberalization advocates. Therefore the results obtained follow from their own
priors, viz, interest sensitive and service responsive deposits, imperfect information, the inter-
mediation functions of banks. We have merely formulated the results of banks' intermediation
services at the individual agent's level, applied a search framework (to take account of one aspect
of imperfect information), and considered strategic behaviour (to take account of rational bank
profit-maximizing). And, contrary to the usual advice, interest rate regulation can be justified in
such markets although several caveats are in order. Rational policy in this context requires careful
examination of the markets concerned and, in particular, does not suggest that simple
31 Note also that Yanelle's model did not incorporate the informational constraints that are fundamental to
financial markets and which, as we have seen, generally assist in price exploitation.
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deregulation will bring the investment expansion and growth usually claimed. Chapter 5 exam-
ines the service quality question from banks' perspective and Chapter 6 goes on to enquire why
entry does not help to erode market power.
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Chapter 5: ImplIcitly Contracted Service Quality
5.1: Introduction
We have shown that depositors will develop switching costs in the long-run equilibrium of
a search market if changing banks means that they lose an improvement in service at their current
bank. The object of this chapter is to describe why banks have an incentive to increase service
quality. Our argument is as follows. There are benefits to a long-term association between bank
and client because the bank can provide transactions services, particularly intertemporal, and
insurance services which customers value. Realization of their benefits requires that the services
be appropriately tailored to the preferences and means of the client. However, customers have
private information about themselves and the value they attach to the bank relation. We may
regard bank and client as signing an implicit contract at the start of the deposit relation. The con-
tract allows for the credible transmission of the information from client to bank by specifying a
performance-contingent level of service. Service rises over time because higher contingent ser-
vice reflects data processed about the client. The additional element modelled in Chapter 4 was
that rising service quality creates customer loyalty. Loyalty or switching costs can then be
viewed as the means by which the bank retains customers with profit potential. The contract is in
effect self-enforcing.
It has been usual to take the view that a long-term contract remedies the exploitation made
possible when a trader has switching costs which are given a priori. Here we argue that it may be
fruitful to take the converse view that the creation of switching costs is an endogenous means of
enforcing a long-term contract required for repetitious transactions where it is difficult for an out-
side party to judge the appropriate structure of trades 1 . This view is suggested by consideration
of service quality as a variable analogous to those in models where time-varying contract vari-
ables serve as a means of contract enforcement. Our view also reflects the bank-customer relation
analyzed in early credit rationing literature. In that literature the bank-customer relation is
For example, while not inconceivable, it would be veiy costly for courts to judge the appropriate levels
of account performance and service provision between bank and customer.
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usually assumed to exist as a result of bank knowledge of customers or because of jointness in the
demand for bank facilities. However, while the banking firm literature describes why the bank
values a continuing relationship, most models do not explain how it achieves it.
Section 5.2 describes what we mean by service quality and discusses the bank-customer
relation. Some authors (for example, Fried and Howiu [1980], Flannery [1982]) have remarked
the parallels between the notion of a long-term relation in the bank market and the contracts usu-
ally analyzed in the labour market. However, with those partial exceptions, the banking literature
does not appear to have exploited the similarity. Section 5.3 discusses models of long-term con-
tracts, arguing that the benefits which these models derive for long-term contracts have parallels
in the banking market which help explain banks' motivation to provide increased service quality.
Section 5.4 gives a simple informal example of banks' incentive to increase service quality when
customer type has been learnt. Section 5.5 discusses self-enforcement and our view of how
switching costs achieve this.
5.2: Service quality enhancement in the banking market
We are arguing that the necessarily long-term relationship between bank and customer is
governed by an implicit long-term contract which starts on the deposit side. This contract
specifies certain behaviour by the client and a contingent enhancement of service quality by the
bank. It complements the legal contract which determines price and repayment (deposit and
loan) by providing for the quality aspect of the trade. The contract is self-enforcing in that the
effect of its service quality specification is to create switching costs for both depositor and bank.
This notion of a repeated relation between bank and customer is widespread in the banking litera-
ture. We discuss the most closely related2 instances of it below before describing our idea of ser-
vice quality and its enhancement
The idea of better service because of a durable bank-customer relation has mainly been used
to explain credit rationing. Fried and Howitt [1980] argue that there is an implicit contract whose
2 Chapter 4 also refers to these ideas.
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terms specify that risk neutral banks protect their risk averse clients from loan raze fluctuations
and are compensated by borrowers' willingness to pay a higher loan ra&. The contract is
enforceable because switching banks is costly for bank and customer. They identify the source of
these switching costs as bank savings on administrative and screening costs in lending to old cus-
tomers. This assumes that the customers have remained in place. Except in so far as old custo-
mers are less likely to be rationed 1 clients' incentive to remain at one bank is not analyzed. In
addition, the idea that the deposit relation starts on the deposit side is only implicit On the other
hand, Flannery [1982] considers only the deposit side, viewing retail deposits as a factor of pro-
duction in which the bank has invested in a manner similar to the training Becker [1962] (see
Section 5.3) saw firms as providing. As a result, banks pay retail deposit razes above the marginal
cost of deposits in earlier periods in order to retain deposit accounts in which they have invested.
This analysis stresses the value of the deposit relationship but accounts only for retail deposits
and does not consider if or how that relation affects the customer as borrower. Devinney [1986]
considers only the loan market, describing the customer relation as the continued willingness of
bank and borrower to sign loan contracts with each other. Repetition improves banks' inference
about borrower quality and competition induces all banks to offer better contracts to non-
defaulters who therefore have no incentive to change banks. Although this characterization of the
bank-customer relation is based on the informational advantages which we stress, it does not
allow for the feedback from the depositor side of the relation which is generally seen as an impor-
tant component4. It thus ignores what would appear to be an important learning opportunity for
the bank, and one which could be cost-saving - learning only by the observation of default seems
a . costly option. Nor is there any relationship specific advantage of the durability since default is
observed on the market; the preferential treatment of established customers, which observers of
the bank market consider important (see Blackwell and Santomero [1982]) is lost.
By focussing on service quality enhancement over time in markets where depositors search
for service, we believe that we capture observed features of the relationship while explaining why
3 This gives nsa to credit rationing because the response of the loan rate to market fluctuations is reduced.
4 See Wood [1974], discussed in Chapter 4, and Flannery, op.cit.
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it is sustainable.
Service Quality
By bank service quality is meant the dimension of the total bank product which permits
banks to improve (or not) the agent's ability to transact over time and space. Hence better service
quality is an increase in an agent's ability to relax his periodic budget constraint and rearrange
(smooth) his consumption pattern over time, as well as to reduce transactions costs in any period.
Most generally, banks provide depositors with access to liquid assets that they might otherwise
have to hold in the illiquid, risky form of loans (or real goods). Where the liquid alternative may
be cash, which is especially relevant in LDCs, banks even provide accounting and security ser-
vices: savings book entries (for example) help keep track of receipts and expenditures. Different
clients require different methods in order that transaction ability is improved, an obvious distinc-
tion being that between firm and consumer. This description begins to resemble a horizontal
notion of differentiation. Note, however, that a bank provides a specialized service of transaction
facilitation and asset transformation. It has knowledge of how a particular client's preferences
can be satisfied, given his constraints, that the client himself may not have. The correct tailoring
of service thus represents a dimension of a deposit account which would be unanimously ranked
by depositors and some banks may be better at such tailoring than others so that their deposit
accounts would, at similar prices, be preferred by all depositors. This tailoring requires that the
bank acquire information about the customer which some customers may have an incentive to
misrepresent.
Improving Service Quality
In order to illustrate how service quality can be increased, three major areas are considered.
These are payment methods, credit and international payments. Take payment methods. Credit
cards and cheque guarantee cards provide their users with a facility to arrange purchases more
cheaply and conveniently over space and time, and are extended on the basis of criteria similar to
those used for loans, although at a rather lower level. They also represent a lower service quality
since they provide very much less scope for intertemporal allocation than does a loan (indeed, a
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cheque guarantee card provides none). For those with demand deposit accounts (passbook sav-
ings accounts have tended to dominate in LDCs), a cheque guarantee card extends the uses of a
demand deposit account and hence the service quality it embodies. If a credit card is used for
credit, a bank earns revenue on its use; on the other hand, losses are possible if the card is
unwisely issued.
Consider credit next. Observation of how a customer handles payments methods will assist
the bank in decisions about whether or not to extend credit and a positive decision increases qual-
ity. But the type and conditions of credit are subject to wide variation. The greater the speed with
which a bank is willing to extend a loan, and the more flexible the loan arrangement, the higher
the quality of service. Not only will the agent be able to effect his transactions more rapidly but
he wifi also be able to save on information production for the bank. There are also direct savings
depending on the type of credit facility offered. For small business, a loan account which com-
mits the client to paying interest on the amount lent on the account, rather than paying as he
draws down, as would happen with an overdraft, is obviously far less flexible. Some banks also
have facilities which cater to particular groups, with specialized loan officers who are able to
advise and offer special assistance to clients. Small business and agriculture are two of the
categories commonly available. Whether and what type of security is required for a loan will
also vary - with highly assessed customers having greater access to loans without security or with
less restrictive forms of security. A further example is provided by the case where a group of
companies are allowed to set off credits in one company account against debits in another. This
dissuades the company from holding accounts at other banks, at the cost to the subject bank of
foregone interest on overdrawn accounts.
Business customers' transactions are also facilitated through the issuance of, for example,
letters of credit. A letter of credit represents an improvement in payments facilities because it
reduces the risks of international trade between companies (importer and exporter) who are not
well-acquainted with each other. Such an improvement in quality will not however, be provided
by a bank to an importer unless the bank is satisfied of his client's "creditworthiness".
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53: Contract model explanations of tenure and its rewards
We describe the benefits attributed to long-tenn contracts and discuss how these apply to
the banking. The idea that longevity or loyalty in economic relations is both valuable and gives
rise to fixed costs which produce monopoly distortion has been around at least since Lewis
[1949]. Its sources in terms of human capital investment were first explored by Becker [1962],
whose insights have infonned several recent analyses, and its effects have been studied by
Rosenthal [1982], von Weizsacker [1984], Kiemperer ([1986a] etc.) and Farrell and Shapiro
[1988]. The analysis of how long-term relationships are implemented and of their benefits is pro-
vided in numerous models which compare long-term with short-term contracts. Many of these
are described in Hart and Holinstrom [1987]. Contract models have the advantage of deriving
loyalty, in the sense that they demonstrate the advantages of long-term contracts. However, to
the extent that the commitment necessary for the contract is assumed, loyalty is not assured,
except when third party enforcement is feasible. If not, the contract itself must provide some
surplus which the partners lose if they renege. Their main application has been in the labour
market where observed tenure between worker and employer is explained principally by asym-
metries of information between worker and employer, on-the-job training or worker insurance.
In the general formulation of the long-term contract model 5, the agent has private informa-
tion about some random variable (the state of the world), or undertakes a private action, which
influences his utility. He chooses a state-dependent action (message) observed, or the results of
which are observed, by the principal. The agent chooses a contract among those offered by the
principal. Roberts [1982] distinguishes three cases: where the probability of a state in any period
is dependent on past state realizations (serially correlated states), where the probability of the
state depends on past actions (behaviour dependent states) and where that probability is indepen-
dent of both past states and actions (time-independent economy). Finite long-term contracts
(when commitment is possible) are shown to improve upon short-term contracts in all cases
because later dates allow the spreading of risk. We suggest that there are similar reasons for
By far the majority of these are principal-agent models, assuming private informaxion.. Exceptions will
be noted.
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long-term contracts to be beneficial to a bank. Banks face risks in most client transactions. This
is obvious with credit but even deposits are risky in the sense that early withdrawal and fluctua-
tions make decision-making more difficult. This may partially account for bankers' concern with
'core' deposits (see Flannery [1982] who attributes the concern to their specific investment).
With serially correlated states (for example, where there is hidden information about type)
the principal can learn from observation of first period actions. As a result, he will be able to
extract an agent's surplus in future short-term contracts. The agent's realization of this distorts
his current actions (the ratchet effect). Long-term contracts which commit the principal to future
reward can remove such inefficiencies. A similar result is obtained in Baron and Besanko [1984]
while Laffont and Tirole [1988] study similar structures when only short-term contracts are avail-
able6. In the banking market information is also acquired in the early stages of the account rela-
tion. The difference arises because both bank and customer gain from the future reward so that a
long-term contract need not require explicit enforcement Depositors differ by "type": in their
honesty, management ability, wealth and income, inter a/ia. Type is private information to depo-
sitors for some of whom misrepresentation may seem advantageous, while the profitability of the
bank's revenue earning services depend on the type to which they are extended. In the opening
stage of the deposit account relation, the service extended is constrained by the bank's lack of
information; as the bank learns more about the depositor it is able to condition service on that
information, adjusting both the components and their proportions to customer needs and capabili-
ties.
Where states are behaviour dependent in such a way that the principal's expected utility is
increased by certain past actions, long-term contracts which shift some of the gain to the agent in
preferred states improve on short-term contracts. With the latter, the agent's knowledge that the
principal's second period payment to the agent (in a two period framework) will reflect his first
period action causes the agent to change his first period action so as to influence the second
period payment. Long-term contracts that commit the pnncipal to second period payments which
6 Both of these analyses are conducted in a regulator- as-principal, firm-as-agent framework.
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reward first period actions desired by the principal induce the agent to take the desired first period
action. Baron and Besanko also consider the moral hazard problem when future stales are depen-
dent on past actions by the agent, and find that contracts which commit the regulator to decisions
which increase the future marginal return to current actions are desirable. The degree of current
improvement rises if current actions are observable (no moral hazard). (See also Lambert [1983]).
In the banking market an increase in later service rewards current behaviour. A bank has
some standard of a desirable account stemming from both its direct conthbution to expected
profits and the informational contribution of its status. Large, stable deposits contribute directly
to reduction in liquidity risk and may reduce administrative costs. Deposits of a given size by a
single customer have lower relative costs than deposits of similar aggregate size by several custo-
mers. The latter customers may also be transacting more through other institutions which reduces
the information base for the bank. The more transactions a customer channels through the bank
the greater the informational content of the account. For example, the deposit of salaries provide
a direct source of information. These transactions can also of course increase non-interest earn-
ings, if there is a future reward for current activity, the customer's future utility will depend on
current activity and more care will be taken with account transactions at the margin. This
improves the probability of non-overdrawn accounts, lower administrative costs etc. For
instance, the customer who knows that he may wish to borrow from the bank later is less likely to
misuse his cheque guarantee card. Again, the contract enforcement requirement is reduced
because having monitored the account, the bank has acquired information which will improve its
future decisions and hence profits. If the depositor leaves at the end of the monitoring, this
advantage is lost. Positively related quality and tenure enables the bank to gain from its informa-
tion.
Some of the advantages mentioned above for the banking market would also apply if
expected future profits were independent of current action - for example, better current care
reduces the probability of high current administrative costs for banks. In a time-independent
economy, if the principal gains from the contract, the long-term contract improves on the short-
term by rewarding present action (effort) by future gain, especially where monitoring is difficult.
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This general result provides a rationale for positive tenure-eamings and effort-promotion
schemes.
Several labour market models derive similar time-varying contract variables though the
sources of the duration-linked payment differ. In Becker [1962] higher wages reflected produc-
tive training or, in the case of specific training, encouraged worker participation and discouraged
employer layoffs. Salop and Salop [1976] have high future wages as a screening device to induce
more productive workers to self-select; Guasch and Weiss [1980] interpret a lower first period
wage as workers' payment of a testing fee which discourages applicants who know themselves
unlikely to successfully complete the apprenticeship. Implicit contracts (enforced by reputation)
which specify wages first below and then above the value of marginal product are also seen as
discouraging shirking (Lazear [1981]). Hoimsirom's [1983] model, however, explained below-
marginal-product first period wages as a premium paid by mobile risk averse labour for insurance
against income fluctuations (layoffs). The implicit contract assumed in his model is enforced by
the firm's need to maintain a reputation for reliability.
There are thus several reasons for tenure rewarding long-term contracts. We have tried to
indicate how these may account for benefits to banks. Banks are the consumption smoothers par
excellence and as such require a repeated relationship with their customers. But the relationship
is fraught with asymmetries of information. A long-term contract helps resolve the asymmetries
by exploiting the extra dimensions provided by memory in a necessarily multi-period relation.
We have also suggested that since the bank reward, does not, like wages, represent solely a cost
to the bank, customers may be confident that the promised reward is forthcoming.
5.4: An Example of improving service quality
An example shows how a bank stands to gain if it extends improved service to customers
after it acquires information on their requirements and constraints. Suppose a subset of deposi-
tors consisting of two ex ante indistinguishable groups. Both groups require loans and other
revenue-generating services in order to undertake a project. Members of one group have skills in
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project management, accounting procedures etc. or are simply more conscientious and careful
managers. Members of the second lack these skills or are more cavalier managers7. Both request
the same loan. Although both groups are likely to claim credit management skills in order to
acquire a loan, the bank cannot trust such claims without verification. Members of the second
group can successfully be extended loans if the bank provides them with special monitoring and
assistance as well as the loans. On the other hand, if the bank takes no special care, their projects
will be unsuccessful and the bank incurs losses.
We denote the second group as the NACs (needing assistance and care) and suppose that
there are a proportion y of this group. There are (i-i) of the first group, CAN (who can take care
of projects without special assistance). When a loan and other services are extended to the CANs,
thebankobtainsareturnr. Ifasim rfacility is extended to theNACs, and thebank also pro-
vides special assistance, gross bank return is r > r. The return is higher because the NACs will
require additional revenue-generating services which their limited knowledge prevents them from
foreseeing8. On the other hand, if NACs are not assisted by the bank's specially trained loan
officers, their project fails and the bank loses, i.e. its return is -R. Let C be the cost to the bank
of offering special assistance and monitoring, where r <C <r'
Suppose a bank were to extend loans and services to recently acquired depositors about
whom it has not yet acquired any information. Knowing that the undifferentiated subset of depo-
sitors is made up of the two types, it has two options. It can provide special assistance to all
clients, earning a total return of
yr +(1-y)r -C = y(r -C)+(l-y)(r -C) ^ 0
Alternatively, rather than incurring the cost of special assistance, it can take its chances with the
two groups. In this case it earns:
(l-y)r -yR ^ 0
There may be alternaxive interpretations in terms of the 'technology' of funds management within a par-
ticular business context, so that it is not a question of vertically, but of horizontally, differentiated types.
8 We can, for example, imagine the NACs to be non-traditional producers of goods which have an export
potential and whose future activities may therefore require letters of credit, foreign exchange transactions etc.
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The inequalities indicate a supposition that neither of these options are profitable. In that case, the
bank would not wish to provide loans before identifying the groups. If it signs an implicit con-
tract to provide improved service which depends on the account performance observed during the
depositor-only relationship, it will learn customer characteristics, only offering special facilities
to those in need of them. Bank returns are in this case are:
From the NAC group: r -c > 0
From the CAN group: r > 0
Thus no loans are made in the first period but an appropriate credit package is offered in the
second, providing improved service. The bank is able to tailor the loan facility to client charac-
teristics. The information acquired through experience with the client thus allows the bank to
make profit-maximizing decisions. It therefore has an incentive to improve later service and the
promise of enhanced service is credible.
We may also ask why the client does not open deposit accounts at all banks and hence
enable all banks to offer improved service, thus avoiding the development of switching costs.
This seems unlikely for three reasons. Within the context of this example, first, the client's incen-
tive to do so is reduced by available loan uses. If the project undertaken is replicable with no
diseconomies of scale, or the borrower has alternative profitable opportunities to employ the
funds, obtaining several loans will be atiractive. It seems overly optimistic to assume that bor-
rowers have such a range of profitable opportunities available. If not, borrowing more than
required is unprofitable, unless default is intended. Second, from the point of view of the bank, a
component of its information gathering about a client is his debtor position. Clients discovered to
be in the process of acquiring multiple loans are unlikely to be well-regarded because, as noted
above, this increases likelihood of default. There is a third aspect In order for the bank to learn
about a client and to judge the information acquired as reliable and reasonably complete, the
deposit account size and transactions volume would have to be at or above some minimum level.
If too low, the bank may well refuse to extend improved service on the grounds that it has too lit-
tle reliable information; or extend veiy little improvement (credit card but not a loan). We may
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speculate that cases of low information content correspond to bankers' arguments that some
clients have not shown themselves to be creditworthy or to have bankeable projects.
5.5: Self-enforcement
In order for an implicit contract to be self-enforcing, it must be individually rational for the
participants to agree to the contract signing and their continued participation must remain indivi-
dually rational over the life of the contract. The association must generate a surplus over and
above what the participants could obtain by termination (see Macleod and Malcomson [19891).
Reputation is the source of surplus often considered (see Bull [1987], Holmstrom [1983]). Tho-
mas and Worrall [1988] show how time varying payments can enforce implicit contracts required
to govern long-term relationships where precommitment is impossible. The incentives to renege
on the contract when spot market payments are favourable are alleviated by varying the contract
wage9 so that it remains within a band of the current spot market wage. This results in serially
correlated wages. They also show that later rewards (the Holmstrom, op.cit., result), that is, ris-
ing wages, occur when the agent who gains little from the contract must be induced to stay on.
This result provides some support for our argument when we consider the depositor option to
change banks.
The deposit contract normally considered, which is legally enforceable, specifies that the
borrower (bank) will pay on demand (or at a specified date) the deposit made by the lender (depo-
sitor), together with the accumulated market interest or the interest determined at the time of
deposit. But the quality of the account is not enforceable by a third party. It depends on informa-
tion (monitoring results) and assessments that a third party does not have. That is, the legal depo-
sit contract is incomplete. Another implicit long-term contract would help if it is self-enforcing.
The example above showed circumstances under which the bank would have an incentive to
increase service. Chapter 4 showed that the searching depositor would have an incentive to
remain in the contract with enhanced service. The switching costs make trade with a third party
Thomas and Worrall consider the contract required when a risk-averse worka is insured against wage
fluctualions by risk neutral firms.
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disadvantageous and the very reward to performance which creates switching costs makes adher-
ence to certain performance (no unauthorized overdrawing, up-to-dale payments on credit cards
etc.) individually rational. But, as shown in Chapter 4, they also facilitate collusive behaviour.
A different view of long-term contracts in a relationship with switching costs is therefore
taken by Farrell and Shapiro [1989] 10 who are concerned with the opportunism possible when
buyers are locked into sellers because of relationship specific investment. They argue that long-
term contracts may remedy such opportunism by pre-specifying price but show that an incom-
plete contract, specifying the verifiable price, is only an improvement on the arrangement without
a contract if utilities are separable in the variables of interest. Otherwise exploitation in the
uncontrolled variable will eliminate the gain obtained from the contracted variable. Recognition
that a deposit provides a depositor with service facilities in addition to a direct monetary return
suggests that the existence of the enforceable deposit contract, which specifies only price and
term, is usefully supplemented."
The forward-looking consumer's willingness to sign a contract which will subject him to
later price exploitation could be explained by a marginal expected tradeoff. There may, however,
be another explanation. The contracts Farrell and Shapiro consider are bilateral contracts but the
price exploitation examined in switching cost models is a market phenomenon. It seems likely
that a bilateral contract wifi specify that trade takes place at the market price, with some adjust-
ments subject to choice which satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. While each indivi-
dual (depositor) signing the contract may well foresee the opportunities it provides for tacit collu-
sion, if he is small relative to the market he will judge that his refusal to sign the contract will
have no effect on market price but will harm him. Competitive prices have a public good aspect.
This makes the idea of exploitation-remedying long-term contracts less convincing. Farrell and
° Our view is closer to that of Aghion and Bolton [1987] where contracts between buyer and seller both
lock them in and enable them to extract an entrant's surplus.
1 Fairell and Shapiro also show that if switching costs are unobservable, incomplete price long-term con-
tracts may improve on a short-term contract by making it so inefficient for the seller to distort quality in order
to compensate for the contracted price that he may even refrain from doing so. Where switching costs are en-
dogenously determined precisely because of private information, the non-observabilicy of the costs them-
selves is not appealing.
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Shapiro do not take account of the possibility that long-term contracts may themselves create
rather than be a corrective for switching costs. Similarly, Hart and Holmstrom, op.ciL, argue that
lock-in can motivate (rather than maintain) long-term contracts. For example, Grout [1984]
shows that there may be inadequate relationship specific investment in the absence of a long-term
contract because the investor cannot appropriate all gains. We are arguing that, in some contexts,
it is the relationship-specific investment itself (in information by the bank who must wait to offer
profitable services, and in both information and reputation by the customer - see Chapter 4.4)
which permits the profitable and credible service improvement that in turn enforces the long-term
contract.
5.6: Concluding Remarks
The association between bank and client is by its very nature long-term: borrowing and
lending (and deposits are loans from the depositor to his bank) are intrinsically intertemporal. At
the most basic level this is because the long-lived individual is concerned with consumption
smoothing over his lifetime. At the same time the transactions are fundamentally characterized
by asymmetries of information. The implications of this have been most widely analyzed in the
credit rationing literature (see Chapter 7). The deposit contract has also been explicitly examined
in the Diamond-Dybvig- [1983] inspired models (see Chapter 2). Both contracts commonly and
simultaneously govern the association between a single agent and the financial intermediary:
depositors borrow from the banks in which they have deposited, the insured borrow on their life
insurance policies. The argument here is that the two facets of the association complement each
other because of the asymmetry of information that characterizes capital markets. Their function-
ing requires that information be credibly transmitted. The long-term depositor relationship facili-
tates this but in order for the relationship to be sustainable it must be enforceable: time-varying
service simultaneously incorporates information gained and provides an enforcement mechanism
by rewarding continuity. It is precisely because the deposit account provides information that
service can improve and that improvement ensures the customer loyalty which permits the bank
to benefit from the information.
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Chapter 6: Entry and Exit with Imperfect Information and Sluggish Market Share
6.1: Introduction
This chapter develops a model to show how the sluggish market share resulting from
switching costs, together with ex ante imperfect information about market prospects, can lead to
the exit of recent entrants. Previous models have demonstrated that locked-in customers consti-
tote a credible entry deterrent and that real switching costs may support monopoly pricing post-
entry. We add to these analyses by demonstrating that entrants may exit if they enter markets in
search of new business but are unable to attract a sufficient share of the lucrative established cus-
tomers, and find that the business they do attract is insufficient to cover their fixed or opportunity
costs. We also find that our results are sensitive to the number of incumbents assumed. A larger
number of incumbents implies more aggressive pricing on their part and the exit story is convinc-
ing in this case, since the entrant is then dependent on the new customers of lower value. Other
models of exit have only considered monopoly incumbency.
Our consideration of entry and exit in the finance industry is dictated by the need to recon-
dile empirical observations with two theoretical expectations. Firstly, the tacitly collusive prices
modelled in Chapter 4 would be expected to attract entry which should erode the market power
exercised by price setters. Secondly, the literature on financial intermediation in LDCs maintains
the hypothesis that inefficient intermediaries on these markets are protected by regulatory barriers
to entry.
Shaw emphasized the disciplinary role of charter policy in enforcing competitive behaviour
among financial intermediaries. This is in accord with the textbook model of a competitive
industry: in the absence of scale economies or regulatory barriers, monopoly prices attract entry
until prices are bid down to competitive levels. But, Shaw argued ([1973], p.88), existing "char-
ter policy does not make the most of competition among banks and other financial institutions".
It is the authorities' reluctance to issue operating licences that inhibits entry and permits incum-
bents to exercise oligopoly power in the repressed economy. However, models of strategic firm
behaviour indicate that regulation is not the only entry deterrent: entry may also be deterred by
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certain structural factors, one of which is switching costs. Observed behaviour in the Caribbean
suggests consideration of structural entry bathers is insufficient. Entry appears to have been all
too easy, with a record of entry, subsequent losses and failure and/or exit. The aim here is to pro-
vide an explanation of these observations.
Banks enter a market where they are at a disadvantage relative to incwnbents in two
respects. Current demand depends not only on current pricing but also on the market share result-
ing from past competition. In addition, new banks have fixed or opportunity costs of operation.
Bank entrants acquire mainly new customers of uncertain value and switching costs imply that it
is difficult to acquire market share among the established banking public. If the business pro-
vided by the new clientele proves insufficient, the entrant must exit. Our analysis has features in
common with several of the many models in the literature which consider entry and exit
behaviour. These are discussed in Section 6.2 below. Section 6.3 describes the Caribbean
environment being modelled and the simpler, duopoly version of the model is described in Sec-
tion 6.4. Appendix 6.1 presents the 3-firm version which is a better, but algebraically tedious,
description of reality. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2: Entry, Predation, Exit: A Survey
Introduction
While models of the potential for competition between firms have tended to concentrate on
deterrents to the entry of potential rivals, there is increasing recognition that entry deterrence, pre-
datory pricing and exit are closely connected. The behaviour analyzed under these categories
reflect ways in which the relative strengths of long-established firms and their potential competi-
tors interact, given the requirement of credibility for their possible strategies in response to
rivalry. Relative strengths are expressed in terms of committed capital, reputation, relative costs
(including advantages gained from experience) and the size of the expected profits to be defended
in the future markets. The surveys by Gilbert [1988], Roberts [1987] and Wilson [1989] all treat
these connections. A variety of models have considered conditions under which a) effective entry
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deterrence is possible, b) entry may result in predatory pricing or wars of attrition, c) entry may
be unsuccessful, culminating in exit. Switching costs have been analyzed as one of the funda-
mental features from which the behaviour described under a) and b) may result, but have not pre-
viously been considered as a cause of exit.
Entry Deterrence
Consider the key feature of entry deterrence: it depends on the existence of conditions that
credibly impede capital mobility (see Gilbert's [1988] survey). The idea is that a market contains
incumbents whose position is a given resulting from history or chance and who are able to
impede entry by virtue of a first mover advantage. Credibility is crucial (and is captured by look-
ing for a sub-game perfect equilibrium 1 - Selten [1975]) because rational potential entrants are
not interested in the pre-entry situation but in the present value of post-entry profits, since only
the incumbents' actions post-entry can affect entrants' profits. 2 Essentially, under complete infor-
mation, strategic entry deterrence requires that there be some link between the incumbent's posi-
tion pre-entry and the expected outcome after entry (Gilbert, op.cit.). It is this link that provides
credibility. Variables that provide credibility include sunk costs which constitute an exit barrier
for the incumbent, firm-specific scarce resources owned by the incumbent, cost-reducing experi-
ence and contracts which an incumbent may make with potential customers. Quality differentia-
tion (which requires an investment whose benefits to an entrant are reduced by competition, so
that customers are reluctant to experiment with his products) may also serve the same purpose,
as may a market where it is costly for customers to switch suppliers.
The contracts and customer-costs--of-substitution cases have been dealt with in the switch-
ing costs models most extensively analyzed by Klemperer. Klemperer [1987b] demonstrates that
very high or very low switching costs may deter entry because they act to lend credibility to
1 Players choose their optimal strategy given the strategies of others (a Nash equilibrium) in evety
subgaxne so that in later periods no player has an incentive to change his strategy, it being optimal for the
remainder of the game, i.e. for the subgame.
2 This assumes complete information. Under incomplete information, pre-enuy observations may be im-
portant to the potential entrant because they can provide information about the most likely post-entry out-
comes.
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post-entry strategies which reduce expected profits to the potential entrant. Increasing output
(lowering price) pre-entry builds a high base of customers, deterring entrants who will have to
pay their switching costs. On the other hand, low pre-ently output can signal that the incumbent
will fight in the event of entry, this tendency is likely to be more important in a market where
demand is growing or new customers are entering. As noted by Kiemperer, op. cit., and Farrell
[1986], as long as price discrimination is not possible, switching costs impose a certain ambiguity
on competitive behaviour. The market share in locked-in customers tempts an incumbent to
exploit these rents by pricing high (the 'fat cat' strategy stance 3), but the noncooperative instinct
induces him to fight by lowering price (the 'lean and hungry look').
Farrell and Shapiro [1988] analyze the fat cat effect of switching costs in a large market
where there is repeated competition for old and new customers, with the incumbent acting as a
Stackleberg leader in a pricing game. With no, or only moderate, scale economies, it is advanta-
geous for the incumbent to exploit its old customers with high prices, rather than competing
aggressively, so that the entrant is able to capture the new customers. As discussed in Chapter 4,
switching costs act to enforce tacit collusion, but here the collusion takes the form of specializa-
tion in old customers (the incumbent) and new customers (the entrant).
The effect of switching costs on entry when the lock-in is governed by an explicit contract
between buyer and incumbent is analyzed by Aghion and Bolton [1987] who find that the con-
tract provides the incumbent and a single buyer with monopoly power over the entrant. It may
both deter entry (since the entrant has to pay the customer's contract liquidation damages) and
impose a social cost if the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent.
Predatory Pricing
In the entry context rational predatory pricing emerges as a means of lending credibility to
threats of future action in a situation where the potential entrant has incomplete information about
the market and/or the strength of the incumbent. A strategy is usually considered predatory if it
This is Fudenberg and Tirole's [1984] terminology. See also Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer
[1985].
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involves cunent losses designed to maximize future profits by discouraging future entry or induc-
ing exit.
Kiemperer [1986b] demonstrates that switching costs can produce a pattern of pricing that
looks predatory. Immediate post entry price declines as the entrant captures, and the incumbent
defends, market share. Price later rises as both entrant and incumbent exploit their locked-in cus-
tomers. Similarly (Fudenberg and Tirole [1983]), where firms learn from experience, there is a
strategic incentive to increase output (lower price) in the early phase of competition because, not
only do later production costs decline as a result, but rivals' knowledge of the firm's lower costs
may lead the rival to reduce later production, facilitating later price increases.
A lack of common knowledge is required for 'real' price wars. Where one firm has infor-
marion on how profitable the market is likely to be for its rival the attempt to credibly signal
disadvantageous conditions, and hence influence a rival's future behaviour, can result in lower
prices as firms battle for market share (see Roberts [1987]). In the long run, however, firms do
not deviate from the action they would have taken under full information because in equilibrium
they are not fooled. The lowering of prices serves to permit credible separation between different
types of signalling (informed) firms.
These results may all be interpreted as battles for market share. There is also a class of
models where predatory action is able to alter rivals' behaviour. Thus Milgrom and Roberts
[1982] show that, when an entrant has incomplete information about the incumbent's preferences,
costly predation may reinforce a potential entrant's beliefs that the incumbent prefers predation.
It may thus deter potential entrants with opportunities for returns elsewhere that exceed the return
with predation. Kreps and Wilson [1982] also derive a similar result. The incumbent is here
investing in reputation whose present value exceeds the short-run costs of predation.
Exit
Relative to entry models there are not many models of exit. It is not uncommon for these to
aim at explaining an entrant's exit since, although empirical observation has suggested that large
incumbents may force entrants out (see Scherer [1980], Chapter 12), the theoretical expectation is
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that the entrant,, foreseeing an incumbent's losses from predatory pricing, will be prepared to wait
him out. None of these specifications capture our empirical story.
Entry-then-exit would be expected in contestable markets (Baumol [1982]) where free
mobility and the absence of sunk costs enforve marginal cost pricing. Potential rivals enter to
take advantage of a profitable opportunity and then exit. The entry-exit phenomenon observed in
the Caribbean is not consistent with contestability since entry there has often resulted in losses,
whereas the contestable markets' entrant is motivated by profit&
In Benoit's [1984] model with complete information, the entrant may leave if financially
constrained to withstand only a finite period of predatory pricing. The threat to fight induces
immediate exit, and with positive entry cost there is no entry, since the fighting incumbent will
eventually induce exit. This model produces a better explanation of the deterrence of small
entrants than of entry with exit.
Asymmetries of information are usually required for a convincing picture of entry with exit.
Benoit, op.cit., models an incumbent who is unsure of the financially constrained entrant's com-
mitment to staying in. Entry sometimes occurs, followed by predatory pricing which may end in
cooperation or exit depending inter alia on the probability the uncommitted entrant assigns to
staying in. The existence of financial constraints may explain cases of entry and failure of small
intermediaries in the Caribbean but the asymmetry in financial constraints is not attractive for
large multinationals.
Roberts' [1986] model also invokes incomplete information to generate predatory pricing
and exit after entry. In a situation where the incumbent has private information about the strength
of market demand and his quantity choice is unobservable, the incumbent has an incentive to sig-
nal low demand by increasing output. The entrant infers demand from the resulting market price.
A credible signal requires an otherwise-unprofitably-high quantity level (low price). In a separat-
ing equilibrium (where the information can be inferred from the signal - the only one considered
Of course, our postulates of switching costs and imperfect information are also inconsistent with come-
stable markets, but as hypothesized piiors they cannot serve to refute the possibility that the Caribbean bank-
ing market is contestable. The empirical observation of losses does so.
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by Roberts) the entrant makes the correct inference and exits only when demand is in fact low.
Thus predation does occur but does not induce more exit than would have taken place under
complete information. It is the entrant's learning that demand is low (as in our model), rather
than asymmetric Information, that explains exit here. However, entry with exit depends on the
non-observ ability of quantity choice, which does not appear a good representation of the financial
industry where price rather than output is the strategy variable.
These models consider entry onto an 'occupied' market where the entrant is at a disadvan-
tage relative to the incumbent, a structure similar to the empirical structure we model. Fudenberg
and Tirole [1986] consider a different structure where two firms enter simultaneously, each with
private information on its own opportunity or fixed costs, and exit time is the strategy variable.
There is dynamic selection game (war of attrition) in which the firms stay in until one becomes
more pessimistic about the strength of its rival, with the higher opportunity cost firm exiting first.
If duopoly profits increase fast enough, both firms may remain in. In contrast to the growing
market, Ghemawat and Nalebuff [1985] model exit in a declining industry. They find that the
largest firm leaves first, unless there are strong economies of scale. It is evident that neither of
these models would be a good description of our stylized facts (see Section 6.3) but, like Fuden-
berg and Tirole, we assume that fixed or opportunity costs are the basic cause of exit.
In Section 6.4 we show that entry with exit can be explained with the simpler assumptions
of sluggish market share and symmetric uncertainty about the volume of new demand if incum-
bent market share is not so great as to limit aggressive pricing and the entrant has fixed or oppor-
tunity costs.
6.3: Entry and Exit in the Financial Markets of the Caribbean
Entry and exit in the four Caribbean financial markets being considered have essentially
been free of regulatory constraints. Most of the large commercial banks are multinationals which
predate the current central banks, and their global size relative to the Caribbean economies is
such as to make their domestic failure a remote possibility. As a result, the regulators have not
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had, until recently, to be concerned with the protection of depositor motive for restricting entry.
Banking licences have therefore been issued to any international bank of good standing. Further,
far from wishing to protect the interests of established local interests - the usual reason assumed
for entry-inhibiting charter policy - the regulators have viewed new international banks as provid-
ing additional access to much-needed foreign exchange resources. Of the four countries, the only
one to impose any 'rules' which could deter foreign banks was Trinidad and Tobago which, as a
petroleum exporter, perhaps considered itself rather more immune to balance of payments con-
straints. However, these rules do not affect domestically owned institutions. In Chapter 4 we
argued that domestically owned competitors, in the institutional form of finance houses, did not
provide effective competition for banks in deposit-taking because of the riskiness attached to
their deposits. The perception of that risk is based not only on their prior lack of reputation but
on potential depositors' observations of their exit from market, following failure - the reputation
acquired proved to be negative. In this context, then, we should also consider such finance insti-
tutions as have tried to establish themselves as potential competitors with commercial banks.
The Bahamas' (see Ramsaran [1984], Ch.2) regulations, fixed in reaction to fraudulent
operations prior to the central bank's establishment, require a banking licence and the publication
of operating statements, and establish the right of supervision. No capital asset requirements are
specified. In Barbados, it is only as a result of the recent establishment of regionally-owned
banks or locally-owned finance houses, that the authorities have begun the process of revising
banking legislation in order to lay down capital requirements for banks. Previously, capital
requirements were not fixed for the branch banks 5 which dominate the banking sector. With an
obviously prudential motive, existing legislation mainly constrains advances to insiders, restrict-
ing loan size to single customers and equity participation in domestic non-bank companies to
25% of paid-up capital and reserves, as well as providing the authority for inspection and mone-
tary policy measures (see Central Bank of Barbados [1986]). Similarly, entry regulations in Bel-
ize do not impose capital requirements. Legislation provides for prudential rules restricting loans
Branch banks have no legal status separate from the parent company.
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to any single customer from exceeding 25% of bank capital (Luben [1983]). None of these regu-
lations seem likely to deter entry - even the prudential measures may have little force because the
capital and paid up reserves refer to those of head office liabilities in the case of multinational
banks. In effect, the regulatory authorities have relied to a considerable extent on the banks'
management capabilities and the discipline of reputation maintenance in dealing with the multi-
nationals as well, of course, as on the supervision of the banks' national authorities. The situation
in Trinidad and Tobago differs somewhat because most multinational banks assumed subsidiary
status6 after 1970 when government required that existing banks have a minimum of 51% local
equity participation. When "localization" took place in 1972, capitalization share issues were
made to meet capital requirements.
In general, there are capital and reserve fund requirements for locally or regionally incor-
porated banks but these are not fixed to deter entry. There are also non-regulatory costs of estab-
lishment. The major item of set-up costs would be an initial loan from headquarters. While this
may represent only "seed" money, in view of the size of the multinational banks' assets relative
to the economies of the islands, it remains an opportunity cost of operating in a particular econ-
omy until adequate local deposits have been acquired. The only sunk costs may be pension funds
etc. for employees. It should perhaps be mentioned that exchange control regulations permit the
automatic repatriation of both after-tax profits and "shares in head office administrative
expenses".
It would appear that the entry decisions of the commercial banks are made on regional
and/or global strategic grounds, the domestic economies of the individual countries having little
influence. For example, following the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and International Sugar
Agreement of 1953, prescribing sugar export quotas, the Bank of Nova Scotia entered the region
to take advantage of the resulting boost to economic activity. Citibank entered Trinidad and
Tobago in 1965 and Barbados in 1968, during its worldwide expansion. More recently, the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International, apparently in the process of expanding into the Latin
6 That is, they acquired a legal identity separate from the head office bank.
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American market, opened offices in Miami, Jamaica and Barbados, and is in the process of nego-
tiating with the Trinidad and Tobago government
The ease of entry and exit is demonstrated by the experience of Barbados. Towards the end
of the sixties there were four long-established banks (Barclays, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Nova Scotia). On the US banks' global expansion
wave of the sixties and seventies, Citibank (1968), the Bank of America (1969), Chase Manhattan
(1971) and the Bank of Chicago (1974) entered. However, none of these newer entries were very
long-lived. It has been hypothesized that the major factor in their exit decision was their failure
to attract sufficient large-scale depositors, and the concomitant business, to make their operations
viable. The only one of them with some success in this area, Chase Manhattan, was the longest-
lived, exiting only in 1986. Both the Bank of America and the Bank of Chicago exited in 1978.
Their portfolios were taken over by the government-created Barbados National Bank (BNB),
benefiting from the substantial deposits of the Barbados Savings Bank, which formed the basis of
the BNB's Commercial Division. Citibank left in 1984, its assets being purchased by the
newly-formed Caribbean Commercial Bank (owned by a Trinidad and Tobago-incorporated
insurance company) which later also bought Chase Manhattan's assets. In 1983 there was a new
multinational entrant: the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. Whether or not these
latter remain is also thought to depend on whether they will be able to attract sufficient custo-
mers.
Except for a relatively brief period between 1973 and 1974, the entry of these banks does
not appear to have had a substantial effect on the pricing behaviour of the banking sector. In
1973 there was some attempt to actively compete on posted deposit rates but these were frus-
trated by official action. It could be argued that the official regulation of interest rates in Barba-
dos throughout this period had a determining influence on the banks' exit decisions and
behaviour. Two facts are inconsistent with this argument. Firstly, legal ceilings on interest rates
had been in effect in Barbados for many years (for example, the ceiling was raised from 6% to
8% in 1961) and forward-looking banks would have taken this into account in planning post-
entry strategies. For example, the Bank of Chicago entered after the reimposition of ceilings.
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Secondly, the ceilings were usually several percentage points above actual rates. The ceilings
became effectively binding only in October 1973 when they were removed, to be reimposed,
although at higher levels, when the new central bank saw the resulting jump in rates. Nor does
the flurry of rate competition experienced in 1973 (see Howard [1976]) appear to have been
greatly influenced by domestic battles for market share. The rise in rates at that time mirrored
the global rise in bank rates resulting from world-wide inflation. The average three-month euro-
dollar rate rose from 5.94% at the end of 1972 to 10.99% in the third quarter of 1973 at a time
when the banks had heavy commitments on the eurodollar markets. By 1976, the ceilings again
ceased to be effective constraints on rate movement.
The entry of non-bank competitors is illustrated by the Trinidad and Tobago experience.
The petroleum boom in the 1970s increased disposable income and liquidity in the Trinidad
financial market but commercial bank loan rates did not fall (Bourne [1985]). High liquidity and
increased demand for housing construction and consumer durables provided an incentive for the
entry of finance houses. Between 1970 and 1978 finance houses' share in the financial assets of
the household sector grew from 0.6% to 2.3%. These institutions were also subject to looser
regulatory constraints, with a legal reserve requirement of only 3% (banks' requirement was
14%) and closer ownership connections with the corporate sector than banks are permitted. How-
ever, far from serving to stimulate competition, their relatively unimpeded entry into the market
has resulted only in failure of several of these companies. The only available analysis of these
failures is a treatment which falls within the ambit of political science rather than economics:
Paths [1984] assesses the events surrounding the failure of one of the largest of these finance
houses, rather than the conditions which produced failure. However, Parris characterises the pro- -
cess as a 'game being fought for control of the financial system in the country' between the 'old
financial elite' and the 'post-colonial political elite'. In less rousing terms, his discussion sug-
gests that the regulators' wish to encourage a more competitive financial system was frustrated by
the dominant banking firms' oligopolistic control of financial resources. The run on deposits,
which started when the finance house and its holding company reported a loss, could have been
stemmed
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'... with financial support from the old financial elite, (this option), though acceptable
and possibly the option most preferred by the Central Bank, was obviously unaccept-
able to the old financial elite, whose goal was to eliminate these "fringe" institutions.'
(Parris, op.cit., p.25)
A 'shallow pocket' type of explanation may apply: newer institutions, who are more vulnerable
because of their smaller, less valuable customer base may require substantial financial resources
in order to withstand adverse factors. Then dominant banks, who provide considerable support to
each other in terms of interbank loans, can restrict rivalry to the oligopolistic group simply by
refusing to extend similar facilities. However, Parns's discussion does not rule out the possibility
that the institution was ineptly (unethically?) managed and hence not a viable proposition for res-
cue, unless administratively restructured.
Other failures of similar institutions have occurred in Trinidad and Barbados. The explana-
lion proposed here is based on the idea that these firms see large profits of existing banks, (or, in
the case of Barbados, the restrictions on banks' credit operations) as providing an opportunity for
profitable operation. This may in part be fostered by the looser regulations. However, the esta-
blished banks are able to hold onto their market share, and the new entrants' inability to capture
substantial volume makes them highly dependent on the value of the business obtained from ini-
tially unattached customers, which they cannot observe until they start operating. If this is not
sufficiently lucrative, it does not cover their fixed costs, the resulting losses scare those customers
obtained, and failure follows.
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6.4: A Model of Bank Entry and Exit
Background
Our empirical context has suggested that there are market feawres relevant to an explana-
tion of entry-with-exit which are not considered in existing exit models. For example, (a) switch-
ing costs have not previously been considered as an influence on exit, (b) models usually require
an asymmetry of information to give exit, (c) only duopolistic post-entry competition is con-
sidered. With reference to (c) a point of interest is that the plausibility of exit under our assump-
tions depends on the numbers already in the market, which determines the degree of aggression
displayed by incumbents. This aspect of potential competition is not captured in models which
consider only monopoly incumbency - all other models in fact.
We wish to explain why potential rivals to long-established intermediaries in the banking
market of the Caribbean have been unsuccessful entrants, testing the idea that their failure to
establish themselves resulted from their inability to capture a sufficient market share of the most
valuable customers on the market. The 'test' consists of discovering whether we can show that,
with switching costs producing sluggish market share, a noncooperative equilibrium exists in
which banks enter the market, only to exit if they learn that the business provided by the clients
most readily acquired is of low volume. The assumptions of an uncertain volume of new business
whose realization is learnt at a cost are consistent with the incomplete information environment
McKinnon Shaw described for LDCs.
Assumptions
1) We model market growth by the entry of new customers whose business volume is less than or
equal to that of old customers. Switching costs require that old and new customers be dis-
tinguished. Therefore, Farrell and Shapiro [1988] consider new customers, but view new and old
as homogeneous, except in attachment. But, unlike a one-shot business, banks are concerned
with customer prospects - the distinction between new and old customers arises in part from the
uncertain value of new customers, a distinction made by credit rating agencies, for example.
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2) It is assumed that banks are faced with a net demand for services and set a single net price.
Although it would be desirable to model banks as rate setters in both their input and output mark-
ets, a model incorporating this feature, as well as entry behaviour and uncertainty, is unneces-
sarily complicated. In addition, deposit and loan rates are not set independently. Thus, while
recognising that important aspects of strategic behaviour may be obscured, we may view banks as
setting their rates in tandem, the loan rate being determined as a markup over the deposit rate to
cover the marginal costs and risks of credit. It is equivalent to the usual assumption of price-
setting with zero marginal cost.
3) The demand function assumed is a linear version of that in Farrell [1986], who used the gen-
era! form to indicate how the inertia created by switching costs influences the one-period problem
of two established firms. Current demand of firm I in period t with two flims, I and j is given by:
= hu_i+p,—p,
where hi,_1 is the market share inherited from the last period, and current demand only exceeds
original share if current price is less than the rival's. The price differential captures sluggish
price response. This function has the linear form usual in models of differentiated product mark-
ets (see Friedman [1986]), recognizing that switching costs serve to differentiate an otherwise
homogeneous market. It illustrates the conflicting incentives of firms in markets with switching
costs when price discrimination is ruled out: to price low to capture additional customers and to
price high in order to exploit their existing market share. Those with the highest market share
have the most to lose by lowering price and hence will tend to price higher. Total industry
demand is assumed inelastic.
4) It is assumed that new customers allocate themselves to banks in inverse proportion to existing
market share. In this way we allow for customer recognition that high customer base banks will
set the highest prices.
5) We attempt to capture a pricing feature peculiar to banks. Most product market models assume
single product firms so that each competitor need fix only one price. However, single-price deter-
mination, on even one side of its market, is obviously at variance with bank practice. Banks usu-
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ally set a range of linked interest rates. Deposit rates may be fixed by term and/or size of deposit,
reflecting the fact that customers fall into segments which may be determined by income and
opportumty, among many other possibilities. The introduction of new customers basically seg-
ments the market served by the banks. As a result, banks fix prices which, given the additive
separability of the demand functions, are themselves additively separable in customer types. We
can therefore regard a bank as determining a price structure whose components depend on the
type of customer the bank has, or wishes to attract.
6) We assume that the entrant has a periodic fixed cost of operation, or an opportunity cost (com-
pare Fudenberg and Tirole's [1986] model). Given the net price strategy used, the entrant must
have a cost of operation which is independent of scale in order for exit to be a possibility. But the
assumption, and the asymmetry it induces between entrant and incumbent, is quite realistic when
considered in the light of our stylized facts. The relative positions of long-established and
newly-arrived financial institutions do differ, especially when both institutions are multinationals
owned outside of the domestic economy. The localised incumbent operates with already trained
staff and domestic management and owns their infrastructural facilities. 7 Their familiarity with
the economy and market participants implies that they already have the base (that is, non-specific
to particular loans) economic information necessary to undertake loan allocation. On the other
hand, the entrant must maintain expatriate management, paying assignment costs and staff train-
ing costs that do not vary with the volume of business undertaken. It also has to acquire the
basic, and costly, information required for financial intermediation in the specific economy. In
addition, if, as argued in 6.3, multinational banks tend to enter particular regions on global stra-
tegic grounds, they would need to consider whether the opportunities foregone by operating in a
particular economy are justified by the profits there. By virtue of their enduring incumbency, one
could presume that long-established intermediaries have already decided on the particular econ-
omy.
7 Thus the Central Bank of Barbados 119861 green paper proposes that such facilities could constitute the
capital fund for already-established banks.
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The market game is viewed as having two stages. A new bank and new customers enter a
market with one (or two in the appendix) established bank(s) at the beginning of the first (entry)
stage, the new bank attracting an above average share of new customers. However, the magni-
tude of the business provided by the new customers is not known to the banks. Incumbent(s) and
entrant fix prices simultaneously, taking account of the effect current price has on future market
share and hence profits. It is only after observing profits at the end of this stage that the banks
are able to assess the value of the new customers. If this value is high enough to cover its oppor-
tunity costs, the entrant stays in. If not, it exits and the incumbent(s) acquire its customers and is
a monopoly (compete as a duopoly) in the second stage. The one incumbent/one entrant version
of equilibrium behaviour is described below. In this the entrant acquires all the new customers so
that the incumbent must infer their value from the entrant's exit decision (he has not had the
opportunity to assess their value himself).
The model was initially formulated with two incumbents and one entrant because, given our
priors about the importance of established market share, the concentration of share resulting from
monopoly incumbency seemed likely to misrepresent empirical strategic behaviour. The algebra
of triopoly is cumbersome in this linear model, however, and is not necessary to an intuitive
understanding of the model structure. The triopoly model has therefore been largely relegated to
Appendix A6. However, in line with our initial intuition, the results of the triopoly version do
provide a more plausible picture for exit. The interfirm elasticity of demand means rivalry
among fewer firms, especially between two firms only, is diluted - the entrant acquires a higher
share of established customers because of higher incumbent prices. The fewer the incumbents,
the fatter the cat8 and the less incentive there is to lower price. (See also assumption 3) above).
Not only does the monopolist's size encourage price exploitation but a high share acquired by the
entrant increases the latter's second period price and reduces second period rivalry if the entrant
does stay in. This suggests a type of collusive tendency.
Considered from the viewpoint of the global market place, the model is rather akin to a
To use Fudenberg and Tirole's, op.cit., expressive terminology.
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search model, although we are looking at decisions within one economy (store) only (in the
short-run). Expected losses for one period are the costs of acquiring information, given a strategy
of locating the most profitable markets. In the long-run within a region (presuming that there is a
known distribution of customer values by region) banks' expectations will prove correct and they
will locate an economy appropriate to their fixed costs.
Model
Consider a market where customers acquire switching costs once they have opened
accounts and banks with higher market shares charge higher prices. A bank entrant into a
monopolistic market will acquire all the new customers (see assumption 4))9. Therefore his
expected demand in the entry period is
	
hEl = N + Pu P
	 (6.1)
whereas the incumbent has demand
	
= L + PEI Pj1
	 (6.2)
where hEl is the demand faced by E in period 1, Ne is the expected volume of new business, p is
the incumbent's price in period 1. L is the volume of established business which we normalize to
have value unity.
Nature chooses N according to distribution p which gives the banks' prior beliefs. Banks
are not informed of the chosen N. It is assumed that incumbents and entrants have common
beliefs. Banks cannot assess the 'value' of new customers until they have had the opportunity to
observe the net revenues resulting from operation of their accounts after first period pricing. The
expected volume of business provided by new customers is
N =pNa +(1p)N"
where Nb <N ^L = 1 and p is the prior probability attached to the occurrence of Na. We
assume that new customers enter the market only in the first stage of the two-stage game.
In appendix equation (A6. 1) K =2, lEO = 0 and 4o = I.
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E, the entrant, has a fixed or opportunity cost, F, of operation, in each period and we
assume that this is such thatE prefers to leave the market if it learns thatN =Nb. That is, we are
assuming that
fl2(Nb) ^ F < fl 2 (N)	 (6.3)
where the superscript d refers to duopoly equilibrium values 10. 11 2 (Nb) is thus E's profits in a
second stage duopoly when N = Nb. This exit rule is known to the incumbent banks.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [1982]). This
requires that a player's system of beliefs and strategy (its assessment) be both consistent and
sequentially rational. Sequential rationality requires that the strategy of each player starting from
each information set be optimal starting from there according to some assessment over the nodes
in the information set" and the strategies of the other players (Kreps and Wilson [op.cit.], p.87).
The consistency condition is that the assessments obey Bayes' rule so that a player's beliefs must
be consistent with its knowledge of the structure of the game and its knowledge of other players'
strategies, satisfying rational expectations.
A strategy for firm k specifies: i) a first stage price, t1 , ii) for the entrant an exit rule
according to the realized value of N at the end of stage 1 and iii) stage 2 prices from the realiza-
tion of stage 1 demand and the exit decision. An equilibrium occurs when each bank maximizes
expected discounted profits given that its rivals are following their hypothesized strategies.
Where information about N is symmetric but incomplete, prices are chosen with no direct infor-
mation about the magnitude of N or other banks' choices. We assume that the banks do not
directly observe N but must infer this from profits. That is, banks require a period of 'learning' to
assess new clients. With a monopoly incumbent who has no opportunity to learn about the new
customers directly, their value is inferred from E's exit decision. At the beginning of the second
10 Noze that small d is used to indicate duopoly in the model with monopoly as an alternative. In the
model of the Appendix, where the two possible market snuctures are duopoly and triopoly, capital D is used
for duopoly values.
The information set is the set of decision nodes among which the player cannot distinguish, i.e. the
player does not know at which precise decision point he is in fact located among the possible set
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period, banks have observed the previous period's demand and prices. In period 2, therefore,
banks know the value of N. Each bank chooses price to maximize period 2 profits conditional on
its period I observation of demand and the exit decision. In period 1 each chooses the price that
maximizes expected discounted profits given its period 2 decision rule and its hypotheses con-
cerning the behaviour of rivals, particularly the entrant's exit rule.
Equilibrium behaviour
Only equilibrium behaviour for a monopoly incumbency is analyzed here, although corn-
parisons are made with the results of the duopoly incumbency model given in Appendix A6. As
usual we begin by considering stage 2. In equilibrium E will know the magnitude of N from his
first period profits. If E exits his customers move to incumbent. If E remains in the market the
banks compete as a duopoly.
If N = Na , the entrant remains in the market and chooses pE2tO maximize:
flE2 =	 = pE2 [ hEl(N ) + P12PE2]	 (6.4)
where 1i 2
 is the price E conjectures that i will set. hEl (Na ) is the demand resulting from pricing
in Stage I when N =N°. Since N =N andE has remained in, i maximizes:
'Tb2 = p 2 h12 = p.2[h1(Na) + PE2
-p12 ]	 (6.5)
The first order conditions give best response functions:
PE2 = ..[ hEl(Na ) + 1i2] and	 (6.6)
p12 = +[ !a ) + J2]	 (6.7)
These best response functions are illustrated in Figure 6.1
± '()
p
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Figure 6.1:
Reaction Functions for Stage 2 Duopolistic Competition
t1EI (N°)
In a Nash equilibrium where each firm take the other's prices as given, simultaneous solution of
the best response functions give equilibrium duopoly prices:
a_iPE2 -	 + h.1(Na)]	 (6.8)
where the equilibrium price is symmetric for incumbent i. Equilibrium price depends positively
on the market shares of all banks, with greater weight given to own share. p 2 > pf if
hEl (N°) > h.(N°), that is, if E's inherited market share is larger, and conversely. In the final
period since higher market share provides an increased incentive to price high, bank services are
strategic complements 12 and banks' prices are increasing in all shares. Substituting prices of
the form in (6.8) for i and E into the demand functions in (6.4) and (6.5), evaluated at equilibrium
prices, realized demand for E in stage 2 is
= .. [2h 1 (N°) + h .1 (Na )]	 (6.9)
12 B regards A's product asa strategic complement ifB responds to an ii ;rease mpA by raisingp 8 . If
B is decreased, the products are strategic substitutes: Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [1985].
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It is evident that if i begins the second period with a higher market share and hence prices higher
in period 2, he loses customers to E. E's second period profits are, from (6.8) and (6.9):
ri 2 = 4
. 
[2hEl(N4) + h. 1(N)]2	 (6.10)
These are the second period profits which E will expect, and symmetrically for i, when he has
learnt N = N' at the end of period 1. In order to find the effect on second period profits of first
period market share and hence first period pricing, substitute for hEI and h. 1 , evaluated at N =Na
from (6.1) and (6.2) into the profit functions of (6.10). Duopoly second stage profits for E in
terms of stage 1 prices are
fld = 1[a +L
	 (6.11)
and for I they are
= 4. [2L + N' + E 1_p11 j2 	(6.12)
If E has exited at the end of stage 1 because N = Nb , I will inherit all his customers and
since market demand is inelastic he will set the reservation price and obtain monopoly profits
which we denote by fl(Nb,L). E's profits in the particular market considered are zero.
Consider the first period. The incumbent knows that E has entered and its exit rule. The
distribution of N is common knowledge. Current price influences current demand as well as the
volume of business that the banks will have in the second period. The entrant therefore chooses
first period prices to maximize expected discounted profits:
ErIe + F (1-i-6p) = EI1E1 + 8pfl2(Na)
—pE1 I N +p,1—p1] + .. [ 2N 42 +L P11PE'2	 (6.13)
where 6 is the common discount factor, and p is the probability that N = Na , that is, that E will
remain in the market and compete with I in the second period. The first order conditions (which
are necessary and sufficient for this problem) give the best reply function for E:
E1 = E29_8)J1 [(9_43)pN a + 9(l_p)Nb - 2SpL + (9 - 26p)]	 (6.14)
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Similarly, I maximizes expected discounted profits over the two periods:
En. = En. 1 + 8pflNa) + 8(l_p)flNb)
= p,1 [L +pE l —pIi] + .2- [2L +N PE1Pjl'2 + 8(Ip)fl(N")	 (6.15)
i 's best reply function is therefore:
p. 1 = [2(9 -Sp)r' [(9-4.3p)L - 2SpN + 9-2Sp) E I]	 (6.16)
In contrast to the second period best replies (compare (6.6) and (6.7)), we note that a rival's inher-
ited business volume has a negative effect on the optimal price of each bank. E starts the period
with N customers and the first derivative of i 's price with respect to N is negative, while I starts
with L customers and the first derivative of E's price with respect to L is negative. Whereas con-
sideration of only the single period problem illustrates only one aspect of the incentives in mark-
ets with switching costs - that of pricing high to exploit customer base - the forward-looking price
reflects the incentive to price low in order to build a customer base for the next period. The
higher the current share of rivals, the more there is to be gained from such pricing and hence price
is negatively related to rivals' share. These conflicting influences on first period pricing are illus-
trated in Figure 6.2's three panels. Panel 6.2a illustrates the upward pressure on prices of the
accommodating incentive given by own-share, omitting others' market segments from the inter-
cepts of the reaction functions. Panel 6.2b illustrates the competitive tendency by ignoring the
own-share effects on the intercepts and panel 6.2c shows the actual reaction functions which are
the vertical (horizontal) sum of the functions in panels 6.2a and 6.2b.
Solving (6.14) and (6.16) simultaneously, and simplifying, we obtain the equilibrium first
period prices:
p 1 = [6 (9-6p)(27-.4p) ] 1 {P[ 3(9-4.6)(27-46p) ^ (9-2p) [3(9_2ö)_4S(6-öp)]] Na	 (6.17)
+ 3(1-p)[9(27-4Sp) + (92p)2] Nb
+ [3(9_asp) [27-2Sp(9--6p)] _66p(27_46p)] L}
?oei .jc,
(-Lsf )L 
—2set4°.
2(.Sp)
?oiei 62J,-
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Figure 6.2: Reaction functions for Stage 1 duopolistic
compel ton
'Li' (q't i-	 -
r' (r)k
e --eT' Na
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p,d1 
= [3(27_46p)]_1{2[27_2P(9_6P)]L + p[3(9_2Sp)_46(6_p)1Na + (l_PX9_269)N b} (6.18)
We may note that components of net price are always greater for the market segment in
which a bank 'specializes'. The differences between p and p 1 are given by
	
d	 d
	
Pj1	 E1 = (27-46p)' [(9-2Sp)L - p(9_2S)Na - 9(l_.p)Nb ]	 (6.19)
For the L segment Pi 1 exceeds PE 1 and vice versa for N. We would expect the entrant to price
lower overall given its need to attract reliable clientele, and this is indeed so in the single period
problem. In a single period game (6=0), p ' —p 1 = (1/3)(L —N') > 0 However, in the two
stage game E's incentive to offer lower prices is reduced by the possibility of exit before it could
gain fully the returns on those prices. A large probability of N" increases E's price (except for the
unlikely N component).
Pricing is less competitive in the duopoly first period game. In the triopoly model other
banks' market share have a negative influence on equilibrium price (compare these prices with
those in equations (A6.19) and (A6.20)). Here they do not. The incumbent's monopoly of
known, established customers makes exploitation of market share more attractive than in a duo-
poly. However, differentiation of (6.19) and comparisons with the effect of p on the two prices
separately indicates that at higher p. when E is more likely to stay in, and expected N more valu-
able, i prices more competitively.
As a result of these prices, in period 1 banks obtain new business which varies for E accord-
ing to whether realized N is Na or N". Substituting p. 1 and E1 from (6.18) and (6.17) into (6.1),
where N is evaluated at N for (6.20), and at N" for (6.21):
	
h 1 (Na ) = (27-46p)-' [(27_9p_26p)Na - 9(1—p)N" ^ (9-26p)L]
	
(6.20)
	
= (27-46p)_'[(18+9p-46p)N" - p(9-26)N + (9-2p)L]	 (6.21)
Since i does not begin the period with N customers he has no opportunity to evaluate them in the
first period and must infer their value from E's decision. He obtains first period business
= (27-4Sp)' [2(9..-6p)L + p(9-2)N° + 9(l_p)N b ]	 (6.22)
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Summing over these demands gives total market demand: h 1 (N4 )+h 1 = L +N4 and
h 1
 (N")+h. 1 = L +Nb, so thatby specifyingvalues forp and 8 we may obtain relative shares. It
turns out however that the value of 6 makes little difference so we consider these shares with
8= 13• Although E's price for N exceeds i 's, E keeps most of its new customers, whatever the
value of N and p. In contrast to the case with entry period triopoly, E obtains almost a third of
the L customers, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. With only two banks competing, the incumbent's
price remains sufficiently higher than the entrant's for the latter to attract a considerable portion
of the established market. Exit seems far less plausible in this model: with so few firms the col-
lusive tendency common in switching cost models becomes dominant and the market tends to be
shared - compare the entrant monopoly of new generation and incumbent monopoly of old gen-
eration results of Farrell and Shapiro's [1988] model. In the triopoly model the outcome is very
different: E obtains only a small proportion of the L customers and is thus highly dependent on
the N customers. If the business provided by these is not sufficiently great, remaining in the
market is not worthwhile. Table 6.1 shows market shares resulting from first period pricing in the
duopoly model and Table 6.2 provides, for comparison, the shares obtained when there are three
firms competing in the entry period. It assumes that the two incumbents begin the game with
equal market shares of the established customers.
Comparison of (6.20) and (6.21) shows that hEl(N°) > hEl(N1') if Na > N e', as expected.
Thus, at the end of period 1, we may specify the beliefs held by E conditional on demand and
prices as: E assigns probability 1 to Nb if pEl hEl ^ pEl hEl(N ) and probability zero to N' if
pE1 hE1 > pEl hE l(N' ). These beliefs are consistent Bayesian updating given N and N" and the
exit strategy is optimal given these beliefs.
13 This facilitates comparison with the values in the appendix and suggests that the simplification of uni-
tary 8 made early in the appendix model does not affect our conclusions.
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Figure 63: First period duopoly market shares
0, = i's origin for N customers; Og = E's origin for N customers. 0 O =1= L measures the old cusio-
mers. - : indicaics martet limits when N =Na; - —: indicates market limits when N =Nb
k%0 f	 c
- 141 -
Table 6.1
Comparison of Stage 1 Duopoly Market Shares
(percentage)
N4	 Nb	 L
p = 0.8
incumbent, 1
	
23.5	 7.56	 68.91
entrant, E	 76.56	 92.44	 31.09
p = 0.2
incumbent	 5.0	 27.48	 67.18
entrant	 95.0
	
72.52	 32.82
Notes:
*: 6=1 in these calculations
Table indicates shares of the market segments in the column headings when the incumbent is a monopol-
istsothatincumbentandentrantcompetcas aduopoly inperiod l.Thus,intheeventthatN =N4,with
beliefs attaching 0.8 probability to that eventuality, the incumbent acquires 23.5% of the new customers
(rst entry).
Table 6.2
Comparison of Stage 1 Triopoly Market Shares
(percentage)
N4	 Nb	 L
p = 0.8
incumbenti	 28.2136 25.3939 48.1523
incumbent j	 28.2136 25.3939 48.1523
entrant, E
	 43.5728 42.2124	 3.6955
p = 0.2
incumbent 1
	
25.7779 26.3866 49.6621
incumbent j 25.7779 26.3866 49.6621
entrant, E	 48.3034 47.2268	 0.6758
Note: The table shows percentage share of each player in the market segments shown in the column head-
ings when the incumbency is a duopoly so that entrant and incumbents compete as iriopoly in period 1.
We have assumed that i and j begin the game with equal shares, 110 = Ijo = 0.5. Consequently, since
their strategies are symmetric, their market shares are equal.
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Stage 2 profits are obtained by substituting hkl (k = i,E) into profit functions of the form in
(6.10). Thus when E is in (N = Na):
n12 = (27-48p) 2 [ (183p_2p)N6 - 3(l-p)N" + 2(6.-p)L 12	(6.23)
fl = (27-46pY2[(l5-2p)L + (9^3p_2Sp)N0 + 3(1_p)Nb]l 	(6.24)
As the rational expectations nature of the equilibrium suggests, we check that exit is indeed
consistent with losses when N = N 1'. While F has not been specified, if rI 2 (N41 ) > 112(N")
there will be values of F for which (6.3) is satisfied. E's second period profits when N = Nb
given by (6.10) with hEd I (N1') from (6.21) and h from (6.22) substituted:
fl 2 (N") = [3(27-4ôp)]- 2 [(45^9p_86p)Nb + 6(6-8p)L - p(9-28)N6 J2	 (6.25)
and comparison of (6.23) and (6.25) shows that N6 > Nb is required for E2 (N6 ) > fl 2 (Nb)
We also need to check that E's entry would be rational. That is, that the expected profit
from entry is nonnegative: expected net revenue exceeds F. For this we require that expected
demand in period 1 (E hE l) and expected profits in period 2 exceed realized hEI and flE2, respec-
tively, evaluated at N = N". Expected period 1 demand is:
EhE1 = pN6 + (1_p)Nb + PI1PEI
= 
(Z1-4.8p)' [p(18^28_46p)Na + (l—p)(18-4Sp)N" ^ (9-. 28p)L 1	 (6.26)
Again, the only requirement for Eh 1 > h 1 (Nb) is N6 > N".
E's expected period 2 profits are pfl2(Na)+ (1—p)0 which is just (6.23) times p. They
exceed realized profits at N = N b when:
[3J(18_3p_26p)^9_2ö]N a > [45^9p-88p+9'I(I-p)]N"
	
(6.27)
+ 6(6-6p)(1—")L
Clearly, this condition is more easily satisfied for high values of p. Setting 6= 1, when p = 0.8,
satisfaction of (6.27) implies N° ^ 1.0638 N" + 0.0739, and, taldng N6 at its maximum value of
unity, N" must not exceed 0.8706 in order that (6.27) be satisfied. The permissible range for N"
is more restricted for low p. For example, a similar comparison when p = 0.2, requires Nb below
0.2358.
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Calculation of market shares in the second period when E has remained in (N =N)
emphasizes the collusive tendencies of the market when there is a monopoly incumbent. Second
period duopoly demands when there is successful entiy (N =Na) are given for E and i by (6.28)
and (6.29), respectively,
h 2 = (27- 4öp)' [(18- - 26p) N - 3(1-p) N' + 2(6 - 6p) L] 	 (6.28)
h = (2l-4p)' [(15-2Sp)L +(9+3p-2p)N° +3(1_p)Nb] 	 (6.29)
The calculation of market shares for these demands indicates that if N = Na , so that E remains in,
he obtains almost half the established customers, while keeping about 5/8 of the new. Given the
separability of the functions, the second period share in L is invariant to the value of N so exit
because of failure to obtain a sufficiently high number of the high value customers is unconvinc-
ing. In second period triopoly, however, he obtains only 20% of the more valuable customers
while the incumbents capture about 30% 14 of the new customers (see Table A6). Exit therefore
seems sensible in this framework only for more than two firms - which is not an unattractive
result from an empirical point of view since we may otherwise be called upon to explain the
presence of several banks in all the markets being considered.
6.5: Discussion and Conclusion
Specifying current demand by a rather general functional form with market share and price
differences as arguments, Farrell showed that in the second period of a market with switching
costs a large finn charges a higher price but not one that is so high as to erode its market lead.
Using a linear version of this demand function we have expanded the model to consider the
effects of first period pricing, the entry of new customers of uncertain value and the entry of new
competitors. As in Farrell's model, market share has the status of a state variable which deter-
mines the strategic variable, price. The requirement that a firm enter, possibly to experience
losses, in order to ascertain the value of new business is intended to capture an informational
14 The p value used makes little difference to these proportions since, although influenced by the uncer-
tainty of stage 1 prices, stage 2 prices are set when N's value has been learnt.
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feature which appears more important for banks. They cannot, for example, conduct surveys and
reseaith to learn market potential, as can commodity sellers but must experience their custo-
mers 15 . Losses experienced in the first period, if staying in proves infeasible, are therefore the
cost of information acquisition.
Incumbent banks are at an advantage in that they have a known customer base and no fixed
costs. The enirants are acting on beliefs alone and we have restiicted the information on which
they condition their posteriors to their own observation of demand. It could be advantageous for
an incumbent to attempt to influence either potential entrants' priors or posteriors since the
incumbents stand to lose by entry, whether or not the entrant eventually exits. Post-entry attempts
will give another equilibrium(a). We can informally consider what such an equilibrium would
look like. By lowering price the incumbent could reduce the clientele available to an entrant and
thus try to persuade him that N = Nb . Of course, the resulting price observed by the entrant
would be inconsistent with the price expected given his priors and the entrant would not be
fooled; this is not a convincing equilibrium since if N = N, the incumbent will have lost on price
without having gained by exit. It could also be consistent with our story to assume that incum-
bents have better information about N and/or an entrant has less information about L. (We have
assumed that the entrant knows the value of L customers, presumably because it is able to infer
this pre-entry from its knowledge of incumbents' payoff functions). With such asymmetric infor-
mation between competitors, we will be in the world of Roberts' [1986] model where the
incumbent's privileged information about the strength of market demand produces predatory
pricing to try and induce exit. Pre-entry strategic pricing for deterrence, of the type analyzed by
Kiemperer, op.cit., also seems a possible equilibrium response to threatened entry. With uncer-
tai.nty about market demand, low price would both signal low business volume and build custo-
mer base. There are thus two counts on which entry may be dissuaded with lower prices.
15 Thus the established banks are also uncertain of the value of new business.
- 145 -
Comparison of the monopoly incumbency and duopoly incumbency models suggests that in
markets where loyalty/switching costs are important, the number of firms may be important to the
equilibrium found. Given a market of fixed size or growing only slowly, (and switching costs are
most significant in such markets) the number of firms determine the market share (customer base)
which in turn detennines strategic stance16.
Consider the model in our empirical setting. There is some, probably regional, exogenous
event which banks expect to expand the demand for their services. If their beliefs about prospects
are sufficiently optimistic, multinationals enter the market to take advantage of the new business.
They probably have a larger incentive to enter a market when their rivals are doing so - especially
a market with switching costs where they are easily pre-empted. If they find it to be sufficiently
lucrative they will stay in the market. But if the new business is insubstantial, and banks fail to
acquire a sufficient share of the old, they will exit having acquired costly information about
regional prospects 7 . Of course, if they enter several regional markets simultaneously they may
well find one where staying is profitable. Having entered a market, the fewer the incumbent
firms, the better their chances of staying in since larger banks are less aggressive in the face of
entry. The cost of information acquisition therefore rises with the number of incumbent firms and
we therefore expect the rate of entry to decrease over time. In an apparently more competitive
market (one with more firms) entry proves to be harder - a collusive oligopoly is essentially its
own protection here, provided it does not collude during the entry period. Even if there are only
prudential restrictions on the issue of bank licences, a number of banks, among whom long fami-
liarity may help tacit collusion, will not be seriously challenged by outsiders seeking profitable
opportunities. The result is consistent with observations in Caribbean markets and suggests that
one should not necessarily expect financial liberalization to encourage competitive entry.
16 We may also recall Scotchmer's [1986] model showing there is no stationaiy Nash equilibrium for
more than two firms where there are marginal customers with zero switching costs. Any firm with less than
half the market is torn between increasing price and losing customers, and decreasing price and attracting
more sales from both his own clientele and the marginal customers of other firms: demand becomes more
elastic at lower prices.
17 Domestic entrants will have acquired information about new areas of activity.
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Appendix A6: The Exit Model with Triopoly in Stage 1
Equilibrium Behaviour
Here we consider the same problem as in Section 6.4 but assume that there is a duopoly
incumbent. Normalizing the volume of established business, L = 1k, where Ik is the market
share of bank k, at unity, and denoting the volume of new business by N, any bank k acquires the
following new customers in a period in which new customers enter the market:
___ N
where K is the number of banks and division by (K-I) ensures that market shares sum to N. In
period t in which new customers enter, a bank on the market, say i, with rivals k and j has
current demand:
= 'il-i + (K-l) (1 -Ijj)N + (p,, -pa) + (pt -pa)	 (A6.I)
where !, = hj is bank i's share of established customers, its demand resulting from pricing in
the previous period. Total industry demand is assumed inelastic. For a single bank current
market demand only exceeds inherited market share and the initial acquisition of new customers
if P: - p > 0 and/or p - p > 0. That is, the net price of bank i is below those of other banks.
Demand in any period depends on both current and previous prices. With this function, when
considering more than two firms, we obtain the rather unconvincing implication that, for any
bank to attract more customers it need only price below the average price of other banks on the
market. That is, from (A6.1)
(pJ +pk,)h,>hjg fpit<	 2
In the usual interpretation, symmetry of the firms justifies this. Here firms differ because of their
market share. But a similar justification is available if we treat long-established banks as having
similar market shares, as we would expect. We will therefore be assuming that 10 = lj O = 0.5,
although for the purpose of keeping track of the effect of market shares on price, we maintain the
Is explicitly.
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For a bank entering a previously duopolistic market in stage 1 at the same time as the new
customers, expected stage 1 demand is given by
hEl = N' + Pu - E1 + P11 - E I	 (A6.2)
and for an incumbent bank, i, by:
hg1 = 110 + ... (1 - 11 oN' + p1 - p11 + E 1 - P 1	(A6.3)
where Io is bank i's share of established customers from the pre-entry stage 0. In (A6.1) K = 3,
and the entering bank has no established customers (l Eo = 0).
In equilibrium in stage 2 the players will have learnt the magnitude of N from their o
demands. They also know whether or not E has exited. Banks therefore solve a one period prth-
1cm. If E has exited we assume that its customers distribute themselves randomly among the
remaining banks in the market
If N =N, E remains in the market and each bank i chooses p12 to maximize:
'112 = p12 h12 = p12 [h1i (Na )+2_pL2 +2_p12 ]	 (A6.4)
where I and j denote the incumbents. 2 is the price I conjectures that j will set The maximand
is symmetric for j and E. h i(Na) is the demand resulting from pricing in Stage 1 when N Na.
This gives best response functions:
p12 = [ hIl (N0 )+Pj2_PE2 1 	 (A6.5)
In triopoly (denoted T) equilibrium, i's price is
T - 1'
i2 -	 [3hll(Na)+hEl(Na)^h. (Ne )]	 (A6.6)J1
As discussed with reference to equation (6.8), price depends positively on the market shares of all
banks, with greater weight given to own share. Substituting prices of the form in (A6.6) for i, j
and E into the demand function in (A6.4) evaluated at equilibrium prices, realized demand for I is
- 1
- S. L 3hIl(Na )+ hEl(Na )+ hJl(Na )]	 (A6.7)
and i will have increased its market share (h12 > h 1 ) if its previous share is less than the average
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of the other banks. Or, assuming, as discussed above, that established banks begin with similar
shares, the entrant (an incumbent) increases its market share in period 2 if the business acquired
in period 1 is less than that of the incumbents' (entrant's): because its inherited market share is
less, its period 2 price is also lower since it has a greater incentive to acquire more customers.
Multiplying (A6.6) and (A6.7), profits are given by
fl =	 (A6.8)
Substituting for the period 1 demands from (A6.2) and (A6.3) the triopoly profits for i in period 2
can be expressed in terms of stage 1 prices:
=	 [34o+1jo+4.Na(5_31io_Ijo)+2fii+ri_4pii]2 	 (A6.9)
If E has exited N = Nb , then i (and j symmetrically) maximize
fl 2 = pj2[hIj(Nb)+hEl(Nb)+L2_2]
	 (A6.1O)
where it is assumed that E's abandoned customers open accounts at random with the remaining
banks. The best reply functions are given by:
p12 = 4[ hIj (N1')++hEl (N") + Pj2]
	 (A6.11)
Given consistent price conjectures, solving (A6.1 1) for i and j simultaneously, equilibrium prices
are given by
pt
 = +[2J1gl(N11)+.-hEl(Nl)+h.l(Nb)]
	 (A6.12)
-
12
the resulting share of bank business obtained in stage 2. Superscript D denotes duopoly equili-
brium variables for the Appendix model. Duopoly profits are therefore given by:
fl/ = [2hllNb^hElNb+hJlNb]2
	
(A6. 13)
Substituting in (A6.13) for h11 , hEI and	 from (A6.2) and (A6.3), given the realized value of N,
stage 2 profits in terms of stage 1 prices are:
=	 Ijo+ Nb (4.5_24 o _1jo) +	 - 1.5P11] 
2	
(A6.14)
-149-
Consider the first penod. The incumbents know that E has entered and its exit rule. The
distribution of N is common knowledge. Current price influences current demand as well as the
volume of business that the banks will have in the second period. The entrant therefore maxim-
izes expected discounted profits:
EI1E + (l+8p)F = E flE 1+ 6''E2 (Ne)
Substituting from (A6.2) and (A6.3) into HE1 and E2' this maximand becomes:
EHE =p1[4-N	 1Jj12PEl]
^	 [..Na(5_1jO_1jO)+IjO+1jO+,1+1_4pEl]2
	
(A6.15)
where 6 is the common discount factor. The incumbents also maximize expected discounted
profits:
F!, = Efli^öpfl1(Na)+6(l_p)fl1(NlP)
and, using (A6.9) and (A6.14)
F!, = p. 1 [ 1 + --p(1—1,o)N" + .-(l--p)(1Io)N" +fi1 +J.1E —2i]
+ .-6(1 —p)[21 0 4	 ^ Nb (4.5_211 o_1jo) - l.5p,1 + i.s	 J2
+	 (A6.16)
The first order conditions give the best response functions
PE1 
=(100_168p)_1{ 
.1.p(25-2O6+4&)N + .j.(1_p)Nb —4öpL +(25_88XPii +fiu i)]	 (A6.17)
p, 1 = (200_256_73Pr 1{ . -[75_5O6^ 146p] 40 — . {25&_ 136pJ lj o	 (A6.18)
+ 1 25(1_leo)_206+46(3lso+ljo)] N°
+ (1_){ 25(l-1,o)-37.56+ 2.(2Jio_1Jo)] N'
+ (5O_256+96)fii+2(25_86)i}
Solving (A6.17) and (A6.18) (with 6 set equal to unity for ease of calculation) we obtain the first
period equilibrium prices:
E1 
= [5(25O_488)]1{
	 [ (12S_24P)+(15+8p)L] N°	 (A6.19)
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+ ..(l_)[ 2.5(200-32p)+ 13Q.(25_8P)LJ Nb 
_P(15+8P)L}
p. 1 = [5(200 + 2p)(150 —1 6p)(250 - 48p) ]-'	 (A6.20)
{ 
J3Q.(25o_48p)[252(6_3 .8p)+ 19p2] — 2P(15+8PX25_8PX200+2P)] 40
- .J3Q(25o_48p)[252(6-4.84p)_35p2] + 2P( 15+8P)(25_8P)(200^2P)] 'JO
+ (200+2p)[(1 25-24p)(75-8p) + (I 5+8p)(25-8p)L] + 50(1 25-24p)[(75-29p)Ij o — 5(87_5.08p)4o]] N
+ (1 _P)(200^2P)[ l25(I25-24p) + 5(25-8p)(1 00—l6p) + J Q. [25(l2S-24p) + (25_8P)21L] Nb}
In contrast to the second period prices (compare (A6.6)) we note that price is decreasing in rivals'
business volume at the beginning of period 1 (negative coefficients on L and ljO in (A6.19) and
(A6.20), respectively). Whereas consideration of the single period problem illustrates only one
aspect of the incentives in markets with switching costs - that of pricing high to exploit customer
base - the forward-looking price reflects the incentive to price low in order to build a customer
base for the next period. This tendency is more profitable, the higher the current share of rivals,
and hence price is negatively related to rivals' share. On the other hand, a high starting share of
old customers (high 40) reduces the starting share of new customers and hence has a negative
impact on price when N = Na ' since lower price will attract new customers if E remains in the
market. If E exits (N = Nb ) incumbents have less incentive to attract N business since they will in
any case obtain E's share.
It is easily seen that p ^ (^)pj i as h O ^ (^) leo. However, a comparison between E's price
and that of the incumbents is more difficult. The components of net price are always greater for
the market segment in which a bank "specializes", e.g. the coefficient of L in P11 exceeds its
coefficient in PE1. We would also expect the entrant to price lower overall given its need to
attract reliable clientele, and this is indeed so in the single period problem. In a single period
game, where N was known to have value n, equilibrium prices are
PEI = 1ff2 +IjO+hjO)	 (A6.21)
P11 = --(31o+1jo+(2-1eo)n)
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However, in the two stage game E's incentive to offer lower prices is reduced by the possibility
of exit before it could gain the full returns on those prices. The differences between P11 and pE1
are given by(withL=1,110=ljo=O.5)
i', 1 -P = [3(200+2p)(l50-16p)(250-48p)]' 	 (A6.22)
{ 
2p(250-42p)(325-t-27p) +
- p(lOO-i-p)[60(15+8p) + 27(250_48p)JNa
- (I_p)25(1OO^p)(15O.I6p)Nb
For the L segment Pit exceeds PE1 and vice versa for N. Price differences for L and Na
greater at high values of p since banks are attempting to differentiate themselves in anticipation
of fiercer competition next period - prices on others' shares are lower, but price on own share is
higher for greatest current benefit. But for N' the excess of PE1 over p is larger at low p since E
then tries to make the most of current opportunity.
As a result of these prices, in period 1 banks obtain the following business which varies
according to whether realized N is Na or N":
hEI (Na ) = [(IOO^p)(I50-I6p)(250--48p)]' 	 (A6.23)
{(100^P)(75_8P){ (250_4Sp)_34pL] Na
- lO(1-p)(IOO-4-p)(75-8p)(5--.J3Q.L)N"
+ 1 +(250-48p)(650^54p) 
+ 40(15+8P)(100^P)] L}
h. 1 (Na) = [(100+p)(150-16pX25O-48p)]—'	 (A6.24)
{250_48P){ (lOO+p)(I50—l6p) - 252(6-4.1467p) - p2] 110
+ (250._48p)[ 252(6-4.4933p)— 17p2] ho
- 20p(15+8p)(100+p)L
+ 2.5[ (25O4Sp)[p(945_79.8p)ljo^(3OOO_p(87S8O.2p))1 0J + 4P(15^8p)(100-fp)L] Na
+ 5( l-p)( l OO+p)(75-8p)(5_ .J3QL ) N1}
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Summing over these demands for all three banks gives total market demand
h1=L+Na
k-.j.E
so that by specifying values for p we may obtain relative shares. Although E's price for N
exceeds I 's, E keeps most of its new customers, whatever the value of N and p. And it obtains
only a small proportion of the L customers - 0.68% when p = 0.2 and 3.7% when p = 0.8, see
Table 6.2. Since the excess of p i is larger for high p. the proportion obtained by E is higher in
the latter case. E is thus highly dependent on the N customers. If the business provided by these
is not sufficiently great, remaining in the market is not worthwhile.
When N =Nb, realized demands at the end of period I are given by:
hEl (Nb) [(IOO+p)(15O-I6p)(250-48p)]'
	
(A6.25)
{ (l00+P)(75_8P){ (250-48p) - l0(l_PX5_.L)]
- 34p(100fp)(75_8p)Na
+ 1 (2SO-48p)(216.6667+ l8p) + 40(l00-fp)(lS+8p)]
h,1 (Nb ) = [(lOO+p)(150-..16p)(250-48p)}-'	 (A6.26)
{ [(I OO+p)[(l 50-1 6p)(250-48p) - 2Op(I S+8p)] - (250-48p)[252(6-4. l47p) + p2]] '10
+ { (25O-48p)[252(6-4.4933p) - 17p2J - 20p(l00-f-p)(15^8p)] 'Jo
+ (l00+P)(75_8P){ (l-1,o)(250-48p) + 5(l_P)(5_JQ.L)] N'
+ Sp[2L(IO0^p)(I5^8p) +(125-24p)[(945-79.8p)lio—(585-83.4P)1,o]] Na}
Comparison of (A6.23) and (A6.25), and of (A6.24) and (A6.26) shows that hkl(N6 ) > h(N,,) for
k = I j ,E if N > Nb , as expected. Thus, at the end of period 1, we may specify the beliefs held
by E conditional on demand and prices as: E assigns probability 1 to N" jf
El'E1	 pEl'El(N')
and probability zero to N" if
PEI'¼l > PElhEI')
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These beliefs are consistent Bayesian updating given M and Nb and the exit strategy is optimal
given these beliefs.
Stage 2 profits are obtained by substituting hkl (k = i j ,E) into the profit functions of the
forms in (A6.8) and (A6.12). Thus when E is in (N = Na):
flt2 +F = .[(1OO+p)(15O_16p)(25O4p)12 	 (A6.27)
{ 
(100+p)(75-8p)[(250--4SpX5--L)-68pL] Na
- 2O(1_pX1OO+p)(75_8p)(5_J!L ) Nb
+ [(250_48p)[( 1 5o_lopxloo+p) + 433.3125p + 36p2] + 80p(15+8p)(IOO+p)] L}
fl= ..[ (1OO+p)(15O-16p)(25O--4p) ]_2	 (A6.28)
{ [ 
(25O-48p)[ 3(lOO-i-p)(150-l6p) - (252(12-8.2934p)--p2) i]
+ [(.so_48p)[(1oo+px15o_16p) + (252(12_8.9866p)_34p2)]] IjO
— 40p(100-i-p)(15+8p)L
+ [6p(loo+px525^8p) + (250-48p)[5(lOO-s-p)(75-8p)
- 3(2S2(12o 2p)-274p 2)1 • o — (252(12^8.2p)+826p2)lj o]] N
+ (1_P)..Q.(1OO^P)(75_8P)N"}
With E's exit (N = Nb ), the incumbents' profits are given by (A6.29):
fl = [3(100^pX150-16p)r2	 (A6.29)
{ [ 2(lOOi-p)(150-lóp) — (252(6-4.32p)_8p2)]
+ [(Ioo^i:15o_1p) ^ (252(6-4.32p)_8p2)] io
+ (100^p)(75-8p)(3.5-4o) Nb
+	 2.S[(I3O5-76.2p)lo-(22S-87p)lo] — 13.5(IOO+p)} Na
As the rational expectations nature of the equilibrium suggests, we check that exit is indeed
consistent when N = Nb . While F has not been specified, if fl 2 (Ne ) > fl 2(N 1'), there will be
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values ofF forwhich
fl2(N") ^ F <fl2(Na)
E's triopoly profits when N = Nb are given by an equation of the form (A6.8) with appropriate
substitutions of hkls:
ri 2 ^ F = -Ø[ (100^p)(150-16p)(250-48p) ]_2	 (A6.30)
{ (100+P)(75_8P)[ (250-48p)(5--L ) - 20(l_p)(5_i3Q_L)] Nb
- 68p L (100+pX75_8p)Na
+	 + 80p(15^8pX IOO+p)] L}
and fl2(Na) > fl 2(N") jf
Na (100+p)[ (75-8p)[(250--4Sp)(5—L ) - 68pL I + 68pL (75-8p)] > Nb (100^p)(75-8p)(250-48p)(5-L)
which clearly holds given Na > Nb
We also need to check that E's entry would be rational. That is, that the expected profit
from entry is nonnegative: expected net revenue exceeds F. For this we require that expected
demand in period 1 (E hEl) (recall that PE1 is invariant to realized type) and expected profits in
period 2 exceed realized hEl and flE2, respectively, evaluated at N =N". Expected period 1
demand is:
E hEl = [(lOO-1-p)(150--16p)(250-48p)]'
{ 
p(100^p)(75-8p){ (250-48p)_34L] Na
+ (l_P)(lOO^P)[ IOO(150-48p) - 8p(50-48p) + .i.(75_8P)L] Nb
+ 
(250-48p)(216.6667 + 18p) + 40(15^8p)(lOO+P)] L
and we findE hE I >hEl(N")if N >Nb
(A6.3 I)
E's expected period 2 profits are given by pfl 2 (N") + (1-p)0 Expected profits in period 2
will exceed realized profits for E when N = Nb if
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4(I00-I-pX75-8p)[ 'I(250-4Sp) + 17p(1-4) ] Na >	 (A6.32)
(l00^p)(75-8p)[4(250-4Sp) -
+ (250_48p)[(150_I6pX100+p)+433.3125p+36p 2 ]( I_I ) + 80p(I5+8pXl00+pXI-'I)
This condition is more easily satisfied for high values of p. For example, taking p = 0.8, inequal-
ity (A6.32) is satisfied when NC > 1.1087 N" + 0.0623. Setting NC at its maximum value of unity,
this allows N" to take any value below 0.8458. But when p = 0.2, for example, (A6.32) is
satisfied for N z > 2.1639Nb + 0.6156 and, for N = 1, Nb cannot exceed 0.1776. Thus, if the pro-
bability attached to a high value of new customer business is low, it will be irrational for the
entrant to seek out infonnation in the market.
Even if E were to remain in the market in the final period (when N = Na ), jt obtains a
minority share of L customers. Realized second period demands in this case are given by:
h 2 (N°) = [5(l00+p)(150-16pX250-.48p) 1_i	 (A6.33)
{ 
(l00^p)(75_8p)[ 4(2SO-4p) - 68P] NC
- (1p)-l.(l00+p)(758p)N1'
+ [(250_48p)[(150_l6pxlOo+p) +433.3125p + 36p2] + 80p(15+8p)(100^P)] }
h, (N C ) = [5(l00+p)(I50-l6p)(250-48p) ]'
	
(A6.34)
{ 
[(25o_48p)[3(loo^p)(lso_16p) - 252(12-8.2934p)+p2] _40p(100+pXI5-I.p)] '10
+ [(250— Sp)[(100-i-p)(150-16p)25(12-8.9866p)+34p 2] - 40p(10C}+pXl5+8p)] ho
+ 
[6p(Ioo+px525+8p) + (250-48p)[5(100-i-pX75-8p)
- 3(2S2(12-6.2p) - 274p2 ho - (252(12-8.2p) + 826p2 ho] N
+ (1_).3Q.(100+P)(75_8)N"}
Equations (A6.33) and (A6.34) are obtained by substituting the realized values of hk 1, as
appropriate, into (A6.7)). Setting hO = 11 0 = 0.5, when p = 0.2, E obtains 20.2703% of the L custo-
mers and maintains 39.4343% of the N customers, whereas, when p = 0.8, E obtains 21.4781% of
L and keeps 3 1.2854% of N - see Table A6.
p=o.8
incumbent i
incumbent j
entrant, E
p = 0.2
incumbent i
incumbent j
entrant, E
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Table A6
Comparison of Stage 2 Triopoly Market Shares
(percentage)
N	 4"o	 L
3 1.2854 54.6798 39.2624
31.2854 23.8449 39.2624
37.4291	 21.4784
30.2829 51.2044 39.8988
30.2829 28.5931 39.8988
39.4343	 20.2703
Notes: The table shows percentage share of each player in the market segments shown in the
column headings. We have assumed that i and j begin the game with equal shares,
'10 = IjO = 0.5L = 0.5. Consequently, since their strategies are symmetric, their market shares
are equal.
* : The entries under 4o indicate that, for example, with beliefs such that p = 0.8, i maintains
54.6798% of the business with which he started if E does not exit, j acquires 23.8449% of i 's
initial customers and E acquires 21.4784% from each of them.
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Chapter 7: An Informational Role for Banks in the Credit Market: a Screening
Model
7.1: Introduction
In this chapter we simplify and adapt Milde and Riley's [1988] model of sorting by loan
size in order to examine the welfare implications of bank screening. Our adaptation accom-
plishes the following. First, it shows explicitly how banks' information acquisition through
screening can affect allocation: loans are allocated according to risk category and not expected
return. Second, we find a separating sequential equilibrium in which lower risk/lower produc-
tivity firms signal their type by accepting a lower loan size. Credit market screening models usu-
ally find a reactive equilibrium or, given assumptions about borrower responses, a Nash equili-
brium. Reactive equilibrium is unattractive because it requires a change in the basic Nash
assumption about strategic behaviour; and the Nash equilibrium is inappropriate to the implicit
two-stage formulation of screening games. Our demonstration that the same assumptions that
give Nash equilibrium are sufficient for its sequential refinement is therefore of interest. Third, it
provides simple demand functions which we will use in Chapter 8 to show that incentive compa-
tibility may mean that the envelope theorem no longer applies to screened borrowers.
Consideration of how asymmetric information in the bank credit market affects allocation
and efficiency has centred on the Stiglitz-Weiss analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard
sources of credit rationing. More recent analyses argue that banks can avoid the credit rationing
response to adverse selection by offering contracts among which customers choose, that choice
revealing their private information. These contracts may variously feature collateral, loan size,
loan receipt probability etc. as screening instruments. Moral hazard effects may also be avoided
by appropriate contract-fixed incentives.
Screening models offer theoretical justification of the original McKinnon-Shaw liberaliza-
tion hypotheses: in lagging economies with imperfect information, financial intermediaries can
act as a mechanism to elicit information which facilitates credit allocations. However, three
further factors should be taken into account. First, theoretical models do not always predict a
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screening outcome. Second, even with screening, perfect sorting may not occur. Third, there is
an expanding theoretical literature which indicates that, where markets are incomplete, or infor-
mation asymmetric, the equilibrium resulting from decentralized economic activity is not con-
strained Pareto efficient.
In Chapter 8 the loan demands and rates obtained here are incorporated into the general
equilibrium framework used by Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] to examine the Pareto efficiency
of economies with incomplete markets and information constraints. We can thus examine the
third factor mentioned above.
In Section 7.2 we survey models of potential-borrower discrimination by banks - whether
through rationing or the use of screening devices. Section 7.3 discusses Caribbean credit markets
in the light of the analyses. We suggest that it is difficult to unambiguously explain observed out-
comes on a theoretical basis alone. Section 7.4 describes the model which assumes perfect sort-
ing: banks go as far as they are able in eliciting incentive-compatible information from potential
customers.
7.2: Asymmetric Information in the Credit Market: A Survey
The literature on asymmetric information in the the credit market examines how banks
make their loan decisions when they face heterogeneous borrowers and lack direct access to reli-
able information on borrower characteristics or choices. It suggests that, unless banks have
sufficient instruments (debt contract variables) relative to borrower characteristics/decisions at
their disposal, and borrowers' relative preferences are appropriately structured, banks' optimal
reactions to asymmetric information may entail the rationing of credit. More recent papers dis-
cuss the strategic and structural features which influence the marketability of these instruments.
Informational asymmetries in credit markets occur because potential borrowers have private
information about their risk characteristics, and can adopt loan uses, which are not observed by
banks. Following project implementation they also have more information about their ability to
repay. Even if outcomes are observable, when there is a stochastic component banks cannot per-
fectly infer actions from the outcomes themselves. 1 To the extent that banks are able to obtain
Perfect inference would allow contingent conuacts and hence resolve moral hazard problems.
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reliable information by investigations and monitoring, the problems of asymmetric information
are attenuated. But a reasonable assumption is that directly obtaining all necessary information
for all potential borrowers would be prohibitively costly. In addition to learning and direct
information-gathering, the literature offers two methods by which lenders cope with asymmetric
information: they may ration credit to deter the worst risks, or offer contracts to differentiate
among risk classes and provide incentives.
Two major categories of credit rationing have been distinguished 2. Rationing of loan size
occurs where, at the quoted rate of interest, borrowers receive a smaller loan than demanded even
though willing to pay a higher rate of interest. This is the definition used by Jaffee and Russell
[1976], the first authors to analyse the effects of asymmetric information on the loan market 3
 The
second category of credit rationing occurs where some borrowers are unable to obtain credit even
though they would be willing to pay a higher rate of interest in order to do so. Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981, 1983a] distinguish three possibilities in this second category. Borrowers denied loans may
be observationally indistinguishable from those who receive; the borrowers denied loans may be
identifiable groups; or loans may be denied in later periods as a result of earlier default, even
though the later projects are better and the borrowers are willing to pay higher rates of interest
Neither category of credit rationing would occur under common information even with
uncertainty. Debt contracts would specify the (verifiable) purposes for which loan proceeds could
be used and repayment would be made contingent on the (again verifiable) outcome. Contract
terms (the rate of interest) would be set such that borrowers are indifferent between receiving or
not receiving a loan, or larger loan, and to compensate the bank for risk, and the degree of com-
petition among banks would determine how surplus is shared between bank and borrower.
The alternative to rationing are loan contracts which induce borrowers to reveal information
about their risk type by selecting a contract, or give them the incentive to undertake the projects
considered desirable by the bank. This is most easily understood in the context of the general
2 They have similar sources. But rationing by loan size cannot occur where it is assumed that loan re-
quirements are fixed.
3 Although we note that Akerlof's pioneering article [19701 discussed imperfect information in credit
markets in India.
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theoty of contracting between principal and agent, relevant features of which are described
below.
The background of principal-agent contracting games
Models examining creditor strategies under asymmetric infonnation can be treated as appli-
cations of the economics of information to the market for credit. Most recent models assume hid-
den information, or adverse selection, where the borrower is the agent or informed and the bank
the principal or uninformed. With hidden information the components of the principal's contract
offers will be aimed at eliciting information and differentiating among the agents. It is usually
assumed that there is a one-dimensional distribution of agents who differ in quality (or risk).
These differences are assumed to imply that agents have different marginal rates of substitution
(MRS) between contract components. Where the MRS differ sufficiently among individuals, and
it is profitable for the principal to have agents choose different treatment, i.e. to self-select, the
market wifi be characterised by a separating equilibrium where each type of agent receives a dif-
ferent contract4. It may not however be possible (or desirable from the viewpoint of the princi-
pal) to induce perfect self-selection. Different types are then pooled together at a single contract.
It is in this case that credit rationing usually occurs. If a bank's expected return from a loan con-
tract is maximized at a rate of interest below that which equates the supply and demand of bor-
rowers accepting that contract, some of those borrowers may be rationed out of the market, or
may receive a smaller loan than they would prefer at the given rate of interest Rationing is then
one means by which banks may deal with the effects that unobserved risk differences have on
their gross expected return, and the ability to offer sorting contracts is another.
In a game theory context, the description above assumes that it is the uninformed (the
banks) who move first. All (published) credit rationing models make this assumption, i.e. they
are screening rather than signalling (where the informed move first) models, in Stiglitz-Weiss's
[1983b] terminology. This labelling is useful because it aids in distinguishing between empirical
Feasible separation requires that the difference in MRS can be ranked by type or, equivalently, that the
screening variable (or signal) have a lower marginal cost for the bank-favoured type; that is, indifference
curves must satisfy the single crossing property.
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counterparts and draws attention to the fact that the equilibrium outcome expected should depend
on the game structure or order of moves posited.
Models of asymmetric information markets tend to find too many or no Nash equilibria5.
The existence and location of equilibrium may appear arcane concerns in the explanation of
empirical phenomena. However, if a theoretical analysis is unable to predict a plausible equili-
brium under the widely used Nash assumption, it suggests that something is wrong with the
model's view of reality. Either the behavioural postulate is an incorrect description of decision-
making in the markets modelled, or the market assumed does not exist; that is, there is market
failure in the sense that there is a commodity 6 for which decentralized activity has failed to fix a
price.
Various approaches have been used in attempts to pin down an equilibrium. As will
become clear, the difficulty basically arises from the nature of competitive behaviour. Earlier
answers changed the equilibrium behaviour of the competitors or the assumptions regarding the
response of their customers. More recently, analysts have used the explicit approaches to stra-
tegic competitive behaviour provided by game theory. In the following, we focus on the credit
market-relevant case of screening but begin by briefly considering signalling.
If it is assumed that the informed move first (signalling) with the uninformed reacting pas-
sively to their offers 7 multiple sequential 8
 equilibria are obtained. Essentially, this is because the
optimal reaction of the uninformed to the signal 9 will vary with their assessment of the informa-
tion conveyed by the signal. As a result the informed chose a signal that depends on his anticipa-
tions of the reaction. Numerous off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs can be formulated for the unin-
formed, so it is difficult to rule out equilibria. By placing restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium
Unless appropriate assumptions, which we describe below, are made.
6	 Deieu's [1959] sense.
Such as firms quoting a price to consumers uninformed about quality and individuals choosing education
prior to seeking a job.
A strategy combination is a sequential equilibrium if there are consistent beliefs such that eah player's
strategy prescribes at evexy information set a choice which is optimal with respect to those beliefs (Kreps and
Wilson (1982]).
Where the signal is the offer made by the informed.
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beliefs of the uninfonned., Cho and Kreps [1987] show in a three-stage game that an intuitive cii -
tenon can be used to eliminate unreasonable sequential equilibria, yielding a separating equili-
brium.
Where the uninformed move first (screening) 1° "nonexistence (of Nash equilibria in pure
strategies) is generic" (Riley, [1985], p.959) in a wide class of models, as in the original Roth-
schild and Stiglitz [1976] and Wilson [1977] insurance market papers 11 . It is the myopic nature
of the noncooperative (Nash) reactions of the uninformed principals that eliminates equilibria.
One answer has therefore been to adopt equilibrium concepts which abandon the Nash notion that
players take others' strategies as given. The most widely used 12 is Riley's [1979] reactive equili-
brium. It requires that any initial defector from an equilibrium anticipate if there is a profitable
reaction to his defection which will be loss-making for him. If there is he refrains from the defec-
tion. Thus, in a separating equilibrium, a potential defector with a pooling contract will antici-
pate that a separating contract reaction which attracts the high quality types will induce losses on
his pooling contract, and will refrain from offering the pooling contract The original separating
equilibrium is then a reactive equilibrium. Instead of modifying the equilibrium, Riley [1985]
alters the parameters of the model to reduce rewards to defectors from an equilibrium. If the pro-
portional rate at which the marginal cost of signalling declines with quality is sufficiently large,
the profitability of NE-breaking competition is eliminated.
These methods of obtaining existence are not very satisfactory. Model parameter alteration
suggests testable conditions under which screening is feasible but seems a very specific way of
dealing with a problem common to a variety of markets. The need to change equilibrium con-
cepts according to the existence requirements of particular markets suggests a lack of understand-
ing, rather than explanation, of behaviour. In addition, the active strategic behaviour implied by
these notions seems inconsistent with the perfectly competitive structure generally assumed 13 It
10 Irii	 companies and banks offer contracts.
In a proposed separating equilibrium with a low proportion of high risk types, some bank will find it
profitable to deviate with a contract which amacss all types - a pooling contract But in a proposed pooling
contract, some bank could offer a contract which attracts the low risk, inducing losses on the pooling con-
tract
12 Wilson's [1977] anticipatory equilibrium was the first such equilibrium notion.
13 The two ere reconciled by implicit appeal to the Bertrand game of price setting firms with constant re-
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implies that markets with asymmetric information must be treated as non-Wairasian.
Two approaches to resolving the nonexistence problem which address these issues or criti-
cisms are those of Gale [1987] and Hellwig [1987]. Heliwig uses a sequential formulation. He
suggests that the game theoretic specification (the order of moves, dynamic structure) may deter-
mine the equilibrium outcome expected. The nonexistence in the usual two-stage formulation is
less acute in a three-stage game. In screening models Heliwig found a pooling sequential equili-
brium to be the most plausible, in contrast to Cho and Kreps', op. cii, separating equilibrium in
the signalling game. Heliwig's result provides support for the credit rationing equilibrium in a
dynamic situation where banks make contract offers and may eventually (in stage 3) reject bor-
rowers' applications. If, on the other hand, potential borrowers announce their preferred contract
variable to banks, Cho and Kreps' analysis suggests that sorting contracts are more likely'4.
Gale's analysis is intended to resolve the existence problem within the Wairasian paradigm
of parametric and complete prices. He formulates a dynamic matching game in which borrowers
and lenders choose a contract by choosing a market to enter and are matched at random. The
lender then quotes a price which may be accepted or rejected. The separating sequential equili-
brium is not subject to defection because a lender cannot hope to change the set of borrowers he
faces by altering price. While this ex post-of-contract-choice pricing avoids the auctioneer it does
so by losing the notion of competitive pricing in a manner not dissimilar to the auctioneer itself.
It could perhaps be used to suggest that in markets with asymmetric information equilibrium
depends on an ex ante matching of agent and principal that in some sense does away with price
competition. It may be, as Gale notes, that a more insightful view of price formation in markets
with asymmetric information would be obtained by use of an oligopolistic model.
The models discussed in the following theoretically precede those of Gale and Hellwig. In
the main they challenge the conclusions of Jaffee and Russell [1976] and Stiglitz and Weiss
turns to scale.
14 Note that this could mean that in a single financial market there may be a variety of contract equilibria -
large borrowers do approach banks (signalling) whereas small bomwers generally choose among available
offers. This provides another possible explanation of observed differential treatment.
15 There is one contract per market and a market for each contract with a distribution of risk types in each
market.
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[1981] that the competitive credit market equilibrium is one with rationing. They argue that
banks have an incentive to offer sorting contracts, eliminating the need for rationing 16. We use
the categories 'rationing by loan size' and 'rationing by exclusion' to classify both rationing and
contract models in order to explain how rationing may be avoided by appropriate contracts.
The possibility of rationing by exclusion
Analyses of the possibilities of rationing by exclusion, or its avoidance, start out from the
S-W [1981] demonstration that banks face a quality of loan demand which may be affected by the
interest rate they charge. Higher rates of interest may attract borrowers with riskier projects who
are more willing to pay a higher rate of interest because they know their probability of repayment
to be low (the adverse selection effect). Higher rates may also encourage borrowers to undertake
riskier, but higher return, projects because this choice maximizes their net expected payoff (the
moral hazard effect).
In the S-W analysis banks are assumed to face borrowers whose projects have the same
mean return but differ by a mean-preserving spread' 7, banks are unable to identify individual pro-
ject risk. When raising the loan rate changes the riskiness of the pool of potential borrowers
through the adverse selection and moral hazard effects, a bank's expected return is not a mono-
tonic increasing function of the loan rate. There may therefore be a bank-optimal rate at which
the banks' expected return is maximized. If this is less than the market-clearing rate the loan rate
is not raised to eliminate excess demand.
Bester [1985] took issue with the pooling equilibrium found by S-W. He argued that banks
could offer several contracts, each specifying different combinations of collateral and the rate of
interest, in order to induce self-selection among borrowers. In his [1987] paper Bester considered
collateral both as a self-selection and incentive device 18. If the single crossing property 19
 is
16 To the extent that contingent contracts complete credit markets - each borrower/loan type is thought of
as a different commodity - no credit rationing would occur.
17 Riskiness is ranked by second order stochastic dominance (SOSD): a distribution F is said to be less n-
sky than a distribution G in the SOSD sense if the probability of low values of the random variable is greater
under G. If G can be generated from F by redistributing probability weight from the centre to the tails of
the distribution leaving the mean unchanged, G differs from F by a mean-preserving spread. Distributions
with similar mean can then be compared by variability alone (Rothschild and Stigliiz [1970]).
18 S-W had argued that collateral could have adverse selection effects if wealthier borrowers with more
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satisfied and the LR are not constrained in the amount of collateral they can provide, collateral
permits banks to sort and provides incentives to undertake less iisky projects. However, these
advantages are bought at the cost of inefficient risk-sharing, if borrowers are risk averse and
banks risk neutral. Further, projects may be riskier than with asymmetric information because
less risky choice requires excessive risk-sharing inefficiencies. Besanko and Thakor [1987 a] find
that when wealth levels are insufficient to permit perfect sorting, it is the low risk (LR) that are
rationed. Intuitively, since the LR cannot prove they are LR by collateral, and the high risk (HR)
will pay a higher rate of interest, it is the latter who are granted loans when banks cannot sort.
Collateral screening contracts may be less feasible in LDCs where collaterizable wealth is
limited - encouragement of the accumulation of such wealth was one of McKinnon-Shaw's argu-
ments for higher deposit rates. However, in some societies, the incentive role of collateral sug-
gests that the market value of collateral is not the only relevant factor. Empirical intuition is lent
to Bester's assumption guaranteeing that initial wealth does not constrain collateral, viz.
U(0) = -, by the observation that the traditional (non-pecuniary) value placed on their plots by
farmers in some African countries is so high that some banks consider its acceptance as security
as a near-certain guarantee of repayment. These are market features that will vary not only from
country to country but temporally if, for example, such farmers' tastes change after long contact
with other mores.
Assuming debt contracts with devices similar to those in Bester's [19871 paper, Besanko
and Thakor, op.cit., obtain similar results. However, they alter the definition of risk: safer pro-
jects first order stochastically dominate (FOSD)20 the less safe. This change in risk definition is
important because, as Besanko and Thakor point out, with FOSD increases in the rate of interest
collateral are less risk-averse. Weue [1983] extended the argument to risk neutral borrowers. Neither con-
sidered incentive compatible contract offers.
19 i.e. The LR are always willing to accept a greater increase in collateral, C, for a given reduction in the
rate of interest, r, than the HR. because they have a lower probability of losing that collateral.
A distribution F is less risky than a distribution G in terms of FOSD if the cumulative probability of
the random variable with distribution F exceeds that of the variable distributed G. The expected value of
the F -distributed variable is therefore always larger. In this case less risky projects also have higher expect.
ed value, while in the S-W SOSD with a mean-preserving spread, projects with similar expected value are
ranked by variability (risk) only.
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cause HR borrowers to exit first. Higher rates of interest increase the return required by potential
investors and since riskier projects have lower expected returns under FOSD 21 they are the first
to leaver.
The first order stochastic dominance risk definition is also used by de Meza and Webb (M-
W) [1987] to find a pooling equilibrium in a competitive economy. There is no credit rationing
in this pooling contract because, given the risk definition, banks' expected profits are monotone
increasing in the interest rate: when the loan rate is increased the HR exit first. Their model's
main interest lies in its consideration of tax policy and it will be discussed at greater length in
Chapter 8 where we focus on policy issues.
In their [1986] paper S-W took up the sorting issues raised by the authors discussed above.
They argue that the increased contract dimensions provided to banks in these models do not
necessarily eliminate credit rationing, given sufficient borrower and technique heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity implies that the single crossing property may not exist. For example, while
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) implies that the poor's MRS between collateral and
the rate of interest exceeds that of the nch, DARA also implies that the rich may undertake riskier
projects. Thus the relative slopes of poor/rich indifference curves are ambiguous. Further, as
collateral increases all individuals undertake less risky projects. As a result, their MRS vary, and
indifference curves between collateral and the loan rate are not quasi-concave and may cross
more than once. There may be various degrees of pooling and separating equilibria, both with
and without rationing; including a (partially) separating equilibrium 23 where borrowers are
rationed at every contract 24,
With second order stochastic dominance low risk borrowers, who are those most likely to have to bear
the increased cost, are the first to exit when the loan rate increases.
B-T also consider the case of a monopoly bank. Its optimal contract is pooling when the social surplus
of the HR is sufficiently large, because this contract enables it to extract maximum surplus. The contract
achieves the first best outcome except for a transfer from the monopolist to the LRlhigh return who is paying
a lower rate than he would under symmetric information when the monopoly bank is able to extract all his
surplus.
This occurs when there is excess demand at a separating equilibrium but an increase in the deposit rate
would require loan rate changes such that contracts on offer no longer sort.
' S-W [1987] used this partially separating equilibrium to reply to Riley's [1987] criticism that rationing
is unimportant in the macroeconomy since aggregation over all banks leaves only one pool rationed.
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We note that all of these authors found either a Nash equilibrium or pointed out that, while
the NE might not exist, their model would have a reactive equilibrium.
In addition to sorting devices, banks have direct ways of obtaining information and control-
ling behaviour: accounting procedures and (monitored) contract specification of loan use are
examples. Less obviously, banks can acquire information about a borrower (or his ongoing
activities) in the course of a repeated relationship. S-W [1983a1 suggests that the latter is itself a
source of credit rationing - the fact that the borrower will need the bank again provides the bank
with an incentive-giving device in the form of the denial threat. It is always possible that there
are some individuals against whom this threat is ineffective - the cost of repayment may outweigh
the Costs of exclusion, or the individual may have no further need to borrow. Knowledge of indi-
vidual circumstances may lessen banks' exposure to default risk on some subset of the market.
Section 7.4's model and Chapter 8 argue that this may result in asymmetric information being
more important for some sectors. Section 7.3 suggests that this may help explain credit alloca-
tion in the Caribbean.
All the models considered so far assume that loans are made by financial intermediaries and
are governed by debt contracts which take a particular form: fixed repayment if the project is
successful, and lender recuperation of realized gains (plus collateral, where applicable) in the
event of default, although credit rationing is a consequence of the divergence in the expected
returns to intermediary and borrower determined by the contract. Given economic theory's usual
prior that individual maximization in a freely operating market will (abstracting from all the
required caveats) evolve efficient mechanisms, the question arises of why the market constrains
itself to operate with these particular schemes. Williamson's [1987] analysis yields both the stan-
dard debt contract and financial intermediation as the endogenous market response to ex post
asymmetric information between borrower and lender. The debt contract ensures truth telling;
intermediary lenders reduce monitoring costs and pool risks. But the probability of costly moni-
toring increases with repayment size so there may be a bank-optimal loan rate where rationing
That is, information about the realized project outcome. His model can be compared to and merges the
analyses of Gale and Hellwig [1985] and Diamond [1984]. These were both discussed in Chapter 2.
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occurs.
The possibility of rationing by loan size
The analyses discussed above all focus on rationing of the type where individual borrowers
(or groups of borrowers) are unable to obtain loans, and where the differences between borrowers
arise from differences in the risk characteristics of their project or choice of projects. Jaffee and
Russell [1976] (J-R) defined credit rationing to be the supply of a loan size smaller than that
demanded at the quoted rate of interest, and took the default risks faced by banks to be risks
dependent on the honesty of the individual, the dishonest being those with lower default costs.
As loan size and loan rate increase there is adverse selection of defaulters as the proportion of
those who find default worthwhile increases. Therefore J-R suggest that competition leads banks
to market a pooling contract at the zero profit loan rate, because it attracts the honest.
Milde and Riley's (M-R) later analysis [1988] derived a single pooling contract with no
default as a reactive equilibrium in J-R's model, if the proportion of potential defectors is
sufficiently high. The contract entails rationing by loan size, as proposed by J-R, because default
is avoided by keeping loan size at the level where no borrowers wish to default. Screening,
though feasible, is not desirable because it would involve potential defaulters choosing larger
loans on which they would then default.
M-R's own model(s) consider informational asymmetry resulting from quality differences
in a neoclassical production function, unlike the models considered above where technology was
indivisible. Its general form is
I = Q(O,L,ii)
where e is gross stochastic project return, increasing in L, L is loan size, 0 is a privately known
quality parameter which varies across projects, and a is a random variable unknown cx ante to
borrower and bank. Loan contracts specify loan size and and rate. M-R consider three models
differing in how the random factor enters the production function. Since we have adopted their
neoclassical specification, Section 7.4 compares their model results with our own. Here we note
only that in their models 1 and 2, with the FOSD definition of risk 26, the marginal borrower who
M-R's production function approach has separable risk and quality, but return is increasing in quality,
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departs is the low return, HR whose expected payoff decreases, but in Model 3 with SOSD and
similar means, the LR exit, so that the average quality of investment declines.
Besanko and Thakor's (B-T) [198Th] generalize the models above by considering a contin-
uum of types with projects whose returns are a continuous positive function of investment size
and success probability. Credit contracts specify loan size, collateral, loan rate and credit granting
probability. In the screening contract reactive equilibrium B-T find that the lower risk bor-
rowers27 signal their success probabilities by accepting a larger loan with a higher rate of interest
than they would under symmetric information. This is a case of overinvestment similar to that in
Milde and Riley's Model 1 and contrasts with the underinvestment found in our model. The
difference, as we will discuss below, stems from the definition of risk used, as does the overin-
vestment and underinvestment pooling equilibria in de Meza and Webb, op.ciL, and Stiglitz-
Weiss, respectively. Collateral in this model does not sort but serves to provide the banks with
full insurance on the loans of the higher risk whatever the distribution of information.
Credit rationing by loan size is also predicted by Gale and Hellwig (0-H) 28 [1985] as a
result of the standard debt contract which responds to expost informational asymmetries between
creditor and debtor, and the technology. Given asymmetric information about ex post project
return and the need for financing, the optimal mechanism is the standard debt contract: its provi-
sion of bankruptcy (observation by the lender) and a fixed repayment is required for truth-telling;
but bankruptcy is costly and diminishing returns to investment increases its probability as loan
size increases. Credit rationing limits this probability. This suggests that, with ex post informa-
tion asymmetries, credit rationing reduces the expected cost of the incentive compatibility
requirements of the debt contract, rather than being the result of a failure to write appropriate
contracts, as is assumed with ex ante asymmetries (compare Williamson's, op.cit, rationing
result).
and all projects are subject to the same stochastic component.
27 High risk (HR) and low risk (LR) are borrowers with success probabilities below and above, respec-
tively, a cutoff probability at which full information equilibrium loan size equals wealth discounted ax the
riskless rate.
Their model, concerned with the more general issue of the firms's financing in incomplete markets, is
discussed in Chapter 2.
-170-
Theoretical predictions about credit market outcomes
Having examined a range of theoretical models we may ask whether they predict the empir-
ical outcome we should expect following liberalization. We suggest that the modelling of risk,
separating conditions and strategic behaviour require that theoretical insights be combined with
empirical knowledge to arrive at economy-appropriate analysis.
Comparison of B-T [1987a,b], M-W [1987] and M-R [1988] with S-W makes it clear that
the risk concept used has a crucial effect on the outcome of banks' credit policy, whether or not
sorting is possible. This arises from the effect an increase in the loan rate has on borrower profit
- which determines which risk category supplies the marginal borrower and hence the direction of
the adverse selection effect. If expected returns are similar across projects, borrowers with less
variable returns have lower expected payoffs and will include the marginal borrowers who exit
when the loan rate increases29. If borrowers with higher expected returns have higher success
probabilities it is the HR30 who have lower expected payoff and contribute the marginal bor-
rowers who exit with an increase in the loan rate. While the authors recognize this difference in
formulation, they do not discuss whether one, or which, assumption should be considered more
plausible. It seems reasonable to assume that real banks are confronted with a whole range of
potential borrowers, some of whom have equal expected returns, and some of whom do not. The
question is then whether banks are able to classify the groups31 . Ignoring auditing (monitoring)
possibilities, banks would have to sort between pools with different expected returns, as well as
within each pool.
The models demonstrate that it is in principle possible to avoid credit rationing which arises
from ex ante informational asymmetiy if the bank has sufficient degrees of freedom relative to
the decisions or characteristics being controlled or screened for (Hart [1986]); and if the contracts
are noncooperatively enforceable on the market (Hellwig, op.cit.).
Expected payoff functions are convex in project return and the distribution of the HR is a mean-
preserving spread (MPS) of the disthbution of the LR. The expected value of a convex function is increased
by a MI'S and therefore LR expected payoff is less than that of HR.
Those whose projects are first order stochastically dominated.
31 sw assumed that banks could identify pools by their expected returns.
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To take the first point: all the models consider the default risk attached to any
borrower/project as varying in only one dimension. This limits the reliability of their predictive
implications. Paraphrasing Engers [1987], when differences are multidimensional, potential bor-
rowers can no longer be simply ordered in terms of their marginal cost of signalling (marginal
rate of substitution between price and the signal). One borrower may have a lower relative mar-
ginal cost for some signals and a higher relative marginal cost for others. We can imagine, for
example, borrowers differing in both management ability and honesty, with project techniques of
vaiying riskiness. These differences could be especially important in the lagging economies of
McKinnon-Shaw, where frustrated but profitable investment opportunities are viewed as originat-
ing mainly in the informal household sector and it is easier to confound individual and activity
characteristics: default risks arise from the capability of the household-firm, the honesty of the
borrower and the project technique adopted. There is also a moral hazard problem because a
bank would find it difficult to control the purpose for which a loan is used: consumption or
investment. One can always constrain a particular model so as to ensure that a bank has sufficient
instruments, or add enough variety to ensure that it does not - that adverse selection remains a
source of rationing; for the purposes of policy analysis, empirically based judgement seems the
best basis for the choice.
There is a more fundamental aspect. For sorting to be feasible it is assumed that banks
know the distribution function of the risks on the market. And the production functions of the
borrowers. While this may be a reasonable assumption in industrialized economies where banks
have developed an acquaintanceship with the market,32 It seems less plausible in LDCs where
urban-based banks, with staff trained in loan assessment of traditional commercial activities, may
be receiving loan applications from rural applicants and small-scale urban borrowers operating
outside of the 'formal' sector. McKinnon's 'suggestion' that moneylenders be recruited as loan
officers in commercial banks recognized that this could pose a problem. McKinnon-Shaw's
insight that information-process failure is an important contributor to underdevelopment, suggests
32 Except perhaps in the case of innovative industries for which venture capital financing has been
developed.
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that more stress should be placed on such issues in LDCs.
Consider the second point: the Hellwig [1986] and Gale [198Th] examinations of rationing
further suggest that whether pooling or separating is predicted depends on the dynamic structure
and order of moves of the game played. Their analyses also raise questions about behaviour on
these markets that are not easily answered. Heilwig explains his results by a tension between the
vulnerability of pooling contracts and Bertrand competition. A competitive bank offering a pool-
ing contract runs the nsk of losses if the high quality types leave, but Bertrand competition leads
towards return and cost equalisation at the margin - not separation. Which of these 'forces' dom-
inates depends on the proportion of high quality types and the order of moves, and determines
whether or not there is credit rationing. There is, it seems, a conflict between competitive pricing
and the strategic behaviour required to plan and implement contracts that sort. This has parallels
with Gale's work where contracts had to be taken as given, and the device of matching with ex
post pricing used to achieve a Wairasian equilibrium.
These models indicate that the existence of asymmetric information calls forth a variety of
private mechanisms which can permit an incentive compatible transfer of the information. In this
sense they support the McKinnon-Shaw intuition on the informational role of banks. But, as we
will see in Chapter 8, implementation of these mechanisms is costly. These analyses also suggest
that an observed market outcome can be an amalgam of responses whose sources and effects are
not self-evident, we will see in our model that screening by loan size can produce loan allocations
that are probably observationally indistinguishable from rationing.
In the model of Section 7.4 we attempt to address one of the points raised here by adopting
the SOSD risk definition but not mean-preserving spread; expected return and risk can then vary
in a non-monotonic fashion since return also depends on a management quality variable.
In Section 7.3 we consider observations and comments on credit markets in our four Carib-
bean economies, to see how these relate to the priors suggested by this literature.
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7.3. Theory and Practice in LDCs
Credit allocation in LDCs is usually thought to be suboptimal: loan returns are not equal-
ised at the margin across sectors because some sectors or activities receive smaller loans than
they should, or receive no loans at all. Output would be higher if credit flows were directed to
more productive sectors. Attributing this outcome to regulatory distortion, current thinking
favours minimum regulation. It has its origins in the McKinnon-Shaw analysis of financially
repressed markets. But policymakers in LDCs have until recently taken the opposing view that
society's interests and those of the private creditor diverge and that regulatory suasion may be
required to reconcile the two.
Recognition of private information raises theoretical doubts about the probability of an
efficient outcome in a liberalized credit market. Agents in a regulation-free market will continue
to possess information about themselves and their activities that creditors do not have, and will
act privately in their own interests. Profit maximizing creditors must condition their decisions on
this knowledge. The present section makes the following points. First, the observations from
which credit rationing is usually inferred, as illustrated by outcomes in the Caribbean markets,
are consistent with rationing of the Stiglitz-Weiss varieties, may be consistent with McKinnon-
Shaw regulation-induced rationing, and even with screening contracts. Care must therefore be
taken in inferring arrangements from simple observations. Second, the issue is far from trivial,
given the importance of debt financing in LDCs. We take the last point first.
External Financing of Enterprise
In industrialized countries distortions in the credit allocations made by financial intermedi-
aries may be of second order importance outside of particular sectors. Firms have feasible access
to alternative sources of external financing33: public share issues, bond issues, venture capital.
Thus, if rationed Out of the bank market they may be able to substitute other funding (credit or
equity) sources. McKinnon-Shaw however drew our attention to the pivotal role financial inter-
We abstract from the asymmetries of information which also affect these alternatives - as suggested by.
for example, Leland and Pyle [1977].
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mediaries' creditM allocation plays in aggregate real economic activity in LDCs. As virtually the
only source of external finance, financial intermediary loans affect production possibilities,
employment, investment demand, technological choice etc.
In the Caribbean, apart from some twenty years of stock exchange operations in Trinidad,
and a nascent exchange in Barbados, alternatives for external financing consist of commercial
banks, finance companies, trust companies, insurance companies, trade credit, pension funds and
development banks. Among the countries considered, only Belize has an unorganized money
market worth mentioning. Therefore, with the possible exception of small-scale rural enterprise
in Belize, it can be presumed that there is no curb market to which rationed firms have access.
We consider the alternatives to private bank debt available in the Caribbean.
Development Banks
The development banks were officially established to provide long-term credit to producers,
the credit allocation to be determined by project evaluation 35. Since their objective function is
presumably the social return to the project (i.e. both borrower's and bank's), and they are man-
dated to investigate, the informational asymmetries which affect private decisions should be less
determinant in development bank financing. However, two factors suggest that they do not
greatly expand the options available to potential borrowers. Firstly, the non-profit maximand
itself appears to create bureaucratic procedures which raise the transactions cost of their credit36.
Secondly, the development banks depend on state subventions, external borrowing and bond
Usually taken to be commercial bank credit for the simple reason that commercial banks dominate the
financial sectors of most LDCs.
There are two ways in which official project evaluation and monitoring appear to be able to overcome
some of the informational problems that necessitate sorting by equilibrium credit rationing or contract screen-
ing. Primo. suppose entrepreneurs are unwilling to risk losing their competitive edge by entrusting their pro-
ductive ideas to a profit-maximizing institution who may exploit them. The institution may not be able to ob-
tain sufficient information to decide on a loan. Official indifference to profit avoids this moral hazard prob-
1cm. ('I'his argument of course ignores unprincipled behaviour on the part of flrnctionaries). Secundo. part of
the rationale of development banks has been the supposition that inexperienced entrepreneurs are unable to
undertake the feasibility studies necessaly to 'certify' their project A private commercial bank may not have
the incentive to undertake detailed and costly evaluation, If the project is found to be non-feasible, it will
have sunk the evaluation costs unprofitably. However, a successful evaluation requires the active assistance
of the entrepreneur who is thus furnished with the information required to certify the profitability of his pro-
ject. The entrepreneur then has an incentive to use this information to request credit from another bank. The
latter can charge him a lower rate of interest since it does not have to cover the costs of project evaluation.
Although their lower loan rates may provide some compensation.
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finance for loanable fimds. Their funding capacity is therefore very limited m comparison with
private financial institutions. For example, in Belize in 1981 the Development Bank held only
14.4% of financial institutions' assets and these were in part allocated to official institutions37.
Similarly, in Barbados in 1982, the Development Bank contributed only 8.4% of total long-term
credit, which was in any case only 27.2% of total business borrowiQ8.
Stock Markets
The equity market is usually assumed to be the principal source of non-debt finance. How-
ever, Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss [1984] argue that it is itself plagued by informational prob-
lems, which may reduce its ability to substitute for denied bank credit. If stronger firms are more
willing to assume the increased risk of greater debt, equity issue may signal poor firm quality,
dissuading potential issuers. In this view, asymmetric information reduces the availability of
external capital, whatever its source. On the other hand, Cho [1986] argues that an equity market
may permit financial liberalization to achieve an efficient capital allocation. He suggests that the
adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena which produce bank credit rationing do not affect
equity finance since the equity investor has the same expected return as does the project. Apart
from the Greenwald-Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection argument above, this ignores the potential
moral hazard problem between firm management and equity investor. Leland and Pyle [1977]
also suggest that adverse selection may deter high quality projects. These difficulties of credible
information transfer may account for the relatively non-active nature of even the established
stock exchanges in the Caribbean. The stock exchange in Trinidad serves mainly as a secondary
market, but even its secondary trading is insufficient to provide adequate liquidity prospects for
investors. In the ten years to 1978, equity declined steadily from 36 to 19 per cent of local cor-
porate liabilities. (See Bourne [1982], Table 11). Bourne attributes this to reluctance to divest
family or foreign control, to substantial issuing costs and to marketability problems on the
demand side. Most activity on the stock market during these years was in fact generated by
equity sales by foreign firms responding to government promotion of local ownership (see
31 See Table 4.1 and Luben [1983], pages 23-26.
38 Worrell and Prescod [1983], page 15
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Bourne [1982] and Ramkissoon [1981]).
Insurance companies and finance companies
Only the private financial intermediaries remain to be considered. Table 7.1 shows the
institutional distribution of financial firms' assets for the four countres being considered39. After
commercial banks, insurance companies, finance companies and trust companies are the principal
financial institutions. In the UK and USA, insurance companies are a major source of finance for
the corporate sector through their holdings of either equity or bonds. Of course, the types of
small-scale risky enterprise considered important in the LDC context are not likely to furnish a
suitable investment for insurance compathes, but it is clear that insurance finns provide little
capital, even when we consider the total business sector. In Trinidad and Tobago, Table 7.1 indi-
cates that they sourced only 5.4% of the local corporate sector's funds. In Barbados, corporate
shares averaged only 6.1% of the local assets portfolio4 ' of all insurance companies between
1979 and 198342. Trust companies and finance companies (the latter in the Bahamas) play a role
similar to building societies and savings and loan associations in the UK and USA. They special-
ise in long-term residential mortgages and construction/real estate investment. In fact, in several
cases the trust companies are subsidiaries of commercial banks established to cater to the long-
term requirements of the household sector. In the Bahamas, 73.5% (in 1978) of finance com-
panies' assets were held in the form of mortgages43. Investment in shares was negligible. In
Barbados published trust company balance sheet information does not include an equity holdings
With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, which has flow-of-funds data, these shares would not be
entirely accurate since they represent proportions of summed financial assets. In Trinidad's case, the institu-
tional structure of local liabilities is used because their flow-of-funds financial assets information includes the
central bank and government, and does not provide the shares of non-bank financial institutions.
In these micro economies which are, moreover, geographically close and economically linked, the
diversification required by insurance companies is likely to be a more crucial issue for domestic or regional
companies.
41 Source: Table D22 in Central Bank of Barbados [1988]
42 No information is available on insurance companies' portfolios in Belize. Statistical infonnation for in-
surance companies in the Bahamn is coo aggregated to permit a similar comparison. However, real estate
and mortgages appear to constitute their major form of long-term investment, averaging 46.1% in 1973-1977
(Table 4.20 in Ramsaran [1984]). Ramsaran's investigations, op.cit., p.178, indicate that most of these mort-
gages were for residential rather than business purposes.
Source: Table 4.2 in Ramsaran, op.cit. While published data for the Bahamas does not provide a distri-
bution of mortgages by sector, viz, residential, commercial or industrial, Ramsaran again (op.cit, p.225) indi-
cates that most of the listed mortgages are in ft residential.
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category. But these would have been registered in the 'other assets' category which was less than
two percent of total assets in 1983. Only 11.9% of total trust company loans were extended for
industrial and commercial purposes in that year.
Commercial banks' equity investment
Commercial banks do not appear to invest in private securities. These averaged less than
two percent of commercial bank assets in the Bahamas between 1974 and 1978, and less than
one percent in Barbados in the five years to 1983. Belize's published bank balance sheet data
lists no private securities. Trinidad's banks held an average of only five percent of assets in both
'government' and 'other' securities between 1976 and 1980; given reserve requirements, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that these consisted mainly of treasury bills. Commercial banks also
discount commercial or trade bills for business firms, providing an indirect source of finance.
However, in Trinidad, the only country for which data is available, such bills only averaged
1.3% of total assets between 1976 and 1980.
Other sources
Other possible sources of external financing are pension funds and credit unions. With the
exception of Trinidad and Tobago, no information on pension funds is available for any of the
countries. In Trinidad pension funds held less that five percent of the corporate sector's liabili-
ties, and credit unions held a similar proportion of the households and unincorporated business
sector's liabilities (see Table 7.1 and Bourne [1982]). In Belize, where credit unions may con-
ceivably provide the finance required for small-scale business, membership is a prerequisite.
Members are required to share a common characteristic: geographical location, economic or
occupational48. They are therefore not a general source of finance although they are an important
source of credit for rural areas, and the bond between members may serve to mediate informa-
tional asymmetries in areas where modem urban financial institutions are at a particular
4 Source: Table Dl. Central Bank of Barbados, op.cit.
Source: Table 2.9 in Ramsaran, op.cit.
Source: Table B 1 in Central Bank of Barbados. op.cit.
Source: Data on Trinidad's bank portfolios is from Table 2 in Ramkissoon, op.cit.
Luben, op.cit., page 18
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disadvantage.
This description of the financial assets in these economies indicates that business finance is
largely limited to that available from intermediaries, and that their finance generally takes the
form of debt. It is therefore subject to agency constraints of the type analysed by the models dis-
cussed in Section 7.2. If, in response to these agency problems, intermediaries ration credit (the
interest rate is the screening device), or issue debt with screening variables set such that some
potential borrowers are unable to obtain credit, or receive a loan other than that they would have
received under common information, borrowers' realized production, investment demand etc.
may differ from their notional quantities. Blinder [1987] has made a first attempt at formalizing
the effects of equilibrium credit rationing on the macro front. In his model(s) firms' only source
of working capital is bank credit which is rationed because of informational asymmetries. The
functioning of the macro economy depends on whether or not the credit constraint is binding. If
demanded credit is unavailable to producing firms, 'there may be a "failure of effective supply"
where firms are unable to produce their notional supply. As economic activity expands, default
risk declines so that banks are able to reduce excess reserves and increase credit. In the working
capital model with credit rationed, monetary policy (which raises bank reserves) 49
 has an expan-
sionary effect on output because customer credit availability is increased.
The idea of effective supply failure due to credit unavailability has often been assumed by
Caribbean analysts: viewing commercial bank credit as the 'main source of working capital',
their models have attempted to
"provide explanations which correspond to observable behaviour, by focussing on
credit-expenditure rather than money-expenditure relationships"50.
This scenario differs markedly from that of McKinnon-Shaw who atiributed credit rationing to
repression. They recommended the minimization of regulation, particularly the removal of limits
on interest rates, to correct the effects of rationing on output. In a Blinder-type regime such
Note that the more usual channels of monetary policy, via interest rates, for example, are assumed
away; money, with the crucial exception of bank reserves, has no 'essential' role.
Worrell [1985]
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deregulation would have no effect.
Credit Rationing after Liberalization?
The credit rationing described by McKinnon-Shaw and by Caribbean analysts appears
closest to the Stiglitz-Weiss rationing of observationally distinct borrowers51 . In the latter banks
are able to distinguish groups of borrowers, where members within each group have a common
observable attribute. But borrowers in the same group (where the group may be taken as an
industry, sector, class etc.) may differ in risk and productivity, these being determined by both
their observed and unobservable attributes. A bank's gross return from lending to each group is
concave in the loan rate, just as it is concave in the loan rate charged to a market of unidentifiable
individuals. Rationing may therefore occur for similar reasons, but whole groups may be
excluded. The point here is that the expected social return on loans to those excluded may be
greater than the return to those receiving loans, since the bank is concerned only with the return
in the event of success.
McKinnon's and Shaw's Views
A major motivation for McKinnon and Shaw's recommended liberalization of the financial
sector in LDCs was the generation of loanable funds for the financing of investment projects with
high real rates of return. They characterized repressed economies as rich in high-return invest-
ment opportunities (Shaw, p.8 1)5 2 whose realization is frustrated by the rationing of potential
borrowers. Rationing is attributed to regulation on both the supply and demand sides of the
market. Regulated low deposit rates (in conjunction with high variable inflation resulting from
high nominal money growth rates) reduce the real supply of loanable funds (savings) to the bank-
ing system. Usury ceilings on loan rates prevent banks from raising rates to the levels necessary
to compensate them for the information acquisition costs and risks accompanying small-scale
lending to non-traditional sectors (McKinnon, p.73). Further, the low loan rates permitted to
51 Carter [1988] also used this analysis to argue that unrestricted markets may ration credit to small risky
agricultural borrowers.
52 Page numbers refer to Shaw's [1973] and McKinnon's [1973] books.
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banks reduce the rates they can offer to depositors (McKinnon, p.69). At these regulated interest
rates there is an excess demand for credit, the available loanable funds supply being allocated not
by price, but by the decisions of government officials and the banks' constrained preferences for
established low-risk borrowers (Shaw, p.86; McKinnon, p.68). By designating priority
sectors/entrepreneurs who receive exclusive licenses (for imports, for example) the authorities
effectively reduce the risk attached to those loans, and banks themselves restrict their lending to
"completely safe borrowers whose reputation is known, or whose collateral is relatively riskless"
(McKinnon, p.73), including government itself. The result of this interaction between regulations
and banks' optimizing behaviour is that small-scale and/or rural borrowers have access only to
the unorganized money market: moneylenders (the curb market) and the village store, whose
unregulated interest rates reflect the excess demand for credit and the risks attached to evading
regulation (Shaw, p.89), as well as the monopoly power acquired by operating with specialized
market information in dispersed localities (McKinnon, p.7253) As a result, moneylenders' rates
are above even the high potential rates of return to investment (Shaw, p.122; McKinnon, p.6) and
discrete expenditures required for innovative investments are blocked by the constraint of self-
finance (McKinnon, p.12).
Caribbean views and policy responses
While Caribbean economists and policymakers also identify specific groups as being
excluded from the market, they see such rationing as symptomatic of the limited nature of banks'
intermediary role. It is argued that banks tend to refuse loans to small-scale and/or non-traditional
activities and investors. This tendency is attributed to a high degree of risk aversion on the part
of banks, the inability of excluded borrowers to provide collateralM and the banks' reliance on
their special knowledge of particular sectors. The asset portfolios of the financial institutions
reflect both the main areas of economic activity and traditional loan patterns. There is a
historically-based dependence on imports throughout the countries of the region. As a result
Although Shaw (p.89) argues that free cony to curb markets reduces lenders' monopoly power.
A theoretical rationale for the collateral presumption is provided by the models in which banks son
among their credit customers through collateral requirements.
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domestic "big" business is concentrated in distribution. In countries whose productive mainstay
has been sugar, traditional sugar industry links are also a determinant of size and creditworthi-
ness.
Manufacturing, agriculture and tourism are seen as the sectors with most growth potential.
The distribution sector (retail and wholesale trade) is viewed as contributing little to growth,
especially since its activities are mainly import-related in economies where the balance of pay-
ments is the crucial constraint. Thus in all the countries, the observationally distinguishable
groups viewed as being rationed are small-scalelmnovatory manufacturers, non-traditional agri-
culture etc. This view is not dissimilar to that of McKinnon, who discussed the rationing of the
poor farmer and 'small domestic machine shop' operator. The penchant among banks of the area
to lend to the distribution and personal sectors is seen as impeding the realization of new produc-
tive structure. As a result, in the 1970s Trinidad and Barbados introduced selective credit con-
trols aimed at restricting the growth of commercial bank loans to the distribution and/or personal
sectors. In Barbados attempts were made to reinforce these by guaranteeing, or offering
rediscount schemes for, loans to the 'rationed' groups. With the exception of the sugar industry,
banks have not taken advantage of the latter. The data in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 reflect the results of
such credit restrictions. Barbados has also had in place extensive interest rate controls. However,
interest rates in the other three countries were market-determined. Neither the Bahamas nor Be!-
ize have attempted to fix credit guidelines.
Selective credit guidelines were introduced in Trinidad and Tobago in 1979 in an attempt to
restrict personal sector credit which grew rapidly following the petroleum boom. They have not
been fully successful: while individuals' borrowing averaged 44 percent of total loans in the three
years before 1979, at 35 percent in 1982 it was still some way above the 25 percent target.
Bourne ([1984], p.43) attributes this large share of personal lending to banks acting "to ration
credit to particular sectors or categories of borrowers'. He explains this by S-W adverse selection
and by the constraints placed on appropriate pricing by oligopolistically-determined rates. In
Belize personal sector credit is only about 10% of the total, but the distribution sector and sugar-
based agriculture are the favoured borrowers. About half the loans to agriculture are in fact to
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sugar-growing, and even the credit to manufacturing shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 mainly
represents loans for sugar-processing (Luben, p.29). Barnett's ([1983], pp.143-144) description
of the banks' loan criteria suggests a possible explanation in terms, for example, of Bester's
[1987] and/or Besanko and Thakor's [1987a] models:
"...the most important requirements are adequate collateral and/or a guarantee and a
sound credit record. The banks prefer as collateral mortgages on urban property,
insurance policies, fixed deposits and papers of ownership. ... (They) hesitate to
accept ... mortgages on small rural land holdings... Consequently, loans to small
farmers, with the exception some small sugar cane farmers, are very rare."
In effect, one could consider the banks as offering imperfectly sorting debt contracts with colla-
teral serving as a signal (vs. adverse selection) and incentive device (vs. moral hazard). Banks'
limited knowledge of the rural economy makes it difficult for them to judge the value a potential
borrower attaches to rural property. Then only borrowers in sectors where the bank has sufficient
a priori knowledge and where borrowers are not wealth -constrained will receive loans. And, as
discussed by Besanko and Thakor, on the assumption that he knows the risk characteristics of the
borrower, a co-signer, i.e. a guarantor, serves a role very similar to collateral in avoiding ration-
ing.
A guarantee of a different sort may have influenced the loan portfolio of banks in the Baha-
mas where, as Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show, real estate and construction receive a quarter of loans.
This reflects 100% public guarantees provided to promote housing loans to land-owners (Ram-
saran, op.cit., p.96). Ramsaran (p.93) also observes that a "noticeable feature" of the data on
commercial bank loans "is the relatively insignificant volume of funds that is made available to
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors". Similarly, Worrell ([1985], p.7) argues that:
"...in the Caribbean customers are rationed by institutional norms, not availability of
funds. Those who do not meet conventional credit standards never qualify for loans,
no matter how liquid the banks are,"
In Barbados the two sectors not subject to rationing are taken to be firms with a distribution sec-
tor base and the personal sector. In 1976, before the imposition of credit controls, personal loans
had grown to 27% of the banks' loan portfolio. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that, despite the selec-
tive credit controls imposed in 1977 to limit growth in credit to these two sectors, they continue
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to receive the largest shares.
The preference for personal sector loans shown by banks in the richer Caribbean economies
could reflect the availability of the collateral signal or incentive device. Personal loans are
secured by, for example, mortgages, insurance policies, fixed deposits and the consumer goods
for which credit is extended. Any evidence of loan size screening would be purely anecdotal and
the S-W [1986] discussion of the effects of wealth and risk aversion on the indifference curves of
borrowers (see Section 7.2) clearly suggests why sorting is likely to be highly imperfect. The
high degree of regulation of the financial sector in Barbados suggests that country as a possible
candidate for M-S type rationing. However, Barbados is the one country where, between them,
manufacturing and tourism receive some 30% of credit. Much of this credit is extended to firms
which are partially owned by multinational companies or subsidiaries of distribution-based hold-
ing companies. The manufacturing category also includes loans to sugar factories. That is, the
firms are known to the banks or have the wealth required to provide a collateral signal.
The underlying perception in the Caribbean literature appears to be that financial intermedi-
aries are impeding the structural transformation of the economy (constraining aggregate supply)
by concentrating loans in well-established but declining activities when resources should be shift-
ing in line with world prices and in order to diversify the economy's production. If collateral is
indeed an important screening variable, it is precisely the non-established sectors who are likely
to be wealth-constrained and hence subject to rationing. Shaw (p.86) explains the "privileged
place" reserved by banks for "established borrowers, especially trading firms with a long record
of stability" by "effective low ceilings on interest rates". The explanation seems inadequate for
Belize and Trinidad, as well as the Bahamas, since none of these countries had ceilings on rates.
Further, the banks had no shortage of loanable funds.
McKinnon [1988] has recently suggested that if banks believe government will rescue
them from the consequences of their bad loan decisions they may have less incentive to screen
out bad risks. He therefore suggests that an interest rate ceiling (which would act like the bank-
See also the discussion in Chapter 8.
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optimal rate in the S-W analysis) would correct these moral hazard effects. However, relatively
few LDCs appear to offer deposit insurance (we note that Trinidad does) and where there are a
large number of multinational banks, as in the Caribbean, their size relative to local economies
makes such insurance (explicit and implicit) rather ludicrous.
This suggests that it is not possible to make recommendations that do not discriminate
between the conditions in each country. Detailed analysis of the contracts offered by banks and
the type of rationing, if any, is required both to determine an appropriate policy stance and to
assess its results. For example, McKinnon attributed the substantial growth in real output experi-
enced by Korea after the 1960s to their financial reforms, arguing that the reform relaxed the
financial constraint on supply. More recent examinations of the MC experience suggest that the
financial reforms neither liberalized the sector, nor made the assumed contribution to growth.
Harris [1985] argues that Korea's 1965 reforms acted to consolidate the role of the state in the
financial sector, rather than to reduce its influence. The high rates of interest channelled funds
into state-controlled commercial banks, and the organized sector, in which the state could control
the allocation of funds. Further, by increasing the range of rates, the reform provided the state
with greater scope for differentiation between sectors in charging subsidized rates to selected bor-
rowers (p.Z3). Harris' view receives support from Park [1988] who argues that Korea's high
growth after the 1960s is explained by their export promotion policies - a strategy the state was
able to pursue because (Harris, p.11) government obtained the necessary supply of loanable funds
to offer subsidized credit in virtually perfectly elastic supply. While Park argues that this degree
of government control has produced economic concentration and misallocation of resources, it
has also produced the economic growth so many LDCs strive in vain for, and which is the ulti-
mate goal of the liberalization policies. Its applicability in other economies can be questioned in
terms of both organizational and political feasibility. The Korean state's success may in part be
due to the very degree of their intervention, so that less concern with private incentives was
required.
Apart from our warning about the interpretation of empirical outcomes, we take from this
section the idea that only particular sectors may need to be screened.
-185-
Table 7.1
Institutional Distribution of Financial Assets
	
Bahamas Barbados Belize	 Trinidad
	
(1977)	 (1983)	 (1981)	 (1978)
Institution_______ _______ _____ HIE LCE
Commercial Banks	 66.7	 69.2	 77.5	 50.1 30.9
Finance Cos.	 17.9	 1.6	 -	 3.7	 8.9
Insurance Cos.	 13.5	 14.1	 ...	 9.0	 5.4
Trust Cos.	 1.0	 7.9	 -	 sc	 2.9
Savings Banks	 0.9	 -	 2.0	 -	 -
Development Banks	 ...	 4.5	 14.4	 -
Public Fin. Insts.	 -	 2.8	 -	 11.4	 3.9
Credit Unions
	 -	 ...	 6.1	 4.8	 -
Bldg Societies	 -	 -	 -	 6.5	 -
HIE	 -	 -	 -	 -	 14.1
ROW	 -	 -	 -	 sc	 19.5
Other	 -	 -	 _______ 14.5 14.4
NOTES: - denotes not applicable; ... denotes not available; sc = see country note
BAHAMAS: Bahamian dollar assets. Source: Table 3.16, Ramsaran [1984]
BARBADOS: Proportional distribution of the assets of the listed institutions. Where possible, inter-institutional hold-
ings have been netted out to avoid double-counting. The public financial institution here is the mortgage finance com-
pany. Source: Central Bank of Barbados, Annual Statistical Digest
BELJZE: Proportional distribution of the assets of the listed institutions. Source: Table 21, Luben [1983]
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Financial liabilities of households and unincorporated enterprises (HIE) and the local cor-
porate sector (WE). As this is flow-of-funds data, the coverage is more comprehensive than that available for the other
countries and is not directly comparable.
ROW refers to the foreign corporate sector and the rest of the world.
sc indicates that this category is included in 'other'.
Other for HIE includes the local corporate sector, pension funds, foreign corporate sector, government nonfinancial
enterprises, central and local government and trust companies.
Other for LCE includes pension funds, mortgage financial institutions, central and local government.
Source: Tables 9 and 10, Bourne [1982]
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Table 7.2
Sectcwal Distribution of Commercial Bank Loans
Sector	 Bahnnin.c Barbados	 Belize Trinidad
_____________ (1978)
	 (1983)	 (1982)	 (1982)
Personal	 16.4	 19.7	 8.1	 34.5
Distribution	 123	 14.6	 31.2	 10.1
R. Est. & Con.	 24.9	 4.0	 10.5	 16.3
Tourism	 14.4	 15.4	 1.8	 0.7
Manufacturing	 1.9	 15.6	 13.7	 10.9
Agriculture	 0.4	 5.0	 19.7	 1.2
Government	 15.1	 1.9	 10.9	 10.3
Other	 14.6	 23.8	 4.1	 16.0
NOTES:
General: R. Esi & Con. = Real Estate and Construction; 'Government' includes loans to governments and statutory
bodies
BAHAMAS: Loans to residents in both Bahamian and foreign currencies; Sources: Ramsaran [1984] Tables 2.9, 2.14,
2.15 2.14
BARBADOS: Source: Table B6, Central Bank of Barbados [1988], Annual Statistical Digest
BELJZE: Source: Luben [1983], Table 14
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Source: Bourne [1984], Table 10
Table 73
Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Bank Loans
Five-Year Average
__________	 (percentage)	 _______ ______
Sector	 Bahamas	 Barbados	 Belize	 Trinidad
______________ ('74-'78)
	 ('79-'83)	 ('78-'82)	 ('76-'80)
Personal	 15.0	 22.6	 10.2	 40.9
Distribution	 10.7	 14.6	 28.4	 13.8
R. Est. & Con.	 25.6	 6.5	 11.7
Tourism	 11.6	 12.7	 0.9
Manufacturing	 5.1	 15.9	 12.2	 17.1
Agriculture	 0.4	 4.2	 24.1	 2.4
Government	 13.6	 1.6	 3.9	 4.4
NOTES:
General: R. Est. & Con. = Real Estate and Construction; 'Government' includes loans to governments and staxutoty
bodies; ... denotes not available
BAHAMAS: Loans to residents in both Bahamian and foreign currencies; Sources: Ramsaran [1984] Tables 2.9, 2.14,
2.15
BARBADOS: Source: Table B6, Central Bank of Barbados [1988], Annual Statistical Digest
BELJZE: Source: Luben [1983], Table 14
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Source: Ramkissoon [1981], Table 5
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7.4. A Model of Bank Screening by Loan Size
In the following model loans supplied by banks are treated as a variable input in firms' pro-
duction functions. This neoclassical specification allows loan size to be considered as a screen-
ing device, and provides a model consistent with a simple general equilibrium framework. It has
been adopted from Milde and Riley's [1988] analysis. We find a separating sequential equili-
brium in which the low quality firms (indexed by a quality parameter) signal by their choice of a
lower loan size (compared to the first best) at the bank zero profit loan rate for their risk class. In
contrast, in Milde and Riley (M-R) it is the high quality who signal - by a larger loan and rate of
interest in their model 1 and by a lower loan size and rate in models 2 and 3. The differences in
these results stem from the following specification changes.
a) We model risk discretely, adopting the normalization that project output is zero in the event of
failure. Our zero isoprofit contours are therefore straight lines at the risk-appropriate loan rate fac-
tor which is therefore the same under both symmetric and private information56. M-R model risk
by a continuous random variable, and the bank collects residual output in the event of failure.
This simplification allows us to specify the loan rate precisely.
b) We use a SOSD risk definition, similar to Bester's [1987] modelling, with higher quality firms
undertaking riskier projects, in line with the assumption that higher return activities are associ-
ated with greater risk. M-R's models 1 and 2 adopt a FOSD definition of risk: all projects are
subject to the same random factor so the high quality are less risky. Their model 3 has SOSD
with a mean preserving spread and low quality are defined as those with the riskier distribution.
In general it is the LR who signal their type in order to benefit from a lower rate. In our model
this implies that it is the low quality who signal, whereas in M-R the high quality, who are LR in
their context, signal.
c) Screening by lower loan size results from the single crossing property of the isoprofit contours.
In their model 3 the HR (low quality) is reluctant to accept a smaller loan; in ours the high quality
(HR) is unwilling to accept a smaller loan.
A similar simplifying assumption is discussed by Clemenz [1986] who attributes it to Bester.
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The Bertrand paradigm is presumed to yield a perfectly competitive outcome. This
assumption violates the hypothesis of oligopolistic behaviour which, it is argued elsewhere in the
thesis, characterises the banking sector in LDC markets. Artificially confining the analysis to
Bertrand competition both simplifies it and permits a ceteris paribus indication of the effects of
asymmetric information on the Pareto efficiency of an otherwise-unsullied credit market.
FIRMS
It is usual in screening models to treat the results as if they apply to the entire economy of
borrowers, i.e. all risk classes in the economy are offered screening contracts by the banks. How-
ever, in line with the idea, discussed in 7.3, that there are observationally distinguishable groups
on the credit market, it is assumed here that banks need to screen only a sector of the potential
borrowers. The output yk of a nontraditional sector or industry is therefore distinguished, and that
sector is presumed to be the only one subject to asymmetric information. In other sectors (indus-
tries) banks have a priori knowledge of each firm.
In the sector or industry producing output y, each firm's stochastic output is given by the
production function:
) =g(L)V(Ojr,p.)
	 (7.1)
where L is loan size, g (L) is the production function; g '(L) > 0, g "(L) < 0. 0 denotes a firm-
specific quality variable, such as firm management. Its value is ex ante private knowledge of the
firm and it is not a choice variable of the firm. t is a random variable which takes the values 0, 1
with probability (1— q1 ) and q1 , respectively. Its expected value thus depends on the quality of
firm management. V(01 ,p.) is thus a function which captures the stochastic effects on output of
firm management. The function V(0j
 ,p.) has the following properties: V(01 ,0) =0, all Oj, by nor-
malization; V(01 ,l) = V(61); aV(01,1) >0 . In order to permit explicit derivation of factor
demand functions and profit functions, the production function, g (L), is specialised to the con-
stant elasticity of output function: L, < 1.
As is usual, the simplified case with two types is considered. The two types are denoted 02
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and 0, 02> 0. Their failure probabilities are given by (1 -q) > (1 -qj). Thus
E[V(0j,p.)] = V(01 ,O)(1—qj ) + V(0j,1)q1
= V (Oj ) q1
and whether or not the expected value of V(.) for 02 exceeds, equals or is less than the expected
value for 0 depends on the assumptions made concerning the relative values of V(02,l) (V(01,l))
and q ( q i ). The equality case occurs when the distribution of V(0 2,p.) is a mean preserving
spread of the distribution of V(0 1 ,p.). Larger 9 can be interpreted as indicating better management
in the sense that, if successful, any production process undertaken by larger 0 will yield more, and
have a higher average and marginal loan product. However, 02 is also riskier since its failure pro-
bability is larger. 0 can be thought of as summarizing a Schumpeterian type of entrepreneur-
management function. The better quality entrepreneur-manager produces higher returns by using
more innovative, and hence riskier, techniques.
Firmf's expected profit is
E41 =qj [Pk L Pv(of )—iu.]	 (7.2)
where $, is the profit function of the firm with management type Oj , and p is the market price of
yk . R = (1+r) is the interest rate factor. In the event of failure, the firm makes no repayment.
The following standard results are obtained:
1.The loan demand of the applicant for credit is the short run factor demand and is decreasing in
the loan rate.
From the first order conditions for profit maximization, loan demand is defined by:
1 pkV(0f)L'-R =0	 or	 (7.3)
- pt V(O1 ) I3Lj [ R]
As expected, loan demand is decreasing in the loan rate. Differentiating (3),
A-=- (l....lS)k <0
	 (7.4)
2. Loan applicants with higher management quality demand larger loans.
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Inspection of (3) shows that at any R, firms with higher 0 demand higher loans.
3. In <R,L> space, the isoprofu curve of the loan applicant is strictly quasi-concave in L, with
zero slope at the point of loan demand.
The slope of a finn's isoprofit curve is given by57:
dR... - pkV(0f)L—R
-
L
>	 >
=0 as pkV(Of )L'—R 0
<	 <
Thus, in <R,L> space with L on the horizontal axis, a firm's isoprofit curve has positive slope
where the value of the marginal productivity of a loan exceeds the loan rate, zero slope at the
point where the loan demand schedule intersects the isoprofit curves, and negative slope at loan
levels beyond this. Further, differentiating (5) with respect to L:
a IdR _1 - (l)pkV(0f)L2_
-	 L	
(7.6)
a1dR'(j -1) < 0 implies that whenever .- =0, - [... IJ <0 so that the borrower's isoprofit curve is
strictly quasi-concave in L.
4. Borrowers' isoprofit curves satisfy the single-crossing property.
The isoprofit curves for these firms satisfy the single-crossing property required for screening to
be feasible. Differentiating (5) with respect to 0:
aI)I	 = Pk V'(01 ) L -2 > 0	 (7.7)
Firms with lower 0 have less steep isoprofit curves. Thus at loan sizes below their profit-
maximizing levels, where the isoprofit curves are positively sloped, they are willing to accept a
smaller marginal decrease in the loan rate for a marginal decline in loan size. In this range of
their isoprofit curves, the marginal productivity of a loan exceeds its marginal cost for both bor-
rowers. But 02 's higher productivity means that he values the marginal loan more and must be
The notation - I indicates that the derivative is taken along the isoprofit contour of type f.
(7.5)
(7.8)
(7.9)
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compensated for a decrease by a larger decrease in loan rate.
BANKS
A bank's profit function is assumed to be additively separable in the loans extended to dif-
ferent firms. Expected profit for loans to an identified firm is given by:
Ex=aj R1 L1 —IL1
where I =(1+i) is the market deposit rate factor.
The bank isoprofit curve in <R ,L > space has slope
dR 1 __ 1—qf__
•7;•z	 L1
Thebankbreaksevenonloanstotypee1 atRj =I/q1 sothat,givenl,foreachtypethereisan
isoprofit schedule, with zero slope, giving the lowest loan rate the bank can charge type Oj for
nonnegative profits.
If the bank is unable to distinguish between types, its profit function is given by:
Et = (qI'ykJ+q2yk)RL — IykL
	
(7.10)
where = the proportion of agents in the y industry, y = proportion of agents of type Oj,
f = 1,2 in the Yk industry, and L = loan size accorded to indistinguishable y firms. The isoprofit
curve has slope:
dR -- 'ykl-(qI'ykl+q2yk2)R
-	 (7.11)
(q i'y i + q2y,)L
Break-even on these pooling contracts occurs where the isoprofit curve has zero slope in <R L>
space at
R=	 •YtI
	
(7.12)
(q i y i + q2yk2)
where R is the break-even pooling loan rate.
THE MARKET
The analytical framework introduced by Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) ([ 1976] and
[1977], respectively) describes behaviour in markets with asymmetric information as character-
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ized by coniract-setting, where the contracts specify both the price and quantity (as well, possi-
bly, as other sorting variables). RSW implicitly modelled the market process as a two-stage game
where (in the context of the market considered here) banks offer contracts in the first stage and
the potential borrowers select among the available contracts in the second stage (see Heilwig
[1987]).
Symmetric Infonnation
In order to provide a benchmark against which to compare the results obtained under asym-
metric information, the symmetric information case is considered first. Each bank maximizes its
separable profit function subject only to the individual rationality constraints that each borrower
obtains at least the equilibrium profit.
Max ykl[qIR1L1 -IL1]+yt2[q2R2L2-IL,]
R1.L1.R2,R2
+I{qIpkL?v(ol)_qIRlLI_l]
+ 2 [q 2pk L V(02) - q2R2L2 - 2]
where r equilibrium profit for firm of type Oj, Xj = multiplier for individual rationality con-
straint for firm of type O, LIS denotes the loan size when information is symmetric, and
L7 V (Q') is the marginal productivity of loan size L1 . The first order conditions give:
R	 !L	 f =1,2	 (7.13)rLiJ V(81) 
= pk
Since equilibrium with perfect information and perfect competition entails equality between the
marginal productivity of a factor and the ratio between its price and the output price, the price of
L1 is R1 =1 /q1 . From (7.13) the symmetric equilibrium loan sizes are obtained as:
	
L = [
Pkv(e1) 1 -r	 (7.14i)
R1	 j
	
L2 = [PkV(O	 (7.l4ii)S
R2 ]
Thus, with symmetric information both types receive the loan demanded ax their respective loan
rates, as can be confirmed by comparing (7.3) and (7.14).
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In this complete information setting, this result can be viewed as reflecting banks' profit
maximization in separate submarkets for each type. In each submarket it can be assumed that
each bank treats the rate of interest as parametric and chooses loan size-. When the assumption
of complete information is relaxed the hypothesis that clients are sorted requires that banks must
choose the loan rate and loan size (the contracts) required for sorting. Explicit consideration of
strategic behaviour becomes necessaiy. Adoption of a game-theoretic approach in even the
present symmetric information environment allows for consistent treatment. We may view the
offer and acceptance of contracts as a game with sequential strategies and look for a subgame per-
fect equilibrium (Selten [1975]) as is appropriate in a repeated game. The economy deposit rate
factor is I and all banks compete by making separate offers to the two types in the first stage, the
offers being accepted or rejected in the second. Consider the second stage when borrowers
choose among the contracts available to them. Given any rate of interest, R, a contract specifying
a loan size L ^ [R' (J3ptV(01))]"('4) will be rejected by borrowers of type Oj if a contract with L
as defined by (7.3) is available since the latter lies on their demand curve. Thus at R only con-
tracts with L as defined by (7.3) cannot be upset by alternative offers. This holds for every R. No
contract with R <IIqj will be on offer since, from (7.8), this implies negative profits. Given
these two properties which the contracts on offer in stage 2 must satisfy in order to be Nash
equilibria for that stage, we consider contract offers in stage 1. At stage I R ^IIq but Bertrand
competition implies R = I/q1 = R1 . Individual profit maximization implies that with R1 L is given
by (7.13). But these are precisely the contracts that cannot be upset at stage 2, for any contract off
the demand curve of type O there is an incentive to offer a contract which will attract all bor-
rowers of that type in stage 2. Thus contracts defined by (7.14) are a subgame perfect equili-
brium.
Under complete information the relative loan sizes obtained by the two types depend on the
assumption made about expected returns. Loan sizes are allocated according to the expected
return of the debtor and coincide with the loan size they demand (see Figure 7.1 which illustrates
Compare Gale's [198Th] treatment in the asymmetric information case. The assumption of a contract
per market and expost matching for price quotes allowed a Wairasian equilibrium.
LRIL
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how loan size depends on expected return, and note the same relalionship in (7.14)). The higher
loan rate charged to 02 compensates the bank for the lower probability of repayment. Thus banks'
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between R1 and L1 equals that of the type 0 agents in eh
market and the solutions to the banks' and borrowers' individual maximization problems coin-
cides with the outcome required for efficient production in the economy. With asymmetric infor-
mation, however, this coincidence of ends is no longer automatically available.
Figure 7.1: The Symmetric Information Loan Contracts
Loan size depends on expected return: taking V (Or), V (02) and q as fixed and letting q i vary, at low R 1 , R IL.
q iV(0 i) > qiV(02), aoiiL'1 > L, atRj qlV(0I)=q2V(02) andL'1 =L, aiR 1,1 q1V(0 1) < q2V(02)
andL <Li.
n
	 L()
iS - S
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Asymmetric Information
We now assume that banks know the distribution of types on the market and their success
probabilities and qualities but cannot identify the types. The symmetric information contracts
make banks vulnerable to losses which occur on any loan offered to 0r at R <I/qj (see (7.9)).
The first two points below indicate the constraints on a bank's options and the third how screen-
ing contracts address these.
1. First best contracts are not incentive conzpatible.
The lower loan rate set for 0 induce 02 types to claim to be 01, that is, the first best contracts
are not incentive compatible. Feasibility of first best contracts when types are private information
requires that 02's profit at the symmetric information contract <R,L > be at least as great as the
profit obtained from pretending to be 0. The following weak inequality must be satisfied:
q 2 [pk (L 2)V(02)—R 2L 2] ^ q2[p(L)DV(e,)_RL]
Substituting for L ,L, R and R and simplifying, this requires:
{q2v(o] * - 1]
Since, with ^ 1 and V(0 1) < V(02)
1	 V(01)l^ {q1v(oi)]*[-_ 
V(02)j
I	 I	 V(01)
.p-_•1 <	 V(92)
this inequality will clearly be violated if either, a) the 0 2 types' return is a mean preserving spread
of the O types' return, i.e. q 2 V(0,)=q l V(0 l) and q<qi, orb) the expected output of O i types
exceeds that of 02 types, q V(0 1) > q2 V(0,J. If q 2 V(e2) > q V(0 1), the inequality will not hold if
I l-V(0i)/V(02)1 > [qi'o	 -rp-
I.	 l—I	 ]	 [qiV(O1
Inspection of Figure 7.1 indicates that this last possibility occurs when, given V(0 1 )IV (02), q i/q2 is
so low that R 1 is sufficiently close to R 2 that 02 types prefer their larger loan sizes at a higher rate
than 0'S lower loan size and only slightly lower loan rate. Asymmetric information then creates
no identification problem for a bank and we exclude this possibility by assumption.
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Given this assumption, Figure 7.1 shows that 02 can move to higher levels of profit by
claiming to be 01. But the lending bank loses on any loans made to type 02 at a loan rate below
R2 = I 1q2. In the absence of complete information, a bank can 1) offer contracts that sort custo-
mers, ii) offer a single contract at a loan rate reflecting the average probability of success, iii)
refuse loans to all borrowers in the y sector. The last possibilities give rise to Stiglitz-Weiss
credit rationing since, we note:
2. Raising the loan rate in a pooling contract produces adverse selection.
Consider the present model with many types. Suppose banks are unable to distinguish these
types, but set a single rate of interest and lend each applicant the loan demanded at that rate of
interest. No firm for whom q [p*LV(0) —RL] <0 will apply for a loan. Let the values for which
this condition is satisfied with equality be:
	
LV(0) =	 that ispk
	
L	
pk
where A7 is the average loan product for the marginal type, 0. Any 0 with A.PL <A.PL will not
apply for a loan. But as R increases the cutoff value of AF increases. (For any 0 an increase in R
reduces profit in the case of success so that expected profit decreases). Firms with lower AP
(lower 0) will leave the market. But firms with lower AP are also less risky and hence more
desirable from the bank's point of view.
3. Screening contracts permit separation
Instead of the adverse selection effect, it is assumed that banks are sufficiently knowledge-
able of profitable market opportunities to screen. We conjecture that equilibrium is characterized
by bank offers of a set of contracts among which borrowers choose according to their type. In the
conjectured equilibrium, the contract variables are solutions to the bank constrained profit max-
imization problem. These constraints are the individual rationality constraints and the following
incentive compatibility constraints:
q 1[pL 1 V (0 1) —R j L 1] ^ q i[pLV (Oi) —R 2 L 2 ]	 (7.151)
q 2 [pL V(02) - R 2 L 2 ] ^ q 2 [pk L? V(02) - R 1 L 1 ]	 (7.l5ii)
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Constraint (7.15i) requires that the LR type, Oi prefer the contract intended for him to that
intended for 02, and conversely for constraint (7.1511). It is conjectured that if constraint (7.1511)
is binding, constraint (7.15i) will not be 59. The Lagrangean for the bank's problem can be writ-
ten:
Mar yti[ q iR iL i — IL 1] + -j .[q,flL2 —!L 2 ]	 (7.16)
R,.Ls.RrL1
- Eq?pkLfr(02)_q2RlLl]}
+	 IPkLfr(0I)_lRiLI_i}
+X2 2PkLV(02)_R2L2_42}
where is the Lagrange multiplier for incentive compatibility constraint (7.1511), j) .2 are the
multipliers for 0 1 1 s and 02 's individual rationality constraints, and 4' = the profit level type Oj
would expect to obtain in a competitive equilibrium, i.e. their reservation profit levels. LIC and R.fc
will denote the loan size and loan rate received by type Or in the screening contract. The first
order conditions give equations (7.17) to (7.20). The equalities follow from the fact that distinct
contracts must be offered in order for screening to be effective, and a positive loan size will obvi-
ously bear a positive rate of interest, i.e.L 1 and L 2 must both be positive, giving the equalities in
(7.18) and (7.20), and hence so must R 1 and R 2, giving (7.17) and (7.19).
R 1 : 'ykIq1+Tq2 — Xiq1 = 0	 (7.17)
L 1 : Ykl [q 1R —I] - Tq2[pk(Li)'V (02) —R] + Iq1[pk(L )' - V(01) —R] = 0	 (7.18)
R2: '1k2-11—?2 = 0	 (7.19)
L 2 : y 2[q2R	  0 	 (7.20)
Using (7.17) and (7.18) to eliminate , simplifying and rearranging, the following value is
obtained for multiplier i:
We note that i) incentive compatibility requires that at least one selfselection constraint binds, ii) that
at most one incentive constraint binds: assume that both bind and add the resulting equations; this implies
that V(0 1)= V(02), that the types do not differ in productivity, contrary to assumption. in) We can also
check that if (7.15i), the constraint on 01, is binding, then (7.lSii) does nol. Equlity in (7.15i) implies that
the difference between the LHS and RHS of (7.l5ii) is pk[L r —L fl[V (0 1) — V92)]. But
V (01) <V (02) and the nonnegativity of the difference required for self-selection implies that L 1 <L - as
we will see is the case in the screening contract. But the implied contracts have 02 signalling by a loan size
above his perfect information choice, while 01 receives his first best contract. But this violates the single
crossing property since 02 has a higher marginal cost of signalling. In short such a contract would not be in-
centive compatible.
<R,L>: R=R=R2=_L.
q2
(7.l4iibis)
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7t1q1[pk(L)'V(Ol)-J/ql1 	 (7.21)q,p(L)P_1[V(e,)_ V(81)]
Substituting (7.19) in (720) gives:
fPk (L)'V(9) -	 = 0	 (7.22)q2
Bertrand competition ensures that at any R1
 >1 /q1, the loan rate will be bid down to equality.
Equation (7.22) therefore indicates that in the contract for 02 loan size is set such that the margi-
nal productivity of the loan is equated to the ratio of loan rate ( factor price) and the price of the
good, as in the full information case. If the contract intended for 0 specified a similarly-
determined loan size, the numerator of equation (7.21) would be zero. 0 would also be receiving
his first best contract But our consideration of 0 2's profits evaluated at <R', L'> in point 1
above shows that it is not incentive compatible for both types to receive their first best contracts.
Hence
(L)?'-1V(01) - ..L. > 0
	 (7.23)qi
therefore i > 0 and constraint (7.l5ii) is binding.
Thus, in the conjectured screening equilibrium, the following contracts will be offered.
Equation (7.22) gives the contract for type 02 as:
p& V(0i) Iw
Ri I[ __ 1
L 2 =12 =
As usual in screening models, the 'lowest' quality types, who have nothing to gain from being
identified, receive the first best contract Quality here is judged from the point of view of the
uninformed, namely the bank, who prefers low risk borrowers. Substituting L from (7.14li) into
(7.l5ii) as an equality gives the contract for type e as:
< Ri,L > : R=RR i =-1-	 (7.24)qi
pk[yk(Li3O2)-(1-)yk(L2,O2)]
L1=	
R1
60 We note that L depends on 02, the Greenwald-Süglitz externality discussed in Chapter 8.
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where y (L ,0) = output of y evaluated at staled values. Recall from (7.5) and (7.6) that the
lsopmfit curves are strictly quasi-concave In L with positive slopes at L input levels below the
loan demand curve. The expression in (7.23) is the slope of the O isoprofit curve at the screen-
ing contract - compare (7.5). Therefore positive (7.23) (positive rI) indicates that 9 types receive
a loan size smaller than demanded at R 1. O types, who have a lower marginal cost of signalling,
self-select by their willingness to accept a smaller than optimal loan. We can now state the fol-
lowing.
Proposition: L > L i.e. the loan size in the screening contract selected by type 02 exceeds
the loan size in the screening contract chosen by type O.
We may first consider a diagrammatic demonstration of this. Consider the set of contract offers
faced by 0 1 and 02. The contract <R 2,L> is optimal for 02. Therefore, in Figure 7.2 the other
contracts on offer must lie in the vertically shaded region. Since profits, 4), are strictly decreasing
in R, we know that 01 prefers any rate of interest below R 2. We also know that loans to 0 are
made at the breakeven rate R 1. Therefore the alternative offers which Oi prefers must lie in the
horizontally striped region in Figure 7.2. The single crossing property says that at any <R ,L>,
02 has a steeper isoprofit curve, and these two isoprofit curves cannot cross again. Then the inter-
section of the two shaded regions (where there is a contract preferred by 8 but not by 02) must lie
to the left of L and belowR1.
Figure 7.2: Screening by low-risk acceptance of a smaller loan
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We may also proceed by contradiction. Assume LI > L. From equation (7.141i), L = L. There-
fore, LI > L. Consider the binding constraint
[pk(L.)V(0,.) —R 2L] = [pk (L)V(O2J —R1Lf]
The RHS is increasing inL since
a[Pk(LI) v (e?) - R1LI]
________________ 
= p*(LI)' V (02) —R i > 0
aL
The inequality follows from (7.23) and V(OIJ > V(0 i). Therefore,
Pk (LjV(02) - R 2L > p (L . )V(e2) - R1L
But this implies that 02 prefers higher interest rates, since R 2 >1 - a contradiction. Hence
LI ^ L, but, with R 1 <R 2, the constraint requires that the strict inequality must hold.
Thus, in order to screen, banks cannot allocate financing according to expected return: the
LR always receive the smaller loan, irrespective of expected return: as noted earlier, LR expected
return may be smaller, equal to, or larger than HR.
Proposition: A binding incentive compatibility constraint (7.l5ii) for 02 implies that the
constraint for O does not bind.
From (17.l5ii), the binding constraint we have:
[pk (L)V(02) - R 2L ] = [p (L)V(02) - R1LI
Adding and subtracting pk (LI)t V (0 j) on the RHS:
EPk (LV(0 2) - R 2L]	 [p (LI)V(O2) - R1LI ] +pk(Li)5V(Oj) pk(L I) V (OI) (7.25)
Adding and subtracting pk(L.)V(0 1) on the LHS:
[p (L)P V(02) - R 2L]	 [p (LV(O2) - R 2L ]+Pk (L 2 )V(9 l)Pk (L 2 )V(O l) (7.26)
Equating (7.25) and (7.26) and rearranging we obtain on the LHS the incentive compatibility con-
straint for O:
pt (L V(0 1) - R 1L1 - [p (L)P V(01) - R2L]
=p*[V(02)—V(O1)][(L—(LI)] >0	 (7.27)
V(02) > V(01 ) and L > LI implies that the RHS of (7.27) is positive.
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We now show that these separating contracts are a sequential equilibrium.
Screening contracts as a sequential equilibrium.
We argue that the conjectured screening contracts are an equilibrium if either or, afortiori, both
of the following assumptions hold:
Assumption. 1: The proportion of O types in the yk industry population is small.
Let 1/Yk2 = y' be the population share of types 01 in industry y. The average success probability
in the industry can be written =y1q1+(1-.'yl)q2 so that the assumption of small 'y ' implies that
the average success probability is near to the lower success probability of 02. While this assump-
tion (or the next) is necessary for the equilibrium we propose, it is in fact the McKinnon-Shaw
assumption of many high productivity, high risk activities in the non-traditional sectors of the
lagging economies.
Assumption 2: The difference	 i -	 i is large.
The assumption is that the 02 isoprofit curve is quite steeply sloped relative to that of 0 or,
equivalently, that 0 1 's marginal cost of signalling is quite low relative that of 02. We have already
shown - see (7.5) - that the low risk have lower marginal cost and that this is required for incen-
tive compatibility.
As discussed we may view the contract signing on the credit market as a sequential game in
which banks offer contracts in stage 1 and borrowers choose among the contracts on offer in stage
2. Given the sequential nature of the game and the private information about borrower types, it is
appropriate to use an equilibrium concept that ensures credibility when information is imperfect.
We therefore look for a sequential equilibrium (SE) (Kreps and Wilson [1982]), following
Hellwig's [1987] method. A strategy combination is a sequential equilibrium if there are con-
sistent beliefs such that each player's strategy prescribes at every information set a choice which
is optimal with respect to those beliefs. In the first stage banks know the distribution of types in
the sector and their preferences but cannot identify the types. Each bank offers a set of contracts
which specify an interest rate and a loan size. They have beliefs about the contracts other banks
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will offer given their common knowledge of the structure of the game and borrowers' strategies
in the second stage. SE requires that they offer contracts that are a best response to the offers of
other banks and to the decisions they expect borrowers to make at stage 2. In the second stage,
since the informed know the contracts placed on the market in the first stage, SE requires only
that their strategies be sequentially rational, that is, that a borrower chooses the contract that is
optimal for him among those available, regardless of the contracts offered at stage 1.
Consider this second stage choice of the borrowers. With the conjectured screening con-
tracts available, type 01 will choose <R,L >, since by (7.27)
>
Type 82 will choose <R,L >,since
[RI] =.4RL1]
by binding constraint (7.l5ii). He is indifferent between <R,L> and <R,Lf > but the former
lies closer to his demand curve.
Suppose a pooling contract were also available. This contract will always be chosen by 02
in preference to his screening contract because q> q means that R 2 > R, where R is the pooling
contract loan rate. However, if only 82 chooses the pooling contract, the bank offering it will
make losses because R does not compensate the bank for the risk borne with 02. Therefore the
deviation to the pooling equilibrium offer in the first stage is only profitable if 0 types also
demand the contract.
In choosing <R,L >0 1 bears a cost in terms of lower loan size than preferred aIR 1 . How-
ever, he thus avoids the subsidy he would have to pay for 02 in the pooling contract. Therefore O
does not take the pooling contract if the cost of doing so in terms of loan rate subsidy outweighs
the gain through loan size. There is no net gain from the pooling contract if R is high. R is high
if the average success probability required by the bank is low, that is, if y is low, as in Assump-
tion 1. This is illustrated in Figure 7.3. With the screening contracts, 01 is on isoprofit curve
As long as 4' lies below R,,, 01 finds the screening contract more profitable. Only if the pooling
rate is as low as !,, would he find the pooling contract attractive, but we have excluded this by
r C ')
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assumption.
Figure 73: The Screening Contracts with Small
The extent of the gain via loan size in the pooling contract also depends on the reduction in
loan size which the screening contract must include in order to sort. This depends on the relative
magnitudes of the types' MRS. If type 0 1 's marginal cost of signalling is veiy low relative to
02 's, that is, if 0 1 's isoprofit curve is relatively shallower, the bank can sort with relatively lower
reductions in loan size relative to first best. In Figure 7.4, with isoprofit 4' the bank has only to
reduce loan size by d 1 <d2 which is the reduction required with isoprofit 4, which represents a
relatively lower marginal cost of being screened for 01. Thus under Assumption 2 0 1 will not
accept a pooling contract.
Under either assumptions 1 or 2 sequential rationality implies that 02 chooses a screening
contract at stage 2. Given this choice a pooling contract will be strictly dominated by the screen-
p.
ccee
L
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ing contract. Therefore in stage 1 the only contracts offered will be screening contracts. All
banks offer these screening contracts and borrowers are allocated randomly among them in stage
2. Banks' beliefs regarding the strategy of borrowers and other banks are proved consistent and
the screening contracts are a sequential equilibrium.
Figure 7.4: The Screening Contracts with Large
MRS (O,)IMRS (Or)
-J
The assumption above on the relative marginal costs of being screened is that derived by
Riley [1985] to ensure existence of a Nash equilibrium in a general screening model. That about
relative population shares was first discussed in the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] paper. Hellwig's,
op. cit., discussion of the two-stage Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson fonnulation breaks the population
share assumption in arguing that that game has no SE. Heliwig adds a third stage in which the
uninformed banks reject or accept the loan applications made in the second stage of the R-S-W
game. With the 3-stage structure the screening contracts we have argued are accepted at stage 2
are no longer an SE because, in the absence of our assumptions, it is profitable to deviate to pool-
ing contract. The pooling contract can always be in turn upset by a separating contract which
attract the LR, leading to losses on the pooling contract (the original R-S-W argument that
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pOoling is never an equilibrium). The two-stage game therefore has no equilibrium in pure stra-
tegies. Hdllwig argues that in the 3-stage game the pooling contract cannot be upset by a separat-
ing contract and is the most plausible SE. Deviation to the separating contract is unprofitable
because a demand for the contract will be rejected by the banks at stage 3 and it will therefore not
be demanded in stage 261.
Hellwig's model has the important advantage of generality: there is no need to make a
specific assumption about population share or relative MRS in order to obtain an equilibrium.
Consequently, the Stiglitz and Weiss original argument that asymmetric information leads to
rationing receives strong support. This is reinforced by the rationing results found in more gen-
era! models of the debt contract (Gale and Hellwig, op. cit., and Williamson, op. cit.). We have
not chosen to use this 3-stage formulation because we wish to consider the prescriptive implica-
tions of assuming that banks' forte lies in making arrangements that produce reliable information
about borrowers' investment opportunities, as argued by McKinnon and Shaw. The use of a for-
mulation that produces the rationing result does not allow banks the most favourable informa-
tional role. Further, as argued, the first assumption is consistent with Shaw's view of the LDC
environment.
7.5: Interim Condusion
Our model has accomplished three tasks. First, we have shown that in models of screening
by loan size a sequential equilibrium can be obtained with assumptions similar to those used by
authors such as Milde and Riley. Since screening models are based on the premise that banks
offer contracts among which borrowers choose, they are two-stage asymmetric information
games in which the sequential equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept. Second, we
have demonstrated that while banks are able to generate information which sorts risk classes, as
61 Let the pooling contract be PC and the PC equilibrium-breaking separating contract be SC. If SC appli-
cations are accepted in stage 3, the accepting bank must believe that its applicants are LR (that its applicants
have an above-average success probability) therefore banks offering the PC must have below-average appli-
cants. But then PC will make losses and applications for it will not be accepted at stage 3. But this implies
that the applicants for SC are the entire risk population and SC will expenence losses. There is therefore a
contradiction to the assumption that SC is accepted.
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hypothesized by McKinnon and Shaw, the resulting loans are not allocated on the basis of
expected social return as would occur under symmetric information. In order to distinguish
themselves for a lower loan rate, the low risk must always accept a lower loan size. Although all
borrowers obtain loans, there is no assurance that the highest productivity projects will be fully
financed. Third, our explicit derivation of the contract variables serve to identify the maximized
profit functions and demand functions of the sector which we assume banks have to screen. We
use these functions in Chapter 8 to show that the competitive equilibrium with screening is not
constrained Pareto efficient even though banks are sorting perfectly. Incentive compatibility con-
strains the screened to be off their optimum and therefore the envelope theorem does not hold for
their indirect profit functions so that price changes can have allocative effects.
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Chapter 8: Credit Market Policy when Banks Screen: A General Equilibrium
Approach
8.1: Introduction
The key feature of credit markets with asymmetric information is the heterogeneity of bor-
rowers whose quality and success probabilities cannot be identified a priori. However, the price
they are willing to pay for a given loan depends on their type. When price changes therefore
demand changes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Banks acquire commodities - loan
accounts - whose value they cannot assess. Chapter 7 discussed and illustrated how banks can
cope with this risk by rationing or by offering screening contracts.
Previous models of credit market policy have considered government intervention when
contracts specify only the loan rate. It is well-known that loan-rate-only contracts lead to credit
rationing and/or underinvestment or to overinvestment. However, until Greenwald and Stiglitz's
[1986] investigation of the Pareto efficiency of economies with incomplete markets and imperfect
information it has been widely assumed that separating equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient.
Therefore, the Pareto efficiency of credit markets when banks sort perfectly has not, it is thought,
previously been examined. This chapter adopts the Greenwald and Stiglitz methodology, incor-
porating Chapter 7's screening contracts into a modified version of their general equilibrium
model. Given the credit market conditions of Chapter 7's model, we find that the appropriate
policy is to subsidize the highest interest rates. This result can be explained as follows.
Screening is achieved in our model through the low risk's acceptance of a loan size below
the first best level. There is less investment, with a lower average success probability, being
financed than in the first best. The implicit policy objective is to increase the expected return of
aggregate investment, without disturbing the self-selection induced by the intervention free com-
petitive equilibrium contracts. High risk (HR) indifference to low risk (LR) contracts should be
maintained in order that banks continue to screen profitably. While a subsidy on higher interest
rates increases the loan size taken by the HR it permits the contract offered for the LR to specify
a sufficiently larger loan size to improve the risk mix of financed investment, simultaneously mis-
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ing total financing. The HR's subsidy maintains his indifference to the lower interest rate and
increased (relative to pre-intervention) loan size of the LR.
There is an alternative way of looking at our result. We find that a subsidy can be Pareto
improving because the envelope theorem does not hold for screened borrowers - a change in their
loan rate has both direct and indirect effects on their indirect objective function in the competitive
equilibrium (CE). This should not be surprising because their indirect profit function does not
represent the maximwn level of profits but the constrained maximum. Although loan qualities are
not bundled at a single price as would occur in a pooling equilibrium, the screening CE has only
determined quality-specific prices by the creation of an externality - the loans received by
screened borrowers reflect the characteristics of others in the market and the marginal rates of
substitution (MRS) between borrower and bank are not equated. If we regard the loans received
by different types as different factors of production, we see that this implies that the MRS
between different inputs are not equated to relative price and there are therefore loan realloca-
tions, achieved via tax-induced changes in relative rates, that can be Pareto-improving. Given no
more information than the banks a central planner can improve on the decentralized system
which, constrained not to make a loss, lacks the planner's redistributive ability.
As discussed in Chapter 7.3 and Chapter 2, McKinnon and Shaw originally 1 argued that
allowing banks to determine loan rates free of regulation would permit them to exercise their
comparative advantage in information acquisition, allocating loans according to expected social
return. We argued in Chapter 7 that screening supports MS's intuition that financial intermedi-
aries have arrangements which help alleviate the inefficiencies caused by imperfect information.
This chapter demonstrates that they were over-optimistic in their assessment of outcomes in a
deregulated market. Even sophisticated. banking arrangements may be improved upon by careful
policy.
Before deriving this result we discuss the policy measures already suggested in the litera-
ture. Section 8.2 considers the policy issues raised when banks use only the loan rate. It
1 We will discuss McKinnon's [1988] revision of this view.
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compares the results of models with similar structures but differing in their bank contract assump-
lions to conclude that policy measures should take account of existing intennediary arrange-
ments. Brief consideration is also given to the effects stabilization policy may have in credit
markets with adverse selection. Section 8.3 examines welfare issues in markets where more
sophisticated banks are acquiring information. In the main it discusses the Greenwald-Stiglilz
analysis and our results. Only de Meza and Webb's [1988] paper examines policy when banks
actively acquire information and there the information is acquired through a credit rating agency.
In Section 8.4 the partial equilibrium model of Chapter 7 is embedded in the adapted
Greenwald-Stiglitz general equilibrium framework to show that Pareto-improving official action
is consistent with the most rational and undistorted behaviour postulated for information-
constrained banks.
8.2: Policy in models with loan rate contracts
Where models of asymmetric information in the credit market consider or derive contracts
specifying only the loan rate, various policy measures have been suggested to deal with the
resulting distortions in investment finance. The social loss in this case results from the fact that,
while society's interest requires maximization of the expected return from project implementa-
tion, bank strategy, concerned only with the return in the event of success, may either exclude
high expected return borrowers (rationing) or permit a loan rate which attracts projects with
expected return different from the opportunity cost of capital.
In the context of the Stiglitz-Weiss [1981] rationing of observat.ionally distinct groups, Ord-
over and Weiss [1981] suggest that banks be forced to lend to all borrowers so that the inclusion
of projects with high but risky returns raise the expected economy-wide return per dollar lent2.
Such total removal of discretion from banks is impractical because it would interfere with any
evaluation/assessment techniques the banks have evolved, as well as nullifying all contract possi-
bilities. Further, borrowers' knowledge of such regulation seems likely to create its own adverse
2 The supply of loanable funds would be maintained unchanged through proportional taxes on borrowers'
profits and transfers to depositors.
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selection effects: for borrowers with poor repayment prospects and protected by limited liability
such a rule would present a golden opportunity.
de Meza and Webb's [1987] model demonstrates the inefficiencies caused by adverse selec-
tion. Nevertheless, a comparison of models indicates that MS's warning about government inter-
vention should be noted; in some cases it is not clear that the policy measure proposed would be
necessary if allowance is made for sorting possibilities. de Meza and Webb model a competitive
banking industry whose potential borrowers are ranked by first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). Although there is no rationing since bank return is monotonic increasing in the loan
rate, competition reduces the loan rate to the point where banks finance projects whose expected
return is below the opportunity cost of loanable funds: there is overinvestment3. First-best is
achieved by a tax on depositors' interest income. This raises the deposit rate banks must pay and
hence increases the loan rate at which the zero-profit market-clearing equilibrium occurs, deter-
ring those HR borrowers with negative expected social returns. Comparison of this model with
Besanko and Thakor's [1987a] competitive model (see Chapter 7.2) suggests that where banks
compete in contracts which specify collateral as a screening device, the market alone can elim-
inate such overinvestment. Collateral provides banks with a means of distinguishing risky bor-
rowers and charging the HR a higher rate of interest.
When de Meza and Webb use the original Stiglitz-Weiss risk definition, they not only find
that there may be a credit rationing equilibrium, but that even in its absence there may be under-
investment. At higher interest rates the entry of HR projects implies that banks must charge a
sufficiently higher rate of interest to compensate for the increased risk. Consequently, competi-
tive equilibrium occurs where expected social project return exceeds the opportunity cost of pro-
ject investment (the deposit rate). The rate charged by banks must compensate them for risk at a
rate that exceeds the social valuation because they are concerned only with success return 4. In
3 Recall that with FOSD the adverse selection effect operates so as to attract HR (low expected return)
borrowers as the loan rate decreases.
The underinvestment result is less acute when credit is rationed, illustrating the social benefits of even
this bank response. With rationing the negative adverse selection effect on expected bank profit which occurs
at higher interest rates is reduced so banks' interest races are nearer to expected project return.
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this case a subsidy on interest income, by reducing the deposit rate banks must pay, allows them
to expand loans to the level necessazy for first best investment. If, however, the sorting possibili-
ties available to banks are considered adequate, comparison of this model with that of Bester
[1985] would suggest that the adverse selection effect responsible for underinvestment could
again be overcome by screening contracts with collateral.
Since collateral is costly when borrowers are risk averse, Greenwald and Stiglitz's analysis
and the results of our application in Section 8.4 suggests that a planner could improve on the
screening equilibrium. Furthermore, the taxes and subsidies suggested by de Meza and Webb
seem likely to be the appropriate instruments in the risk environments they specified. However,
an investigation of policy with collateral screening would be needed for a clear indication.
The juxtaposition of these undennvestment and overinvestment results stresses the
commodity-bundling effects of imperfect information. The basic problem is that qualities cannot
be identified and correct prices determined. Heterogeneity and private information causes social
and private (bank) returns to diverge whatever the risk definition used, the definition determining
only whether the selection is adverse or "proverse" to the bank. In a pooling equilibrium HR and
LR borrowers pay the same interest rate which reflects only the average risk on the market. If
expected return and success probability are positively correlated (FOSD) this results in too many
projects being financed 5, if non-positively (SOSD) too few projects are financed.
Other implications of adverse selection of special significance to LDC monetary policy
have been discussed. McKinnon [1988] has recently recognized the possibility of equilibrium
credit rationing due to asymmetric information. As a result of this recognition and the further
assumption of macroeconomic instability, he virtually reverses his earlier recommendation of
minimal regulation. He suggests that macroeconomic instability can produce positive yield
correlation within groups so that whole borrower classes may be forced into default in adverse
macro situations, increasing the bankruptcy risk of the lending bank. In these conditions
Comparison of de Meza and Webb's analysis, which uses the zero profit result of a competitive equili-
brium to show underinvestroent, with that of Stiglit.z and Weiss's suggests that the rationing result is more
likely if banks are assumed to behave strategically, recognizing the adverse effects of interest-rate increases
past the bank-optimal rate. Myopic competition seems most likely to result in higher rates.
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McKinnon suggests that it may be appropriate for the authorities to impose an interest rate ceil-
ing. This would both discourage banks from lending to the riskiest borrowers and reduce a
borrower's incentive to choose riskier, higher return investments. But interest rate regulation
does not appear well-justified here. In the circumstances described it is not clear why the authori-
ties should be more adept at (concerned with) preventing its bankruptcy than the bank itself. A
profit-maximizing bank, aware of the positive covariance among returns in a particular risk class,
would wish to structure its overall loan portfolio so as to minimize bankruptcy costs, if its bears
the entirety of those costs. On the other hand, and this is the major focus of McKinnon's new
analysis, banks' belief in a government commitment to rescue them in the event of bankruptcy
does pose a moral hazard problem. With a rescue system in place, banks have an incentive to
lend to riskier borrowers, at higher interest rates than they otherwise would, because they no
longer bear the full cost of loan default. It is in this context that the new McKinnon advocacy of
an interest rate ceiling regulation may be justified. Assuming that the authorities have the same
information as the banks, the regulated rate should be set at the bank-optimal rate in the absence
of moral hazard. However, in this change of direction McKinnon does not take account of banks'
screening and incentive arrangements. If discriminating contracts are offered by banks, a blanket
interest rate ceiling of the type he suggests, may interfere with their ability to sort and result in
the exclusion of investments that may be socially desirable ... as McKinnon originally argued.
This is easily seen by considering the result of a ceiling below R 2 in the model of Chapter 7.
McKirinon placed his analysis in the context of the macroeconomy, implicitly recognizing
that when individual behaviour does not satisfy once-standard assumptions, its interaction with
macroeconomic events may give surprising results. We have already described in Section 7.2
Blinder's [1987] analysis of the enhanced effects of expansionary monetary policy. Mankiw
[1986] has considered the converse case of restrictive monetary policy. He considers an exo-
genous upward shift of banks' supply curve which raises the loan rate. Adverse selection may
then decrease the average success probability faced by banks, necessitating a further increase in
loan rate. This process could lead, in Mankiw's words, to 'financial collapse' - the pool of bor-
rowers available to banks becomes so risky that no loans are made. A major plank of
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stabilization policies is restrictive monetaiy policy aimed at reducing demand. It assumes that
only marginally productive investment projects will be precluded, and that the funds released by
reduced government borrowing and attracted by higher interest rates will permit financing of the
most productive investments, which can pay a higher rate of interest. But no account is taken of
the divergence between social and private returns induced by private information. The adverse
selection effect could result in investment finance stagnation, despite the availability of projects
which are socially productive at the higher rates of interest. While this does not seem a good
description of current conditions in industrialized countries - Mankiw mentions historical
incidents of instability - it does not seem too far removed from conditions in several LDCs. Man-
kiw suggests that restrictive policy be accompanied by special government assistance, such as
guarantees6, to certain borrowers. Stabilization programmes may have to include quite active
government intervention, in the form of official project evaluation, subsidies and loan guarantee
schemes, in order to obtain socially productive investment. Mankiw does not consider sorting
contracts, however, and their absence or presence would need to investigated.
8.3: Policy when Banks are Active Information Processors
We first consider the only published model which considers tax policy when banks actively
obtain information, before discussing the general approach used by Greenwald and Stiglitz which
we shall apply in the following section.
de Meza and Webb [1988] examine the role of tax policy where banks obtain information
directly rather than through self-selection contracts: banks pay a fixed fee to a credit rating
agency to learn the expected return on individual projects. Clients choose whether to be rated.
Clearly this choice is itself a screen and rating is chosen by the LR. But there is still overinvest-
ment because the adverse selection effect continues to operate in the unrated group where the
interest rate reflects average success probability. But now there is the additional social cost of the
rating. A prohibitive tax on screening and a tax on depositor income would give the first best
6 Mankiw notes that a subsidy serves a function similar to a loan guarantee which removes the downside
risk for banks.
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result.
Greenwald and Stiglitz argue that where information is asymmetric markets are not con-
strained Pareto efficient because the quality effects of price have results similar to technological
externalities. The overinvestment, underinvestrnent7 and collateral inefficiencies which result in
the screening models discussed in Chapter 7.2 may be seen as representative of this externality.
The source of the externality described by Greenwald and Stiglitz appears to lie in the fact that
the average riskiness on the market affects the individual borrower (except for the marginal) who
must accept a contract which reflects not his characteristics but market-imposed constraints.
Greenwald-Stiglitz (GS) make two points. In the first place they remind us that pecuniary
externalities have welfare consequences when the economy is distorted. And, as the results dis-
cussed above illustrate, asymmetric information does produce distortions. Secondly, that the dis-
tortions produced by asymmetric information or incomplete markets resemble technological
externalities. OS offer a general methodology which exploits this similarity, introducing a qual-
ity variable into the utility and production functions of a general equilibrium model. The cri-
terion used to determine whether a Pareto improvement is possible in the presence of asymmetric
information (with or without sorting/incentive-compatible contracts) is whether, at the competi-
tive equilibrium (CE) with no intervention, there exist taxes or subsidies and lump-sum transfers
that can improve everyone's welfare.
Operationally, in an assumed intervention-free CE they investigate whether there is a set of
taxes etc. such that household utilities are unchanged and government net revenues increased. If
the change in government net revenue is zero when taxes are zero, having taken account of how a
tax change affects equilibrium decisions via the indirect value functions, the original equilibrium
is constrained Pareto efficient. That is, any government intervention which leaves household util-
ities unchanged has no effect on government revenue, and hence a Pareto improvement is not
possible with taxes/subsidies and lump-sum transfers alone. In general, however, taxes change
the level of the unobservable variable chosen by market participants (moral hazard case), or the
These are relative to symmetric information, result from screening by loan size and sbould not be con-
fused with the inefficient investment from adverse selection.
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average quality of those on the market (adverse selection), or the level of signal chosen
(screening/signalling). The tax change, which changes prices, is the source of the pecuniary
effect, its allocative and distributive effects are zero at the CE, but the change in the level of the
unobservable variable (like the technological externality) affects government revenue.
Our results differ in flavour from G-S's. As indicated above, they find a Pareto improve-
ment because the tax-induced change in their quality variable is not eliminated by the envelope
theorem. We find that the envelope theorem does not apply to screened borrowers because the
incentive compatibility constraint forces them to be away from their profit maximizing loan level.
The scope for government intervention appears to arise from the fact that MRS are not equated.
The 0-S externality effect is operating via the fact that profit functions at the CE are not
separated (except for the highest risk who is not signalling), since it is only because types are
linked through the incentive constraints that identification is possible.
Intuition suggests that it may be possible to consider the G-S analysis in the light of recent
research on the Pareto efficiency of missing markets. This possibility is suggested by our finding
that non-equalization of MRS 8 is the source of a Pareto improvement. Similarly, the non-
equalization of MRS is the intuitive explanation for Geanokoplos and Polemarchakis's [1986]
finding of generic suboptimality of equilibria with incomplete markets. They proved that when
asset markets are incomplete a CE exists but that the equilibrium portfolio allocation is almost
everywhere constrained inefficient - the structure of markets in the CE is not used efficiently.
When markets are complete changes in relative prices have no effect on actions and welfare
because the envelope theorem applies. If there are markets missing, however, asset reallocations
which change relative prices affect welfare generically. Since a technological externality essen-
tially results from a missing market, 0-S's analogy should be consistent with the more fomial
analysis.
8 We may note that Gale [1987] overcame the problem of missing markets to obtain a Wairasian equilibri-
urn in his model of adverse selection in the credit market by the devices of complete conuacts and a matching
game - the latter giving MRS equality.
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8.4: The Genera) Equilibrium Framework
In this section, the partial equilibrium model developed in Chapter 7 is embedded in G-S's
general equilibrium framework in order to investigate whether a tax/subsidy and lump-sum
transfer scheme can bring about a Pareto improvement, at least theoretically.
The usual assumption for economies with asymmetric information is that, with no better
information than the market, the authorities can do no better. The point of the G-S methodology
would appear to be its focus on government intervention via taxes/subsidies (together with lump-
sum transfers) which require only that the government have the same information as banks. The
tax-induced price changes, by changing agents' opportunity costs, change the quality choice and
hence bring about a Pareto improvement. However, although G-S sketch several models to illus-
trate applications of their general approach, their results are not readily interpretable in terms of
the usual partial equilibrium models of markets with asymmetric information. Most extant
models of screening/signalling etc. incorporate indivisible variables/ uncertainty conditions that
do not fit into the neoclassical general equilibrium framework. Hence the use of the partial
equilibrium model developed in Chapter 7. Although our use of it has been slightly complicated,
at least notationally, by the wish to take account of the existence of observationally distinct
groups which, Section 7.3 suggests, is usually taken to be a feature of LDC markets.
The fact that our concern is with a credit market complicates the use of the 0-S framework.
We need to introduce a credit market and banking sector into the general equilibrium framework.
However, the microeconomic foundations of a monetary economy are not well -developed. A
logically specified model consistent with the existence of money and financial institutions would
require the explicit introduction of time, stale contingency, strategic behaviour and issues of trust;
see, for example, Gale [1982] and Shubik [1987]. In order to avoid the modelling complications
accompanying these factors, the following assumptions are made:
Assumptions
(1) Banks obtain their loanable funds from the household endowment so that 'deposits" are
viewed as an endowment good which may be either consumed by the household or invested with
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banks for a return - sold to banks for a price which is the deposit rate factor. While this formula-
tion captures the notion of a tradeoff between the consumption and deposit decisions, it does not
reflect the intertemporal nature of the choice.
(2) The assumption of marginal cost pricing by banks was discussed in Chapter 7.
(3) Loans supplied by banks are treated as a variable input in firms' production functions.
(4) The justification for banks in our framework is their assumed ability to offer screening con-
tracts; an ability which the household who owns the endowment does not possess. A drawback is
that this ability is exogenously imposed, rather than endogenously determined, however the aim
is not to explain the existence of banks.
(5) It is the combination of uncertainty regarding project yield and the asymmetry of information
regarding project type that leads banks to use sorting contracts. In order to avoid aggregate
uncertainty, it is assumed that, although information regarding the identities of individual agents
(firms) in the screened sector is private, there is public knowledge of output realizations.
The general equilibrium framework used follows that of Greenwald and Stiglitz very
closely. It differs in the following respects: a) A banking sector is introduced. b) A single
representative household is assumed and given an endowment which serves as the deposit good.
The assumption of a representative household saves on notation in our model. Endowments are
excluded in their general model as a simplification. c) Individual firm output is random. d) Pro-
duction sectors are distinguished.
We proceed by a) describing the economy and assuming a competitive equilibrium with no
government intervention; the important feature of this description is the specification of indirect
objective functions and their price derivatives at the CE, and b) testing for a tax and transfer pol-
icy which changes government revenue at a zero tax rate while leaving profits and utility
unchanged. The economy's agents consist of firms, households, banks and government. The fol-
lowing describes their maximization problems and the outcomes.
-218-
FIRMS
Firms are distinguished by their management 'type', o. Each firm maxinuzes expected
profit
Ej =y+qfpjyjj
	 (8.1)
subject to the production constraint
yij' -Gj(q1,Y1,01)^O
where
= profit function for firms of type e1,
(y 11,Y1) = production vector for firm of type f,
y i = numeraire production good,
Y1 = (-L1 ,Y3f ,...,yNf) is a vector of the N-i non-numeraire production goods,
yj <Odenotesthatgoodj is an inputtoafirm of type!,
L1 =Ioaninputtofirmoftypeo1,
P = (R ,p,..., pN) = vector of producer prices for N-i non-numeraire goods,
R = loan rate factor in terms of the numeraire good,
qj = success probability of firm of type O,
G (.) = production function,
Oj = firm-specific factor such as management ability.
=proportion of firms of type Oj
= proportion affirms of type O producing one or more of the goods i =3,...,k-1,k+i,...,N
= output of only sector subject to asymmetric information
In the production vector, good k, y, with production conditions specified in the partial
equilibrium model of Chapter 7.4, is distinguished. In line with the idea that there are observa-
tionally distinguishable groups in the credit market, ytj is interpreted as the output of a non-
traditional sector or industry. In sector k each firm's and hence q1 is private knowledge.
It may be assumed that all industries use L as an input. In other sectors (industries) banks
have a priori knowledge of each firm's O and qj i.e. they can identify the firms individually.
Therefore screening only takes place in the y sector. Other firms and their outputs are indexed i.
The production functions of non-yk firms need not be specified but, unlike the particular produc-
tion and profit functions used in the partial equilibrium model, firms not producing y may be
assumed to have factor substitution possibilities. For these sectors it is assumed that y*f is an
input if Ykf^O.
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We assume that the distribution of firm types and the production functions are public
knowledge. For notational simplicity we maintain Section 7.4's assumption that there are only
two types in the economy, but that there are many firms of each type. In order to avoid problems
of aggregate uncertainty, we make the assumption commonly used for this purpose: that it is pub-
lic knowledge that a proportion (I — qj) of the fraction yr of each type ej will fail, and ' is
known. We use the normalisation that output is zero in the event of failure. Thus total production
of any good] is:
yj = qiyu yjie +q2y2gyj2i	 (8.3)
where yj u is the production of good j by a firm of type 0 producing outside of the k industry,
and q Yli is the share of those firms of type 0 producing good yj whose production process is
successful. Aggregate production is thus known and in a perfectly competitive system, prices
may be treated as if parametric to all agents. (While R is an exception, as discussed earlier the
Bertrand assumption implies that the loan rate is determined at the marginal cost level.) Private
information pertains only to individual firm identification by type in industry k. This assumption
to avoid the effects of uncertainty is formally correct only in a continuum economy where the
influence of a finite number of agent types can be smoothed by aggregation. In order to retain the
flavour of this approach use has been made of firm shares. Then yj should be interpreted as the
share of all agents who are firms of type Oj. Similarly, since banks are all assumed to have the
same profit functions, the share of agents acting as banks could be denoted ,
Profit and demand functions of I firms
Since all firms receive loans, with banks being compensated for risk by the interest rate
charged, total loans to firms of type j in the sectors I are:
q	 yj L1, +(l—oj) yj LfI = 1 Lj	 (8.4)
I	 I
where Lj, = loan size to firm of type 0, producing i. For firms in the I sectors the realized
indirect profit function is given by
•i (Rj,p,ptd)
where R1
 = interest rate charged to firm of type Oj ; p = price of good yk, if Yk enters these firms'
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profit functions it is assumed to do so as an input; pa = vector of prices of goods other than y.
As usual,
= y	 (8.5)
ap
is the commodity supply of or (if negative) factor demand for good n by a firm of type 0 in an i
industry.
Profu and demand functions of k firms
From the partial equilibrium model, the following indirect profit function is assumed to
characterize firms in the y sector
= [p* (L)V(0j )—R1 Lj]	 (8.6)
We know from (7.l4iibis) that for firms of type 02 who receive their first-best contract the loan
received is
- pV(82) WL	
[ R2 ]
where L.rc = screening CE loan size to firm of type 0r. Differentiating (8.6)
._=1
I pk—(L'V(02)—L2
R2	 L	 R2	 aR2]
ISubstituting for	 = - 
-a--
 ---- and simplifying:
aR2 = - L
	 (8.7)
which is the demand for the loan factor by firms of type 82. Similarly,
= Yk2k	 (8.8)
is the supply of y by firms of type 02. Note that the envelope theorem holds as expected for these
types who do not signal.
For the firms of type 01 in the k industry who are signalling their low risk L is defined by
((see 7.l5ii) and note (7.24)):
pt (L)V(02)—R 2L pk(Li)V(02)+RILi = 0	 (8.9)
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Thus, unlike firms of type 02, type 0 1s' loan size and indirect profit function are dependent on type
02's contract and management parameter. Differentiating (8.6) for type 0 with respect to input
and output prices, we find that, since 0 is not producing according to its own-optimum, not only
does a change in price have a larger than direct effect on its profit function, but that its profit
function is affected by changes in the loan rate charged to 02:
= [PLi
-
'V(oi)_Ri]	 (8.10)
aR 1 aR1
where, implicitly differentiating (8.9),
L
> 0	 (8.11)
aR 1 	 pk(Ll)'V(02)—Rl
The inequality in (8.11) follows from (7.23): p(LfrV(01)—Rl >0, and V(02) > V(0 1) so that
the denominator in (8.11) is positive. Thus an increase in R 1 has the usual direct effect of nega-
tive factor demand on the indirect profit function, plus a positive effect whose size depends on the
differences between the marginal productivity value of a loan and its marginal cost which arise
because of the management parameter. Differentiating (8.6) for O with respect to R :
S
= [Pk(L-'V(0l)_Rl] ..L	 (8.12)
aR 2 aR2
where
CL2
— — f3pt(L1t'V(02)—Ri < 0
	 (8.13)
Since an increase in R 2 reduces the loan size demanded by type 02, it implies that the loan size
required to distinguish type 01 must fall, with a negative effect on the latter's profit - 0 must
move to a higher isoprofit curve in <R ,L> space. Considering the effect of a marginal change in
pk on 0 1 's equilibrium profit
a.lk .y +[p(Lc fr4v (o )R l . .L	 (8.14)
apk
	
' JPk
where
ai$ = V(02)[(L)—(L1)] > 0
	 (815)
apk
	
pk(Li)V(02)—RI
Thus an increase in Pk has the usual direct effect of the supply of the produced good, plus a
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positive indirect effect which appears to reflect the increase in 0 2 's output and hence loan demand
(allowing 0 to accept a larger loan) following an increase in Pk.
The externality resulting from asymmetric information is evident. Compare the effects on
02 and 01 types of a change in prices. For 0 who receive the first-best contract, loan size depends
only on their own quality and is identical to loan size demanded. But, as a result of the incentive
constraints, there is a type of joinmess in production for type 0 1 s and the envelope theorem does
not hold. In equations (8.10), (8.12) and (8.14) the marginal effect of price differs from the usual
direct effect because dR (1k)/dL >0 in the screening equilibrium - see equation (7.23) - which
results from the binding incentive compatibility constraint on type 02 in industry k. Note that in
the many-type economy, with many probabilities of success, only the final type with lowest pro-
bability would be receiving the first-best contract.
REPRESENTATIVE CONSUMER
The representative household maximizes the utility function:
U =
subject to:
x 1 + 'CaXR ^ T+qfyJkfk	 +I(id—xd)	 (8.16)
where:
= consumption of numeraire good
= consumption of deposit good
Xd = compensated demand for xd
= household's endowment of the deposit good
x = net supply of deposits
X = consumption vector of N-2 non-numeraire and non-deposit goods
x = consumption of good n
c = consumer price of good n in terms of numeraire good
c = vector of consumer prices for goods other than k
= consumer price for good XL in terms of numeraire good
T = lump-sum government transfer to household, when operable
qj	 = total realized profits for firms of type Or in the k sector
I = deposit rate factor in terms of numeraire good
The solution to the household maximization problem gives the expenditure function:
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E (I, c , ck, u)
where u' = the utility level auained in the competitive equilibrium with screening and without
government intervention. Differentiation of the expenditure function gives the compensated
demand for a commodity, thus
aE
--Iu =Xd(I,CA,Ck,US)	 (8.17)
is the compensated demand function for Xa as a consumption good. The household can either
consume its endowment, i, or sell to banks in return for payment I. The uncompensaled
demand is Xd (I, c", Ck,1,T), (= I in CE), so the net supply of deposits to the banking system is:
[ij_X4(I,c R ,Ck ,id,T)] = x'd(I,C R , ck ,id,T) 	 (8.18)
BANKS
Banks function only as conduits of deposit endowments from household to firms and as
contract writers, where contract writing is assumed a costless activity. Banks with separable
profit functions maximize:
ZEti =q1 R1 L1 —IL1	 (8.19)
F
where indicates summation over all types in all sectors. It is assumed that all banks offer the
F
same contracts and that borrowers and depositors are randomly allocated among the banks. Since
the model in Chapter 7 shows that interest-rate setting in contracts by banks results in marginal
cost pricing, bank profits are zero and do not affect the household budget constraint.
GOVERNMENT
The government collects taxes from (or gives subsidies to) firms borrowing from banks and
makes lump-sum transfers to (imposes lump-sum taxes on) the household who owns the firms,
receiving net income:
—T	 (8.20)
where t = the tax imposed on loans with interest rate R 2 = I /q. Negative t implies that loans to
this sector are subsidised, T is then also negative, a lump-sum tax imposed on the household.
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This formulation of the government's maximand is based on the partial equilibrium model.
It is type 02's loan size which constrains the loan size obtained by the types 01. The smaller is
the loan size taken by type 02, the smaller the loan size required for O to signal higher success
probability. Intuitive reasoning then suggests that reducing the loan size taken by types 0 2 would
increase the Oi loan size banks can offer while continuing to induce self-selection. This is illus-
trated in Figure 8.1. A subsidy of s on the higher loan rate moves 02 to a lower isoprofit (where
profit is higher) curve where he is just indifferent between the subsidized contract he receives and
the contract chosen by O. The latter is 0 1 's first-best contract. Although subsidizing 02 has
shifted him from his original first-best position, he remains on his demand curve.
Figure 8.1: A Pareto-improving loan rate subsidy
L=L LL	 '4flP.I
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What advantage does the government have here that banks do not have? Banks are as aware
of this possibility as are the authorities but, given the market deposit raze of interest, and the suc-
cess probabilities of the two types, banks cannot charge 92 a rate below R 2 without making a loss.
A bank could only afford to do so if it were able to 'tax' some other group receiving credit. But
raising the loan rate for that group would induce its departure to other banks with a lower loan
rate. Essentially, the authorities have 'market power' that, in the perfectly competitive system
postulated, banks do not.
Government intervention in the assumed competitive equilibrium
To test our intuition using the Greenwald-Stiglitz criterion, it is assumed that a competitive
equilibrium, without government intervention, exists, i.e. T =0=:. In that competitive equili-
brium producer prices equal consumer prices:
(R1 ,P) = (qj'I,C)
where: P = (p3,.. . ,JPN) = producer price vector, omitting the price of the loan factor,
C = (C3....,CN) = consumer price vector for non-deposit goods
and all markets clear: the demand for all goods n, n =k,i (i = 3,...,k—1,k^l,...,N), equals the real-
ized supply of good n over all firm types:
x(J,c,ij) =	 q1y,,r(R,P,01)	 (8.21)
and the net supply of the deposit good by the household equals the total loans supplied:
Xd(I ,C J) = ZyíL,(R,P,Oi)	 (8.22)Ii
The government maximizes revenue subject to the constraint that household utility remain
at the level in the CE with screening and without government intervention. It therefore solves the
following problem:
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Maxv =	 (8.23)
subjectro E[I(t),c*(f),c*(t),,j ] = T(t)+I(t)i1
+ q iyuu[R ii.t),Rt)+: Pk(:).O1]
^
+ qly1i1i[RI(:).pk(t)pRo),o1]
+ q2ti[Rt)+tIPkIo2]
That is, government maximizes its net revenue subject to maintaining the expenditure of the con-
sumer at the competitive equilibrium level given by its income from the transfer, if any, income
from the deposit good and from firm profits. If the original CE is Pareto efficient, this problem
has a zero solution at t = o. That is, taxes (subsidies) do not exist such that government revenue
can be marginally increased while maintaining household utilities unchanged.
If the constraint in (8.23) is substituted into the maximand, a maximization problem can be
solved in its usual form. Notation is simpler, however, if the constraint is first considered
separately. Along the constraint, the change in lump sum transfer, for a unit change in t,
required to keep the household at utility level u is:
dl' - E dl	 E d	 dC,, -
- _7_ •ai- + •;- -di-- +	 - Xj
	
I aIk dl?1	 1k dR 2	 alk
-q1y1k1
	
dR2	 41k dpk'
-212k1-j-+	 arj
I	 dR1 + a1j dp* ,
- q 1 Id ' I -- -di-- 
-ai;;- —	 + d .	 -j
a	 + 2i dp*	 a2 dPk I
- q2 : ?21 [Ri
- -di-- -i;;-
	
d
(8.24)
Using the envelope theorem i.e. equations (8.5), (8.7) and (8.8), together with equations (8.10) t
dpk dck	 dR2_ I di(8.15), and noting --- - -.-- at zero taxes and	 -	 - + 1(8.24) can be written:
dl
._(i. -Xd) .j
-qn'lkykIk -q22.tyk2k + q l yI, ykIi +2?2iYkV]
—q i yii yn ii _q2Y2iYn2i]
(8.25)
av	 d(,ik
- qIyIk A (8.28)
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+	 +L +ZyiiLii
+q2'L +q2y2jL2i
I aLc dRi aLk dR 2
	dp 1
-qlylkA1 dR 1	 iR 2 -ai-• dPk
where A =p* (L )-'V(0 1) - R 1 , that is, the difference between the value of marginal productivity
of the loan to types 01 in sectork and the price of the loan. Note thatyt is the supply of good k
by firms of type 1 in the k industiy, y, is the demand for good k by firms of type 1 in the I
industry, and y , is the supply of good n by firms of type 1 in the I indusiry. Market clearing,
(8.21), implies that the square bracketed terms above are zero, and since (i - I, ) = x'd is deposit
supply, with clearing in the loan market equation (8.25) becomes:
(8.26)- =q 2 [yL +y2jL2j]
J L dR	 L 1k dR 2 aLck 40k 1
- q	 dR1 • i- + dR 2 -ai- + P* 1fl
Differentiating the government maximand and substituting from equation (8.26) for
.-	
tq2[	
dLe	 dL2l	 dLik
=	 -•-- + 'y 
-j_j + q i'IitA &
	
(8.27)
where 
-j- is the expression in braces in the second term on the RHS of (8.26), that is, the tax-
induced change in 0's screening loan size. At zero taxes, t =0 equation (8.27) reduces to
At zero taxes a marginal change in government revenue is possible while maintaining household
utilities at the pre-intervention level. Hence a Pareto improvement in possible. This is because
A ^ 0 and A is 0 1 's MRS between R and L (see equation (7.5)) and would be zero if Oi* were
receiving a loan on his demand curve at the point of tangency to the bank's MRS at R1.
The optimal "tax" to effect a Pareto improvement is found by solving (8.27) (noting that
= 0 is required for optimality) fort:
dLIk
—qI'yIkA
I	 ____	 I	 (8.29)
+)42i_-i--j
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The denominator of (8.29) times t can be interpreted as the marginat deadweight loss from the
'tax': the change in 82 loan sizes from their first-best levels. qlylkA	 is the marginal benefit
of the tax. Equality between the marginal loss and gain being required for tax optunality. t will
be a subsidy, as has been conjectured, if 	 is positive. From equations (8.11) to (8.15)
>0 is implied by
	 <0. One way to interpret such a subsidy in practical terms is to con-
sider tax concessions on interest rate payments, a progressive tax rebate reduces the effective
interest rate paid by those charged the highest loan rates.
8.5: Conclusion
We have shown that a Pareto improvement can be brought about by a subsidy on the
highest interest rate in markets where banks are screening by loan size. The direction of this
intervention (that is, a subsidy rather than a tax) is dictated by the need to increase the loan size
of the signalling borrowers subject to the requirement that contracts remain incentive compatible.
The use of loan size as the screening variable implies that the signalling borrowers are con-
strained to be off their loan demand curves. Hence MRS differ, production is not optimal and
price changes have effects on signailers' profit functions which cannot be eliminated by the
envelope theorem. The CE with screening can therefore be improved upon.
It should be noted that the subsidy derived here is a policy specific to the model used, par-
ticularly the definition of risk used in Chapter 7. If we had assumed that higher risk borrowers
had lower expected returns, intuition and the model comparisons of Chapter 7 suggest that a tax
would be the appropriate intervention. Greenwald and Stiglitz were making the general point
that a planner can improve upon a competitive equilibrium whenever markets are missing and
information is imperfect. The use of their methodology has permitted us to show the type of pol-
icy required in a particular credit market, as well as to gain some intuition as to underlying rea-
sons policies can improve efficiency since the non-equality of MRS is a feature common to
screening models. The feasibility of the subsidy could be questioned. However, its use requires
no more information than the banks have for screening.
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Chapter 9: Summary of Principal Results and Conclusions
This thesis had two points of departure. First, was the perception that a re-examination of
the McKinnon and Shaw hypotheses was called for by theoretical advances in the economics of
information and the strategic analysis of firms. Second, we wished to test whether informal
hypotheses about bank behaviour in the Caribbean made economic sense, that is, could they be
derived as noncooperative equilibria of games which were a reasonable representation of the
institutional structure. The two points have proved highly complementary in that we have been
able to use models based on Caribbean conditions to test not only hypotheses about those coun-
tries but some of the McKinnon and Shaw tenets. Those considered were: that liberalized banks
would raise deposit rates to levels reflecting scarce capital, that liberal charter policy would result
in competition-enforcing entry, and that, in the absence of interest rate controls, banks could allo-
cate credit to its best uses without rationing. In each case we found a model whose noncoopera-
tive equilibrium failed to confirm the outcomes postulated by McKinnon and Shaw, although we
introduced no assumptions which violated theirs. Indeed, our information assumptions could be
considered representative of their informal descriptions of fundamentals. In two instances we
were also able to show, contrary to liberalization ideas, that there existed a government regulation
that could improve on the market equilibrium. However, we have simultaneously found support
for the more fundamental of the McKinnon and Shaw arguments - subtleties which have hitherto
largely been ignored from the policy and operational viewpoints. McKinnon and Shaw pointed
out that financial intermediaries are producers and carriers of information in economies with poor
and costly information flows. Each of our models showed that there are feasible arrangements by
which banks can acquire information about their customers.
In Chapter 4 we showed that in the long-run equilibrium of a search market, tacit collusion
can be supported as a noncooperative equilibrium since banks who are similar will set the
monopsony rate. With switching costs it is in the individual interest of each bank to bid down the
deposit rate: the incentive to compete is reduced by the knowledge that small rate increases will
not lead to an expansion in supply. This result shows that unrestricted markets need not achieve
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an efficient result, and explained observations in the Caribbean. Of more general interest was our
derivation of switching cost as the interest rate premium required by long-term customers to
switch banks. We showed that searching customers uncertain ex ante of the service offered by
banks would develop switching costs once a satisfactory bank had been found, as a result of the
enhanced service quality provided once they had established a reputation with the bank. The idea
that switching costs are connected with uncertainty about future gain has been suggested by writ-
ers like Schmalensee [1982] and Klemperer [1987a]. However, its application did not differ sub-
stantially from transactions or search costs in that switching costs were modelled only as a cost of
leaving a known supplier. We argued that switching costs place greater restrictions on mobility
because they reflect not only the cost of acquiring information about a new supplier, but also
foregoing the gain from remaining with the current bank for improved service.
In Chapter 5 we argued that this gain in effect enforces an implicit contract between bank
and customer. The bank wants to keep the client in order to learn his needs and reliability and
can do so by offering him a reward contingent on behaviour. Since this reward itself entails
expected profits for the bank, the client considers the promise credible. This chapter argues that
the models which derive tenure payments as rewarding effort and conveying information are use-
fully applied to the banking market and gives an example to illustrate this. This explanation of
switching costs may help us to understand why rational individuals enter relations they know
may entail later opportunistic exploitation.
Another aspect of the sluggish market share created by switching costs was examined in
Chapter 6, viz, the difficulties it may create for potential market entrants. We considered the case
of (mainly) multinational banks who are aware of switching costs but see expansion opportuni-
ties, which we modelled as the entry of new customers. However, the exact value of such oppor-
tunities is uncertain ex ante. If their value proves low the new bank's failure to attract old loyal
customers means that it exits because the business it does obtain provides insufficient revenue to
cover its opportunity costs. Losses incurred in this process are in effect a cost of information
acquisition about new markets. Three points emerged from this model. First, it provides a new
example of how switching costs may influence potential competition. Switching costs have
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previously been modelled as a source of entry deterrence, of 'price wars' post-entry and of col-
lusive behaviour between entrant and incumbent. Here they are a source of exit. Second, we
showed that in conditions of imperfect information about market prospects, freedom from charter
restrictions need not be sufficient to bring about entry which improves competition. Third, we
have explained observation of entry-then-exit in the Caribbean in a manner consistent with the
general observation of bank-client attachments.
In Chapter 7 and 8 we moved to consideration of credit allocation and its welfare implica-
lions. This is the single area of information economics applied in the financial liberalization con-
text (as in the analyses of Cho [1986], Carter [1988] and McKinnon [1988]) but these applica-
tions only treated Stiglitz-Weiss credit rationing. Financial liberalization requires that banks gen-
erate information enabling them to place loanable funds attracted by higher deposit rates in the
most efficient uses. We show that self-selection models in the credit market confirm McKinnon
and Shaw's intuition about information-generating banks. We modelled an economy in which
banks are initially unable to identify risk in a particular sector, as is often assumed to be true of
non-traditional industries in LDCs. Identification is accomplished by the offer of contracts such
that the less risky reveal themselves by the choice of lower loan size than would be demanded at
the contract rate of interest. These contracts were shown to be a sequential equilibrium if the
difference in marginal rates of substitution between borrowers are sufficiently large, or if the pro-
portion of low risk is sufficiently low. This equilibrium improves on the use usual in credit
market screening models which usually employ reactive equilibrium, violating the Nash assump-
tion, or use the Nash equilibrium which is inappropriate in a sequential game. This model
demonstrated that even with bank information acquisition there can be outcomes that look like
rationing. Information is only acquired because marginal rates of substitution are not equated.
The welfare issue is taken up in Chapter 8. We use a simple general equilibrium model to
show that government intervention can accomplish a Pareto improvement because the
government's coercive power allows it to change prices, and the price change affects welfare
because marginal rates of substitution are not equated. The separation achieved by contracts is
illusory in welfare terms because types are tied together through the incentive compatibility
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constraints. This illustrates the Greenwald-Stiglitz [1986] point that economies with incomplete
markets and imperfect information are almost never constrained Pareto efficient. It is thought that
this is the first specific application of the (3reenwald-Stiglitz methodology to the credit market
We believe that there are three points of general interest for financial policy in LDCs sug-
gested by the thesis. First, once we recognize an environment with imperfect information and
strategic behaviour, predictions about empirical outcomes are not clear cut. They depend on the
institutional structure (which may be endogenous in the long-run), preferences and hence cultural
norms, technological conditions etc. Quite detailed knowledge of particular economies may be
required for reasonable predictions. Second, this is important for policy because if we cannot
describe the behaviour underlying our observations, correct policies cannot be formulated. Third,
there are in general government interventions which can improve on the decentralized equilibria
of economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information. Since lagging economies are,
almost by definition, such economies, Pareto-improving policies will almost always exist there.
The problem is to find appropriate policies which do not destroy private arrangements and incen-
tives, taking account of the fact that no intervention may be better than unsuitable intervention.
While we have found policies for two of our specifications, each economy would require specific
analysis.
-233-
Bibliography
Aghion,P. and Bolton,P. [1987] "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review,
72(3), pp.388-401
Akerlof,G. [1970] "The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechan-
ism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.84, pp.288-300
Allen,B. [1986] "General Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Chapter 1 in W. Hildenbrand
and A. Mas-Colell (eds), Contributions to Mathematical Economics, North-Holland
Arrow,K. and Hahn,F. [1971] General Competitive Analysis, Elsevier-North Holland
Arrow,K. [1986] "Agency and the Market," Chap.23 in K.J.Arrow and M.D.Intriligator (eds.),
Handbook of Mathematical Economics,, v.ffl, Elsevier-North Holland
Barnett,C. [1982] "Commercial Banking in Belize, 1960-1980," Social and Economic Studies,
31(4), pp.136-169
Baron,D. and Besanko,D. [1984] "Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship,"
Information Economics and Policy, v.1, pp.267-302
Baumj). [1974] The Banks of Canada in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Praeger
Baumol,W. [1982] "Contestable Markets: an Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure,"
American Economic Review, 72(1), pp.1-15
Becker,G. [1962] "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political
Economy, v.70, pp.9-49
BenoitJ.-P. [1984] "Financially constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information,"
Rand Journal of Economics, 15(4), pp.490-499
Bernanke,B. and Gertler,M. [1987] "Banking and Macroeconomic Equilibrium," Chapter 5 in
W.Barnett and K.Singleton (eds.), New Approaches to Monetary Theory, Cambridge
University Press
Besanko,D. [1985] "Multiperiod Contracts between Principal and Agent with Adverse Selection,"
Economics Letters, v.17, pp.33-37
Besanko,D. and Thakor,A. [1987a1 "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic
and Competitive Credit Markets," international Economic Review, v.28, pp.671-689
_____________________ [198Th] "Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under
Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, v.42, pp.168-i 82
Bester,H. [1985] "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," Amer-
ican Economic Review, v.75, pp.850-855
- 234 -
[1987] "The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," Euro-
peon Economic Review, v.31, pp.887-899
Bhattacharya,S. and Gale,D. [1987] "Preference shocks, liquidity and central bank policy,"
Chapter 4 in W.Barnett and K.Singleton (eds.), New Approaches to Monetary Theory,
Cambridge University Press
Blackman,C. [1985] "How a Small Country Banker views the International Financial Outlook,"
Address to the Tenth World Banking Conference, 1984, reprinted in Central Bank of Barba-
dos, Economic Review, 12(1), pp.34-38
Blackwell,N. and Santomero,A. [1982] "Bank Credit Rationing and the Customer Relation,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, 9(1), pp.121-129
Blinder,A. [1987] "Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failure," Economic Journal, v.97,
pp.327-35 2
Bourne,C. [1982] "Notes on Financial Changes in Trinidad and Tobago,1966-78", Social and
Economic Studies, 31(4), pp.171-191
____ [1984] "Structure and Performance of Commercial Banking in Trinidad and Tobago,"
Paper presented at Sixteenth Annual Conference, Regional Programme of Monetary Studies
____ [1985] "Banking in Boom and Bust Economies: Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago
and Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies, 34(4), pp.139-162
Boyd,J. and Prescott,E. [1986] "Financial Intermediary-Coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory,
v.38, pp.211-232
BuU,C. [1987] "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, v.102, pp.147-159
Bulow,J., GeanakoplosJ. and Klemperer,P. [1985] "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes
and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), pp.488-511
Carter,M. [1988] "Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture," Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, v.28, pp.83-103
Central Bank of Barbados [1986] A Regulatory Framework for Financial Institutions in Barba-
dos, Draft Discussion (Green) Paper
[1988] Annual Statistical Digest
Cho,I-K. and Kreps,D. [1987] "Signalling Games and Stable Equilbria," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 102(2), pp.179-222
Cho,Y. [1986] "Inefficiencies from Financial Liberalization in the Absence of Well-Functioning
Equity Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18(2), pp.191--199
Clemenz,G. [1986] Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes
in Economics and Mathematical Systems, No.272
- 235 -
Coase,R. [1960] "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, v.3, pp.1-44
Conrad,C. [1983] "The Advantage of Being First and Competition Between Firms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization," v.1, pp.353-364
Cooter,R. [1987] "The Coase Theorem" in The New Palgrave
Debreu,G. [1959] The Theory of Value: an Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, Yale
University Press
de Meza,D. and Webb.D. [1987] "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Informa-
tion," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.102, pp.28 I-292
______________ [1988] "Credit Market Efficiency and Tax Policy in the Presence of
Screening Costs," Journal of Public Economics, v.36, pp.1-22
Devinney,T. [1986] Rationing in a Theory of the Banking Firm, Berlin: Springer-Verlag Studies
in Contemporary Economics
Diamond,D. and Dybvig,P. [1983] "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity," Journal of
Political Economy, 91(3), pp.401-419
Diamond,D. [1984] "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic
Studies, v.5 1, pp.393-414
Eatwell,J. MilgateM. and Newman. (eds.) [1987] The New Paigrave: A New Dictionary of
Economics, Macmillan Press Limited
Engers,M. [1987] "Signalling with many Signals," Econometrica, 55(3), pp.663-674
Farrell,J. [1986] "A Note on Inertia in Market Share," Economics Letters, v.21, pp. 73-75
Farrell,J. and Shapiro,C. [1988] "Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs," Rand Journal of
Economics, 19(1), pp .123-137
[1989] "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," American Economic
Review, 79(1), pp.51-68
Flannery,M. [1982] "Retail bank deposits as Quasi-fixed factors of production," American
Economic Review , 72(3), pp.527-536
Fried,J. and Howitt,P. [1980] "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory," Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 12(3), pp.471-487
Friedman,J. [1986] Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press
Fudenberg,D. and Tirole,J. [1983] "Learning-by-doing and market performance," Bell Journal of
Economics, v.14, pp.522-531
- 236 -
___________________ [1984] "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean
and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74(2), pp.361-
366
[1986] "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, 54(4),
pp.943-960
Galbis,V. [1979] "Structuralism and Financial Liberalization," Finance and Development ,13(2),
pp.33-37
Gale,D. [1982] Money: in equilibrium, NisbetlCambridge
[1987a] "Price Setting and Competition in a simple duopoly model," mimeo
- [198Th] "A Wairasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection, with an application to
credit markets," mimeo
- and M.Hellwig [1985] "Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: the One-Period Problem,"
Review of Economic Studies, v.52, pp.647-663
Geanakoplos,J. and Polemarchakis,H. [1986] "Existence, regularity and constrained suboptimal-
ity of competitive portfolio allocations when the asset market is incomplete," pp.65-95 in
W.Heller, R.Ross and D.Starreu (eds), Uncertainty, Information and Communication:
Essays in Honour of Kenneth I. Arrow, VoIJII
Geroski,P., Phlips,L. and Ulph,A. (eds.) [1985] Oligopoly, Competition and Welfare, Basil
Blackwell in cooperation with the Journal of Industrial Economics
Ghatak,S. [1981] Monetary Economics in Developing Countries, Macmillan
Ghemawat,P. and Nalebuff,B. [1985] "Exit," Rand Journal of Economics, 16(2), pp.184-194
Gilbert,R. [1988] "Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency," in R.Schmalensee and
R.Wihig (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier-North Holland
_____ and Vives,X. [1986] "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem,"
Review of Economic Studies, v.53, pp.71-83
Goodhart,C. [1984] Monetary Theory and Practice: the U.K. Experience, Macmillan Press
Greenwald,B., Stiglitz,J. and Weiss,A. [1984] "Informational Imperfections in the Capital Mark-
ets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceed-
ings, v.74, pp.194-200
Greenwald,B. and Stiglitz,J. [1986] "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and
Incomplete Markets," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), pp.229-264
Grossman,S. [1976] "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders have
Diverse Information," Journal of Finance, 31(1), pp.573-585
- 237 -
______ [1977] "The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Infor-
mational Externalities," Review of Economic Studies, v.44, pp.431-449
[1981] "An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymmetric
Information," Review of Economic Studies, v.48, pp.541-559
_______ and J. Stiglitz [1980] "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
American Economic Review, 70(3), pp.393-408
Grout,P. [1984] "Investment and Wages in the absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining
Approach," Econometrica, v.52, pp.449-460
(ivasch,J. and Weiss,A. [1980] "Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with
Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing," Review of Economic Studies, v.47,
pp.653-664
Hadley,G. [1964] Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc
Hahn,F. [1988] "On Monetary Theory," Economic Journal, v.98, pp.957-973
Harns,L. [1985] "Financial Reform and Economic Growth: A New Interpretation of South
Korea's Experience," mimeo, The Open University
Hart,O. [1975] "On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete,"
Journal of Economic Theory, v.11, pp.418-443
_______ [1986] Comment on Stiglitz and Weiss [1986], pp.136-143
_______ and Holmstrom,B. [1987] "The Theory of Contracts," Chapter 3 in T.Bewley (ed.),
Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press
Hayek,F. [1945] "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, v.35, pp.519-
530
Hellwig,M. [1987] "Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competition in Markets with
Adverse Selection," European Economic Review, v.31, pp.319-325
Holmstrom,B. [1983] "Equilibrium Long-Term Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Supplement, v.98, pp.23-54
Holmstrom,B. and MyersonR. [1983] "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete
Information," Econometrica, 51(6), pp. 1799-1819
________ and Weiss,L. [1985] "Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implica-
tions: Scale Effects," Review of Economic Studies, v.52, pp.403-425
Howard,M. [1976] "Interest Rate Behaviour in an Open Developing Economy: the Barbadian
Experience, 1965-76," Central Bank of Barbados Quarterly Report, 3(4), pp.24-50
-238-
heland,N. [1987] Product Differentiation and Non-price Competition, Basil Blackwell
Jacklin,C. and Bhattacharya,S. [1988] "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs:
Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, 96(3), pp.568-592
Jaffee,D. and Russell,T. [1976] "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit Rationing,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.90, pp.651-660
Klemperer,P. [1986a] "The Welfare Effects of New Entry," Chapter 5 in Markets with Switching
costs, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University Graduate School of Business
___________ [1986b] "Price Wars caused by New Entry," Chapter 6 in Markets with Switching
Costs, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University Graduate School of Business
[1987a] "Markets with Consumer Switching Costs," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, v.102, pp.375-394
________ [198Th] "Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,"
Economic Journal Conference Papers, v.97, pp.99-Ill
________ [1987c] "The Competitiveness of Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,"
Rand Journal of Economics, v.18, pp.138-150
Kohn,M. and Shavell,S. [1974] "The Theory of Search," Journal of Economic Theory, v.9,
pp.93-123
Kreps,D. and Wilson,R. [1982] "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic
Theory, v.27, pp.253-279
Kreps,D. and Wilson,R. [1982] "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, 50(4), pp.863-894
Laffont,J-J. and Maskin,E. [1982] "The Theory of Incentives: an overview," in W. Hildenbrand
(ed.), Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press
Laffont,J-J. [1985] "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asym-
metric Information," Economerrica, 53(1), pp.1-29
_______ and Tirole,J. [1988] "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Economerrica,
56(5), pp.1 153-1175
Lambert,R. [1983] "Long-term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2),
pp.441-452
Larson,R. and Casti,J. [1978] Principles of Dynamic Program,ning: Part!, Marcel Dekker Inc.
Lazear,E. [1981] "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity and Hours Restrictions," American
Economic Review, v.71, pp.606-620
Leland,H. and Pyle,D. [1977] "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial
Intermediation," Journal of Finance, 82(2), pp.371-388
- 239 -
Levhari,D. and Srinivasan,T. [1969] "Optimal Savings under Uncertainty," Review of Economic
Studies, V.36, pp.153-163
Lewis,W.A. [1949] "The Economics of Loyalty," Chapter III in Overhead Costs, London: Unwin
University Books
Lippman,S. and McCall,J. [1976] "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry,
v.14, Part I, pp.155-189
Luben,M. [1983] "The Financial System in Belize," mimeo, paper presented at the Fifteenth
Annual Regional Programme of Monetary Studies Conference
Lucas,R. [1972] "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money," Journal of Economic Theory, v.4,
pp.103-124
MacLeod,B. and Malcolmson,J. [1989] "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatility and Involun-
tary Unemployment," Econometrica, v.57, pp.312-322
Mankiw,N. [1986] "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, v.101, pp.455-470
McClean,W. [1975] Money and Banking in the East Caribbean Currency Area, Mona, Jamaica:
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies
McKinnon,R. [1973] Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington,D.C.:The
Brookings Institution
_______ [1988] "Financial Liberalization in Retrospect: Interest Rate Policies in LDCs,"
Chapter 13 in G. Ranis and T. Schultz (eds.), The State of Development Economics, Basil
Blackwell
Merton,R. [1969] "Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: the continuous case," Review
of Economics and Statistics , V.51, pp.247-257
Milde,H. and Riley,J. [1988] "Signalling in Credit Markets," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
103(1), pp.101-129
Milgrom,P. and RobertsJ. [1982] "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence," Journal of
Economic Theory, v.27, pp.280-312
Mirrlees,J. [1974] "Optimal Accumulation under Uncertainty: the case of stationary returns to
investment", in J. Dreze (ed.) Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality,
London: Macmillan, pp.36-SO
Mortensen,D. [1986] "Closed Form Equilibrium Price distribution functions," mimeo
Myint,H. [1971] "Dualism and the Internal Integration of the Underdeveloped Economies,"
Chapter 14 in Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped çoun tries, Oxford University
Press
- 240 -
Ordover,J. and Weiss,A. [1981] "Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions on
Competitive Contracts," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, v.81,
pp.399-404
Ostroy,J. [1989] "Money and general equilibrium theory," in The New Paigrave
Parris,C. [1984] "Political Economy of Financial Collapse: the Saga of International Trust Ltd.,
Trinidad and Tobago, 1982/84," Paper presented at the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the
Regional Programme of Monetary Studies
Park,Y. [1988] "Korea," Chap. 15 in R.Dornbusch and F.Helmers (eds.), The Open Economy:
Tools for Policymakers in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press
Phelps,E. [1962] "The accumulation of risky capital: a sequential utility analysis," Econome-
inca, 30(4), pp.729-743
Postlewaite,A. and Vives,X. [1987] "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Pol-
inca! Economy, 95(3), pp.485-491
Quinzii,M. [1988] Lecture 4: Production and the Behaviour of the firm, pp.32-39 in Lecture
Notes in Incomplete Markets, D.P. A-192, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms, University of
Bonn
Radner,R. [1972] "Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence
of markets," Econometrica, v.40, pp.289-304
_________ [1981] "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relation-•
ship," Econometrica, v.49, pp.1 127-1148
_____ [1982a] "Equilibrium under Uncertainty," Chapter 20 in K.Arrow and M.Intriligator
(eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. II, Elsevier-North Holland
__________ [1982b] "The role of private information in markets and other organizations,"
Chapter 3 in W. Hildenbrand (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University
Press
Radner,R. and Stiglitz,J. [1984] "A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information," Chapter 3 in M.
Boyer and R. Kihistrom (eds.) Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science Pub-
ushers B.V.
Ramkissoon,R. [1981] "Commercial Bank Portfolio Behaviour in Trinidad and Tobago," mimeo,
Paper presented at Regional Monetary Studies Conference
Ramkrishnan,R. and Thakor,A. [1984] "Informational Reliability and a Theory of Financial Inter-
mediation," Review of Economic Studies, v.51, pp.415-432
Ramsaran,R. [1984] The Monetary and Financial System of the Bahamas, Growth, Structure and
Operation, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies,
Jamaica
-241-
Riley,J. [1979] "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, 47(2), pp.331-359
_______ [1985] "Competition with Hidden Knowledge," Journal of Political Economy, 93(5),
pp.958-976
______ [1987] "Credit Rationing: A Further Remark," American Economic Review, 77(1),
pp.224-227
Roberts,J. [1986] "A Signalling Model of Predatory Pricing," pp.75-93 in D.Morris, P.Sinclair,
M.Slater and J.Vickers (eds.) Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition, Oxford:
Clarendon Press
[1987] "Battles for Market Share: incomplete information, aggressive strategic pric-
ing, and competitive dynamics," Chapter 4 in T.Bewley (ed.) Advances in Economic
Theory - F4fth World Congress, Cambridge University Press
Roberts,K. [1982] "Long-Term Contracts," mimeo, University of Wartwick
Rosenthal,R. [1982] "A Dynamic Model of Duopoly with Customer Loyalties,"
Journal of Economic Theory," v.27, pp .69-76
Rothschild,M. and Stiglitz,J. [1970] "Increasing Risk:!. A Definition," Journal of Economic
Theory, v.2, pp.225-243
_______________________ [1976] "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: and
Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.90,
pp.629-649
Salop,J. and Salop,S. [1976] "Self-Selection in the Labour Market," Quarterly Journal of
Economics,FR v.90, pp.619-627
Salop,S. [1977] Comments on J.G. Greenhut, ML. Greenhut and W.H. Kelly, "A Spatial-
Theoretical Perspective for Bank Merger Regulations," in Federal Reserve Bank of Clii-
cago, Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Performance, pp.255-259
__________ and StiglitzJ. [1977] "Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of monopolistically competi-
tive price dispersion," Review of Economic Studies, v.47, pp.493-510
_____________________ [1982] "The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium
Price Dispersion with Identical Agents," American Economic Review, 72(5), pp.1121-1130
Samuelson,P. [1969] "Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic programming," Review
of Economics and Statistics, V.5 1, pp.239-246
Santomero,A. [1984] "Modelling the Banking Firm," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
16(4)
Scherer,F. [1980] Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chicago: Rand
McNally College Publishing Company
- 242 -
Schmalensee,R. [1982] "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands," American
Economic Review, 72(3), pp.349-365
Selten,R. [1975] "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive
Gaines," International Journal of Game Theory, v.4, pp.25-55
Shapiro,C. [1982] "Consumer Information, Product Quality and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal
of Economics, 13(1), pp.20-35
Shaw,E. [1973] Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Oxford University Press
Shubik,M. [1987] "A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Money and and Financial Insti-
tutions," European University Institute, Department of Economics, W.P. No. 87t280
Stiglitz,J. [1984] "Information and Economic Analysis: a perspective," Economic Journal,
Conference Papers, pp.21-41
_____ [1987] "Competitivity and the number of firms in market: Are Duopolies more
competitive than Atomistic Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 95(5), pp.1041-1061
Stiglitz,J. and Weiss,A. [1981] "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," Amer-
ican Economic Review ,71(3), pp.393-410
____________________ [1 983a] "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the
Credit and Labour Markets," American Economic Review, v.73, pp.912-927
___________________ [1983b] "Sorting out the Differences between Screening and Sig-
nalling Models," Columbia University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No.
224
__________________ [1986] "Credit Rationing and Collateral," in J.Edwards, J.Franks,
C.Mayer and S.Schaefer (eds.), Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, Cambridge
University Press
[1987] "Credit Rationing: Reply," American Economic Review,
77(1), pp.228-231
Thomas,J. and Worrall,T. [1988] "Self-Enforcing Wage Coniracts," Review of Economic Studies,
v.55, pp.541-554
Van Wijnbergen,S. [1983] "Interest Rate Management in LDCs," Journal of Monetary Econom-
ics, 12(3), pp.433-452
von Weizsacker,C. [19801 "A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics,
11(2), pp.399-420
[1984] "The Costs of Substitution," Econometrica, 52(5), pp.1085-1116
Wette,H. [1983] "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," Ameri-
can Economic Review, 73(3), pp.442-445
- 243 -
Williamson,S. [1986] "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation and Equilibrium Credit
Rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, v.18, pp.159-179
________ [1987] "Costly Monitoring, Optima! Contracts and Equilibrium Credit Ration-
ing," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v.102, pp.1 35-145
_________ [1988] "Liquidity, banking and bank failure," International Economic Review,
29(1),pp.25-44
Wilson,C. [1977] "A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information," Journal of
Economic Theory, v.16, pp.167-207
Wilson,R. [1989] "Entry and Exit," Chapter 8 in G.Feiwel (ed.) The Economics of Imperfect
Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, Macmillan
Wolinsky,A. [1983] "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," Review of Economic Studies, V.50,
pp647-658
WoodJ. [1974] "A Model of Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Behaviour," in
H.G.Johnson and A.R.Nobay (eds), Issues in Monetary Economics, Oxford University
Press
World Bank,The [1989] World Development Report 1989, Oxford University Press
Worrell,D. and Prescod,R. [1983] "The Development of the Financial Sector in Barbados, 1946-.
1982," Central Bank of Barbados Economic Review, 10(2), pp.9-26
Worrell,D. [1985] "Monetary Mechanisms in Open Economies: A Model for the Caribbean,"
Chapter 6 in M.Connolly and J.McDermott (eds.) The Economics of the Caribbean Basin,
N.Y.: Praeger
[1987] Small Island Economies, N.Y.: Praeger
Yanelle,M. [1986] Bertrand Competition among inteimediaries, D.P. A-3J, Rheiniscbe
Friedrich-Wilhelms, University of Bonn
